A view of ſome EXCEPTIONS Which have been made BY A *ROMANIST* TO The L^D Viſcount *FALKLAND'S* DISCOURSE *Of the* INFALLIBILITY *of the* CHURCH *of* ROME.

Submitted to the Cenſure of all ſober Chriſtians.

Together with

The *Diſcourſe* it ſelf of *Infallibility* prefixt to it.

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M. DC. L.

To the READER.

THE Length and quality of this inſuing trouble will ſeem to have been given the Reader ſomewhat impertinently, if a brief account be not firſt rendred of the occaſion thereof.

The ſad effects of the preſent *differences*, and diviſions of this broken *Kingdome*, having made *peace*, and *unity*, and *infallibility*, ſuch pretious deſireable things, that if there were but one wiſh offered to each man among us, it would certainly, with a full conſent, be laid out on this one treaſure, *the ſetting up ſome Catholick Umpire, or Daies-man, ſome viſible, infallible Definer of Controverſies*; the Pretenders to that *Infallibility*, having the luck to be alone in that pretenſion, have been lookt on with ſome reverence, and (by thoſe who knew nothing of their grounds, or arguments) acknowledged to ſpeake, if not *true*, yet *ſeaſonably*; and having ſo great an advantage upon their Auditors (their inclinations, and their wiſhes to finde themſelves overcome, going along with every argument that ſhould be brought them) and ſo a faire probable entrance, by that inlet of their *affections*, to their *minds*, they began to redouble their *induſtry*, and their *hopes*, and inſtead of the many particulars of the Romiſh doctrine, which they were wont to offer proofe for in the retaile, now to ſet all their ſtrength upon this one in groſſe, and by the compendiouſneſſe of that courſe to expect a more eaſe reception, then formerly they had met with; the very gaines, and conveniences, that attend this doctrine of theirs, if it were true, being to fleſh and blood (which all men have not the skill of putting off) mighty Topicks of probability that it is ſo.

To diſcover the danger of this ſweet potion, or rather, to ſhew how farre it is from being what it it pretends, and ſo to exchange the *ſpecious* for the *ſound*, the *made-diſh* for the *ſubſtantiall food* (allowing the *Univerſall Church* the *authority* of an *irrefragable teſtimony*, and the preſent age of the *Romiſh Church*, as much of our beliefe, as it hath of conformity with the *univerſall* of all ages) but not a priviledge of not being able to ſay falſe whatſoever it ſaith, and ſo to ſet us in the ſafer though longer way, thereby to whet our induſtry in the chaſe of truth, in ſtead of aſſuring our ſelves that we cannot erre (which is not a vertue, but an excellency, not a grace to be crown'd, but a great part of the crowne it ſelfe, reſerv'd for another world, a felicity, but not a duty) this Diſcourſe of the Lord Viſcount *Falkland*'s was long ſince deſigned; as alſo to remove the great ſcandals, and obſtacles, which have obſtructed all way of hope to that univerſall *Ἅιμα* of all true Chriſtians, that *καθολικὴ ἁρμονία*, *Catholick harmony* which *Iamblicus* talkes of in the *ſpheares* above, but would ſound better in this vault (this arch to beare up thoſe ſpheares) the Church below, the *Univerſall peace of Chriſtendome*; for to this nothing is more unreconcileably contrary than pretenſions to *Infallibility* in any part of it; all ſuch making it unlawfull either for themſelves to mend, or others to be

endured, ſhutting out all poſſibility either of *compliance*, or *charity*, or *reformation* in their owne, or *mercy* to other mens errours. What was thus by his Lordſhip deſigned in all juſtice, was by an intire lover of peace and truth publiſhed in all charity, to reſiſt and check a threatning tempeſt, which riſing from out preſent evils, was apt (if it did not begin) to ſhake ſome. The Printing of this Tract preſently provoked an Aſſertor of that *Infallibility* to take upon him the *anſwering* of it, and to complaine that an *Anſwer* which had been by the ſame hand given it formerly, was not permitted to attend it into publick. This then being a *ſecond Care*, was probably to have arrived to a higher degree of *perfection*, and indeed among the Favourers of that perſwaſion, was cried up for ſo ſatisfactory a piece, that it was delivered to a *Member* of the *Church* of *England*, as unanſwerable. From him it came to thoſe hands, which returned it to the Authour with this enſuing Rejoynder, withall intimating, that ſince in his, he ſeemed to with the ſame freedome of the *Preſſe*, which his *Lordſhip* had found; both the Anſwer and the Reply ſhould be recommended thither, if he pleaſed.

After he had detained the Reply ſome weeks, he was pleaſed to returne it with a proteſtation, That he neither intended, nor would permit his to become publicke, *pretending* (that I may give you his owne words) *his Treatiſe to have been no finiſh'd worke, but onely a firſt draught, or inchoation, ventured abroad, to explore the judgements of one of two intelligent Adverſaries, that ſo the Authour by his ſecond* (he might have ſaid third) *thoughts, might be better able to underſtand, what was to be altered in it, what added or what taken away, either as ſuperfluous, or offenſive, and till that act was done, and withall till an approbation and licenſe given by thoſe, to whom it belonged, neither the worke, nor any line of it, is to be acknowledged or vouched by the Authour.* And ſo both were returned with ſome few alterations and additions in his Anſwer, and marginall Notes on the Reply, and one ſheet at the end of them, containing a new Scheme of probation of the pretended *Infallibility*, and a *preloquium* to it, wherein the paſſage juſt now mentioned, is *in terminis* recited.

This the Replicant (to avoid all appearance of ſeverity) was content to accept for ſad earneſt, and therefore freely expreſt his willingneſſe to give the Authour leave to provide a new Anſwer to his Lordſhips Treatiſe, which he might be willing to owne in publicke, which when he ſhould doe, promiſe was made to prepare a ſpeedy Anſwer thereunto, and on thoſe termes to be content to lay aſide the former.

That this ſhould be done, was affirmed on one part, and on the other expected ſome months with patience, till at length the Anſwerers pleaſure was made knowne, that that reſolution was put off, and that in ſtead of ſo meane a combat either with his *Lordſhip*, or this *Replicant*, he was pleaſed now to deſigne a full diſcourſe on that Subject, without taking notice of either, any farther, than he ſhould thinke fit to take in his way any thing by them objected againſt his *poſition*, and that this ſhould be printed beyond the *Seas*.

When this will be performed I cannot tell. Onely this is now diſcerned (ſomewhat contrary to expectation) that what hath been diſclaimed by him, is extolled by others, and the weakneſſe of the *Replicant* ſufficiently deſpiſed; Wherein

Wherein though he hath not much temptation to thinke himself injured, being ready to acknowledge the emptyneſſe of theſe Papers (and more then ſo, to render a reaſon of it, *viz.* the fate which they were under, by a neceſſity of attending this *Apologiſt* χαὶ πόδα, which yeilded them occaſion of little variety, unleſſe they would extravagate.) Yet could he not reſiſt the Reaſons which charged it on him as a *duty*, thus confidently to importune the Reader with the view of the whole matter, as farre as it hath paſt between them; ſetting downe that *Anſwer* to, and this *Vindication* of his *Lordſhips* Arguments by Chapters, and then (not doe him the leaſt injuſtice) adding in the end of all, the *Anſwerers* marginall *Replyes*, and that concluding Sheet (that even now was mentioned) with a Rejoynder to that alſo.

By all this, endeavouring to lay grounds, for all men to judge, how little truth there is in that ſo *Epidemicall* perſwaſion, that there is no middle, betwixt aſſerting an *Infallible Judge*, and the falling headlong into all the *Schiſmes*, and *Hæreſies* of this preſent age.

My Conſcience aſſuring me, that the grounds on which the *eſtabliſh'd Church of England* is founded, are of ſo rare an excellent mixture, that as none but intelligent truely Chriſtian minds can ſufficiently value the compoſition, ſo there is no other in *Europe*, ſo likely to preſerve *Peace* and *Unity*, if what prudent Lawes had ſo long agoe deſigned, they now were able to uphold; For want of which and which onely it is, that at preſent the whole Fabricke lyes polluted in confuſion and in blood, and hopes not for any binding up of wounds, for reſtauration of any thing, that lookes like Chriſtian, till the faith of the reformed Engliſh have the happineſſe to be weighed prudently, and the *military* Sword being timely ſheathed, the Power and Lawes of Peace be returned into thoſe hands, which are ordained by GOD the Defenders of it.

H. H.

Of the INFALLIBILITY of the CHURCH of ROME.

A Discourse written by the Lord Viscount FALKLAND.

TO him that doubts whether the Church of *Rome* *have* any errors, they answer, that She *hath* none, for She never *can* have any. This being so much harder to believe than the first, had need be proved by some *certaine* arguments, if they expect that the belief of this one should draw on whatsoever else they please to propose: Yet this is offered to be proved by no better wayes than those by which *we* offer to prove she *hath erred*: Which are, arguments from *Scripture*, *Reason*, and Antient Writers; all which, *they* say themselves, are fallible; for nothing is not so, but the Church; which if it be the onely infallible determination, and that can never be believed upon *its owne* authority, we can never *infallibly know* that the Church is infallible: for these other waies of proof (they say) may deceive both them and us; and so neither side is *bound* to believe them. *Section* 1.

If they say, that an argument out of *Scripture* is sufficient ground of *Divine faith*, why are they so offended with the Protestants for believing *every part* of *their* Religion upon that ground, upon which they build *all theirs* at once? and if following the same Rule with equall desire of finding the truth by it, (having neither of those qualities, which *Isidorus Pelusiota* says, are the causes of all Heresies; ἀυθάδειαν καὶ πρόληψιν, *pride* and *prejudication*) why should God be more offended with the one than the other, though they chance to erre? *Section* 2.

They say the *Church* is therefore made *infallible* by God, that all men may have some *certain* Guide; yet though it *be* infallible, unlesse it both plainly *appeare* to be so, (for it *is* not certaine to whom *Section* 3.

whom it doth not *appeare* certaine) and unleſſe it be manifeſt *which* is the *Church*, God hath not attained his end; and it were to ſet a Ladder to Heaven, and ſeem to have a great care of my going up, whereas unleſſe there be care taken that I may know this Ladder is *here* to that purpoſe, it were as good for me it had never been ſet.

Section 4. If they ſay we *may know* it, for that *generall* and conſtant *Tradition* inſtructs us in it; I anſwer, that *ignorant* people *cannot know* this, and ſo it can be no Rule for *them*; and if *learned* people miſtake in this, there can be no condemnation for *them*. For ſuppoſe to know, whether the *Church* of *Rome* may erre, (as a way which will conclude *againſt* her, but not *for* her; for if She *hath* erred, certainly She *may*, but though She *hath not* erred hitherto, it followes not that She cannot erre) I ſeeke whether She *have* erred; and conceiving She *hath contradicted* her ſelfe, conclude neceſſarily, She hath *erred*, I ſuppoſe it not *damnable* though I erre in my judgement: becauſe I trie the *Church* by one of thoſe touch-ſtones her ſelf appoints me; which is, *Conformity with the Antient*. For to ſay I am to believe the *preſent Church* that it differs not from the former, though it ſeem to me to doe ſo, is to ſend me to a Witneſſe, and bid me not believe it.

Section 5. Now to *ſay* the *Church* is provided for a *Guide* of faith, but muſt be known by ſuch marks as the *ignorant* cannot *ſeek* it by, and the *learned* may chance not to *find* it by, though ſeeking it with all diligence, and without all prejudice, can no way ſatisfie me.

Section 6. If they ſay, God will *reveal* the truth to whoſoever ſeeks it in theſe wayes *ſincerely*; this ſaying *both ſides will* (without meanes of being confuted) *make uſe of*; therefore it would be as good that *neither did*.

Section 7. When they have proved the *Church* to be *infallible*; yet to my underſtanding they have proceeded nothing farther, unleſſe we can be ſure *which is it*; for it ſignifies onely that God will *alwaies have* a *Church* which ſhall not erre; but not that ſuch or ſuch a *Succeſſion* ſhall be alwaies in the right; not that the *Biſhop* of ſuch a place, and the Clergy that adheres to him, ſhall alwaies continue in the *true* faith. So that if they ſay the *Greek* Church is not *the Church*, becauſe by its owne confeſſion it is *not* infallible; I anſwer, that it may be *now* the *Church*, and may *hereafter* erre,

erre, and ſo not be *now* infallible; and yet *the Church never* erre, becauſe before *their* fall from truth, *others* may ariſe to maintain it, who *then* will be the *Church*; and ſo the *Church* may *ſtill* be infallible; though not in reſpect of any ſet perſons whom we may know at all times for our Guide.

Then if they prove the *Church* of *Rome* to be the true *Church*, and not the *Greeke*, *becauſe their* opinions are conſonant either to Scripture or Antiquity, they run into a circle, proving their *tenets* to be *true*; firſt, becauſe the *Church holds* them, and then theirs to be the *true Church*, becauſe it *holds the truth*: which laſt, though it appeare to me the onely way, yet it takes away it's being a Guide which we may follow *without examination*, without which, all they ſay beſides is nothing. *Section* 8.

Nay, ſuppoſe they had evinced, that *ſome ſucceſſion* were infallible, and ſo had proved to a *learned* man that the *Roman Church* muſt be *this*, becauſe none elſe *pretends* to it; yet this can be no ſufficient ground to the *ignorant*, who cannot have any *infallible* foundation for their beliefe, that the *Church of Greece pretends* not to the ſame; and even to the *Learned* it is but an *accidentall* argument, becauſe if any other company had likewiſe claimed to be *infallible*, it had overthrowne all ſo proved. *Section* 9.

Nay, it is but an *arbitrary* Argument, and depends upon the pleaſure of the adverſary; for, if any *ſociety* of Chriſtians would *pretend* to it, the *Church* of *Rome* could make uſe of it no longer. *Section* 10.

The chiefeſt reaſon why they diſallow of the *Scripture* for *Judge*, is, becauſe when differences ariſe about the *interpretation*, there is no way to end them; and that it will not ſtand with the goodneſſe of God, to damne men for not following his will, if he had aſſigned no infallible way how to find it. I confeſſe this to be wonderfull true, ὁ γὰρ ὕτω τάλας ἐγὼ ὡς ἕτερος λόγος παρὰ θεοῦ, and let them excuſe themſelves that think otherwiſe. Yet this will be no argument againſt him, who believes that to all who follow their *reaſon* in the *interpretation* of the Scriptures, and ſearch for *Tradition*, God will either give his *grace* for aſſiſtance to *find* the truth, or his *pardon* if they *miſſe* it: and then this ſuppoſed *neceſſity* of an infallible Guide, with this ſuppoſed *damnation* for want of it, fall together to the ground. *Section* 11.

If they command us to believe *infallibly* the contrary to this, *Section* 12.

they are to prove it falſe by ſome *infallible* way, (for the concluſion muſt be of the ſame nature, and not conclude more then the premiſſes ſet downe,) now ſuch a way, *Scripture* and *Reaſon*, or *infuſed faith* cannot be, (for they uſe to object the *fallibility* of them to thoſe that build their Religion upon them) nor the *Authority* of the *Church*, for that is part of the queſtion, and muſt be it ſelfe *firſt* proved, and that by none of the former waies, for the former reaſons.

Section 13. The *Popes infallibility* can be no infallible ground of faith, being it ſelfe no *neceſſary* part of the faith; (& we can be no ſurer of any thing proved, then we are of that which proves it) and if *he* be fallible, no *part* is the more *infallible* for his ſideing with them. So if the *Church* be divided, I have no way to know which is the *true Church*, but by ſearching which agrees with *Scripture* and *Antiquity*, and ſo judging accordingly. (But this is not to ſubmit my ſelfe to her opinions as my *guide*, which they tell us is neceſſary.) Which courſe if they approve not of as a fit one for a *Learned* man, they are in a worſe caſe for the *ignorant*, who can take no courſe at all, nor is the better at all, for this Guide, the Church; whileſt two parts diſpute *which is it*, and that by arguments he underſtands not.

Section 14. If I granted the *Pope*, or a *Counſell* by him called, to be *infallible*, yet I conceive their Decrees can be no ſufficient ground (by their owne axiomes) of *Divine faith*. For *firſt* (ſay the moſt) No *Councell* is valid not approved by the *Pope*, (for thus they overthrow that held at *Ariminum*) & a *Pope* choſen by *Symony* is *ipſo facto* no Pope. I can then have no certainer ground for the *infallibility* of thoſe *Decrees*, and conſequently for my beleife of them, then I have that the choice of him was neither directly nor indirectly *Symoniacall*; which to be certain of, is abſolutely impoſſible.

Section 15. *Secondly*, ſuppoſe him *Pope*, and to have *confirmed* the *Decrees*; yet that *theſe are* the Decrees of a Councell, or that he *hath confirmed* them, I can have but an uncontradicted atteſtation of many men, (for if another *Councell* ſhould declare *theſe* to have been the Acts of a *former* Councell, I ſhould need againe ſome certaine way of knowing how *this* declaration is a Councells) which is no ground (ſay *they*) of faith, I am ſure not ſo good and generall a one as that Tradition by which we prove

that

that the Scripture is Scripture, which yet they will not allow any to be certaine of but from them.

Thirdly, for the *ſence* of their Decrees, I can have no better expounder to follow then *Reaſon*; which if, though I miſtake, I ſhall not be *damned* for following, why ſhall I for miſtaking the ſence of Scripture? Or why am I a leſſe fit interpreter of *one*, then of the *other*, where both ſeeme equally cleare? And where they ſeem ſo (I meane equally cleare) and yet contradictory, ſhall I not as ſoon believe *Scripture*, which is, without doubt, of at leaſt *as great* authority? *Section* 16.

But I doubt whether *Councells* be fit deciders of Queſtions; for ſuch they cannot be, if they beget more, and men have cauſe to be in greater doubts *afterwards* (none of the *former* being diminiſhed) then they were at firſt. *Section* 17.

Now I conceive there ariſe ſo *many* out of this way, that the Learned cannot end *all*, nor the Ignorant know *all*. As (beſides the forenamed conſiderations) *Who* is to *call* them, the Pope, or Kings: *Who* are to have *voices* in them; Biſhops only, or Prieſts alſo: *Whether* the *Pope* or *Councell* be *Superiour*; and the *laſt* need the approbation of the *firſt*, debated among themſelves: *Whether* any Countries not being *called*, or not being there (as the *Abiſſines*, ſo great a part of *Chriſtianity*, and not reſolvedly condemned by them for *Heretiques*, were abſent at the Councell of *Trent*) make it not *generall*: *Whether* if it be one not every where received (as when the Biſhops ſent from ſome places have exceeded their Commiſſion, as in the Councell of *Florence*) it be yet of neceſſity to be ſubſcribed to: *Whether* there were any *ſurreption* uſed or *force*, and *Whether* thoſe diſanull the Acts: *Whether* the *moſt voyces* are to be held the Act of the *Councell*, or thoſe of *all* are required, (as *Canus* ſaith, *All the Councell cannot erre, the moſt may*; which never yet agreed) or *Whether two parts* will ſerve (as in the *Tridentine* Synode,) a conſiderable doubt, becauſe *Nicephorus Calliſtus* relateing the reſolution of a Councell at *Rome* againſt that of *Ariminum* makes them give three reaſons. One, *That the Biſhop of Rome was not preſent.* The ſecond, *That moſt did not agree to it.* Thirdly, *That others thither gathered were diſpleaſed at their reſolutions*: which proves, that in their opinions, if either *moſt* *Section* 18.

ἕτερος ἦν εἰκὸς συνδεδραμηκότων τοῖς δεδογμένοις ἀπηχθάνοντο. *Tom.* 2. *pa.* 272.

not present agree not to it, or, *all present* be not pleased with it, a *Councell* hath no power to bind. All these doubts, I say, perswade me that whatsoever brings with it so many *new* questions, can be no fit ender of the *old*.

Section 19. In those things in which, *before* a Generall Councell have *defined*, it is lawfull to hold either way, and damnable to doe so *after*; I desire to know how it agreeth with the Charity of the Church, to *define any thing*, and so bestow upon the Devil one path more for us to walke in to him?

Section 20. If the *infallibility* of a *Generall Councell* be a point of faith, I desire to know *why* it is so? Scripture and Tradition seem to me not to say so: But if they did, so, I suppose, you will grant they do of this doctrine, [*That the soules of the blessed shall see God before the day of judgment, and not be kept in secret Receptacles:*] For, else the doctrine of prayer to Saints cannot stand: and yet for denying this, doth *Bellarmine* excuse Pope *John* 22. (of which beliefe they know he was not alone) because the *Church* (he means, I doubt not, a Generall Councell) had not then condemned it. I desire to know, why should not *he* be condemned as well without one as many *Heretiques* that are held so by their Church, yet condemned by *no Generall Councell*? which if he makes to be the rule of *Heresie*, it had been happy to have lived before the Councell of *Nice*, when no opinion had been damnable, but some against the Apostles *Councell* at *Hierusalem*, because there had *yet* been no *Generall* Councell:

Section 21. At least, why shall not I be excused by the same reason, though I believe not a *Councell* to be *infallible*, since I never heard that any Councell hath decreed that they are *so*? Neither, if it have, can we be bound by that Decree, unlesse made certaine some other way that it selfe is so.

Section 22. If you say, we must believe it because of *Tradition*; I answer, *sometimes* you will have the *not believing any thing*, though not declared by a Councell, to have power enough to damne; (that is, when it makes *against us*) at *other times* the *Church* hath not decreed, unlesse a Councell have, and their errour is pardonable, and they good Catholiques.

Section 23. *Next*, (as I have asked before) how shal an *ignorant* man know it? for he, in likelyhood, can speak but with a few, from whom he cannot

cannot know that *all* of the Church of *Rome's* part doe *now*, and in *paſt* Ages have believed it to be *Tradition* ſo *certainly* as to make it a *ground of Faith*, (unleſſe he have ſome revelation that thoſe deceive him not.) Neither indeed can thoſe that ſhould enforme him of the opinions of former times be *certainly* enformed themſelves; for truly if (as they would perſwade us) the relation of *Papias* could coſen ſo farre *all* the Prime Doctors of the Chriſtian Church into the belief of the doctrine of the *Millenaries*, ſo as that *no one* of thoſe two firſt Ages oppoſed it, (which appears plain enough becauſe thoſe that after roſe up againſt this opinion, never quoted any for themſelves before *Dionyſ: Alexandrinus*, who lived at leaſt 250 yeares after Chriſt.) Nay, if thoſe firſt men did not onely believe it as *probable*, but *Juſtin Martyr* ſaies *he* holds it, and ſo do *all* that are *in all parts Orthodox* Chriſtians, ἐγὼ καὶ τινὲς ἐσμὲν ὀρθοφρόνουτες καθ' πάντα χριστιανοί. *Irenæus* ſets it down directly for a *Tradition*, and relates the very words that Chriſt uſed when he taught this; (which is plainer than any other *Tradition* is proved, or ſaid to be (out of Antiquity) by them.) If (I ſay) *theſe* could be ſo deceived, why might not *other* of the Antients as well be by others deceived in other points? And then, what *certainty* ſhall the *Learned* have, when after much labour they thinke they can make it appeare that the Antients thought any thing *Tradition*, that indeed it was ſo? And that either the folly, or the knavery of ſome *Papias* deceived them not? I confeſſe it makes me think of ſome that *Tully* ſpeaks of, who (*arcem amiſerunt, dum propugnacula defendunt*) loſe the *fort*, whilſt they defend the *out-works*; for, whilſt they anſwer this way the arguments of *Tradition* for the opinion of the *Chiliaſts*, they make unuſefull to them the force of *tradition* to prove any thing elſe by. For which cauſe it was rather wiſely than honeſtly done of them, who before *Fevardentius* ſet him forth, left out that part of *Irenæus* which we alledge (though we need it not much, for many of the Fathers take notice of this belief of his:) Yet he juſtifies himſelf for doing it by a worſe blow to them than this it ſelf, which is, *ſaying*, that *if they leave out all Errours in the Books they publiſh*, (that is, I ſuppoſe, all opinions contrary to the Church of *Rome*) *bona pars Scriptorum Patrum Orthodoxorum evaneſceret*, a good part of the writings of the Orthodox Fathers muſt vaniſh away.

Dial. cum Tryph. pag. 307. lib. 5. cap. 33.

Section 24. But the *Tradition* that can be found out of Ancients (ſince their witneſſing may deceive us) hath much leſſe ſtrength when they argue onely thus: Sure ſo *many* would not ſay this is *true*, and joyne in opinions, if there were no tradition for them. I would have you remember they can deliver their opinion poſſibly, but either *before* the controverſie ariſe in the Church (upon ſome chance) or *after*. If *before*, it is confeſt that they write not *cautiouſly* enough; and ſo they anſwer all they ſeem to ſay for *Arius* and *Pelagius* his faith, before *themſelves*, and ſo conſequently their *controverſie* (though it may be not their opinion) aroſe. If *after*, then they anſwer often (if any thing be by them at that time ſpoken againſt them) that the *heat of diſputation* brought it from them, and their reſolutions to oppoſe *Heretiques* enough; I deſire it may be lawfull for *us* to anſwer ſo too, either one of theſe former wayes; or that it is (as often they ſay too) ſome *Hyperbole*, when you preſſe us in any thing with the opinions of Fathers. At leaſt, I am ſure if they may deceive us with *ſaying* a thing *is* a *Tradition*, that *is not*, we may be ſooner deceived if we wil *ſay* and conclude it for a *Tradition*, when they ſpeake it onely as a *Truth*, and (for ought appeares) their *particular Opinion*.

Section 25. For beſides, if when *Salvian*, comparing the *Arians* with evill Livers, (and that after they were condemned by a Councell) extenuates, (by reaſon of their beleiving themſelves in the right) with much inſtance the fault of the *Arians*, and ſayes, *How they ſhall be puniſht for it in the day of Judgement, none can know but the Judge*. If (I ſay) they confeſſe it to be his opinion, they muſt alſo confeſſe the doctrine of their Church to be different from that of *Salvian's* times; becauſe he was allowed a Member of *that* for all this *ſaying*; whereas he of the Church of *Rome* that ſhould ſay ſo of *us* would be accounted *Seſqui hæreticus*, a Heretique and a half: Or elſe they muſt *ſay* (which they can only ſay and not prove) that he was ſo earneſt againſt ill men, that for the aggravation of their crime he leſſened that of the Heretiques, and ſaid, what at another time he would not have ſaid; which if they doe, will it not overthrow wholly the authority of the Fathers? Since we can never *infallibly* know what they thought at *all times*, frō what they were moved to *ſay* by ſome *collateral conſideration*.

Section 26. Next to this certaine and undoubted *damning* of all out of the Church

Church of *Rome*, which averſeth me from it; comes their putting *all to death*, or at leaſt paines, that are ſo, where they have power: which is an effect, though not a neceſſary one, of the firſt opinion; and that averſeth me yet more; for I doe not believe *all* to be *damned* whom they damne, but I conceive *all* to be *killed* whom they kill. I am ſure if you look upon *Conſtantine's* Epiſtle, written to perſwade concord upon the firſt diſagreement between *Alexander* & *Arrius*, you will find that *he* thought (and if the Biſhops of his time had at firſt thought *otherwiſe*, he would have been ſure better informed) that *neither* ſide deſerved either death or damnation, (and yet ſure this queſtion was as great as ever roſe ſince:) For having ſpoken of the opinions as things ſo indifferent, that the *Reader* might almoſt think they had been fallen out at Spurn-point or Kettle-pins, he adds, Τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἅπασι περὶ τῆς θείας προνοίας συμφωνεῖν πάντας καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τηρεῖν πίστιν, *For that which is neceſſary is one thing, that all agree and keep the ſame faith about divine providence.* I am ſure in the ſame Author, *Moſes*, a man praiſed by him, refuſing to be made Biſhop by *Lucius* becauſe he was an *Arrian*, and he anſwering, That *he did ill to refuſe it before he knew what his faith was*; Anſwered, ἡ γὰρ πίστις δείκνυσι τὴν τῶν ἐπισκόπων ἀρετήν, *The baniſhing of Biſhops ſhews* ENOUGH *your faith.* So that it is plaine he thought *puniſhing* for opinions to be a marke which might ſerve him to know *falſe* opinions by. *Nicepb. Tom. 1. pag. 555.* *Tom. 2. p. 206.*

I believe throughout Antiquity you will find no putting any to *death*, unleſſe it be ſuch as begin to kill firſt, (as the *Circumcellians* or ſuch like); I am ſure *Chriſtian Religions* chief glory being that it increaſed by being *perſecuted*, and having that advantage of the *Mahumetan* (which came in by force) me thinks, eſpecially ſince *Syneſius* hath told us, and reaſon told men ſo before *Syneſius*, that τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕκαστον φθείρεται, *Every thing is deſtroyed by the contrary to what ſetled and compoſed it.* It ſhould be to take ill care of *Chriſtianity*, to ſeek to hold it up by *Turkiſh* meanes: at leaſt, it muſt breed doubts, that if the Religion had alwaies remained the *ſame*, it would not be defended by waies ſo *contrary* to thoſe by which it was propagated. *Section 27.* *De Regno.*

I deſire recrimination may not be uſed: for though it be true that *Calvin* hath done it, and the Church of *England* a *little*, (which is a little too much) for, *Negare manifeſtum non audeo, & excuſare* *Section 28.*

excuſare immodica non poſſum, yet She, confeſſing She *may* erre, is not ſo chargeable with any fault as thoſe which pretend they *cannot*, (and ſo will be ſure never to mend it:) and beſides, I will be bound to defend no more than I have undertaken, which is, to give reaſons *Why the Church of* Rome *is* fallible.

Section 29. I confeſſe this opinion of *damning* ſo many, and this cuſtome of *burning* ſo many, this breeding up thoſe who know nothing elſe in any point of Religion, yet to be in readineſs to crie, *To the fire with him*, and, *To Hell with him*, (as *Polybius* ſaith in a certaine furious Faction of an Army of ſeverall Nations, and conſequently languages, μόνον τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κοινῇ συνίεσαν, τὸ βάλλε, *All of them underſtood onely this word, Throw at him*) this I ſay in my opinion was it chiefly which made ſo *many* ſo *ſuddenly* leave the Church of *Rome*, that indeed, to borrow the Authours phraſe, οὐ παρακλήσεως δεῖς ἦν ὁπόσιον, ἀλλὰ ἀφορμὴν ἐδέοντο —— *They needed not perſwaſion to doe it, but onely newes that others had begun:* For, as this alone, if *believed*, makes *all* the reſt be ſo too; ſo one thing alone *miſ-liked*, overthrowes alſo *all* the reſt.

Section 30. If it were granted that, becauſe it agrees not with the *Goodneſſe* of God to let men want an *infallible Guide*, therefore there *muſt* be one; and that the *Church* of *Rome* were that *one*; yet if that teach *any thing*, to my underſtanding, *contrary* to Gods *Goodneſſe*, I am not to receive her doctrine, for the ſame cauſe for which they would have me receive it, (it being *as good* an argument: This *Guide* teaches things contrary to Gods *goodneſſe*, *therefore* is not appointed by God; as to ſay, It is agreeable to his *goodneſſe* there ſhould be a *Guide*, *therefore* there is one.) And ſure it is lawfull to examine *particular* doctrines, whether they agree with that principle which is their *foundation*; and to *that* (me thinks) to damne him that neither with *negligence* nor *prejudication* ſearcheth what is Gods will, though he miſſe of it, *is* as contrary as the firſt can be ſuppoſed.

Section 31. I would know *whether* he that *never heard* of the Church of *Rome* ſhall yet be damned for not believing her *infallible*. I have ſo good an opinion of them, as to aſſure my ſelf they will anſwer, *he ſhall not*. I will then aske, *whether* he that hath ſearched what *Religions* they are, and finds *hers* to be one, and *her infallibility* to be part of it, if his reaſon will not aſſent to that, ſhall he

be

be damned for being *inquisitive* after *truth?* (for he hath committed no other fault greater then the other) and *Whether* such an *ignorance* (I mean after impartiall search) be not of all other the most *invincible?*

Nay, grant the *Church* to be *infallible*, yet, me thinks, he that *denies it*, and imployes his reason to *seeke* if it be true, should be in as good case as he that *believes* it, and *searcheth not* at all the truth of the proposition he receives: for I cannot see why he should be *saved*, because, by reason of his *parents* beliefe, or the Religion of the *Country*, or some such *accident*, the *truth* was offered to his understanding, when had the *contrary* been offered he would have received that; and the other damned that beleeves *falshood*, upon as good ground as the other doth *truth*; unlesse the Church be like a Conjurers circle, that will keep a man from the Devill though he came into it by chance. *Section* 32.

They grant that no man is an *Heretique* that believes not his Heresie *obstinately*; and if he be no Heretique, he may sure be saved. It is not then *certain damnation* for any man to deny the infallibility of the *Roman* Church: but for him onely that denies it *obstinately*, and then I am safe; for I am sure I doe not. *Section* 33.

Neither can they say, I shall be damned for *Schisme*, though not for Heresie, for he is as well no *Schismatique*, though in *Schisme*, that is *willing* to joyne in communion with the *true* Church, when it appeares to be so to him; as he is no *Heretique* though he hold Hereticall opinions, that holds them not *obstinately, that is* (as I suppose) with a desire to be informed if he be in the wrong. *Section* 34.

Why, if it be not *necessary* alwayes to believe the *truth*, so one believe in generall *what the Church would have believed*, (for so they excuse great men that have held contrary opinions to theirs now, before they were defined, or they knew them to be so) why (I say) shall not the same *implicit assent* to whatsoever God would have assented to (though I mistake what it is) be sufficient? When indeed to beleeve *implicitly* what *God* would have believed, is to believe implicitly likewise what the *Church* teacheth, if this doctrine be within the number of *those* which God commands to be believed. *Section* 35.

I have therefore the lesse doubt of this opinion, that I shall *Section* 36.

have no harme for not beleeving the *infallibilitie* of the Church of *Rome*, because of my being so farre from *leaning* to the contrary, and so suffering my *will* to have power over my *understanding*, that if God would leave it to me which Tenet *should* be true, I would rather choose that that *should*, then the contrary. For they may well beleeve me, that I take no pleasure in tumbling hard and unpleasant bookes, and making my selfe giddy with disputing of obscure questions & dazled ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τινος ὑψηλῆς ἀκροφείας εἰς ἀχανὲς καταπίπτοντες πέλαγος, If I could believe, there *Section* 37. *Cæsarius.* should *always* be (whom I might alwaies *know*) a society of men, whose opinions must be *certainly* true, and who would *Synesius.* ἐκ τῆς ἁπάντων ἀχολίας χολῆς, labour to discusse & define all arising doubts so as I might be excusably at ease, and have no part left for me but that of obedience, which must needs be a less difficult, and so a more agreeable way then to endure endlesse volumes of commentaries, the harsh *Greeke* of *Evagrius*, and the as hard *Latine* of *Ireneus*, and be pained by distinguishing betweene different senses and various lections, and he would deserve not the lowest place in *Bedlam* that would preferre these studies before so many, so much more pleasant, that would rather *employ* his understanding, then *submit it*; and if he could thinke God imposed upon him only the *resisting temptations*, would, by way of addition, require from himselfe the *resolving of doubts*. I say not that *all these bookes* are to be read by *those* who understand not the languages, for *them*, I conceive, their seeking into *Scripture* may suffice. But if I have, by Gods grace, skill to look into them, I cannot better use it then in the search of his will, where *they say* it is to be found, that I might assent to them if there I finde reason for it; or if I doe not, they may have no excuse for not excusing *me*.

Section 38. For whereas they say, it is *pride* makes *us doubt* of their infallibility; I answer, that their too much *lazinesse* and impatience of examining is the cause many of *them* doe *not doubt*.

Section 39. *Next*, what *pride* is it, never to assent before I find *reason* for it, (since *they*, when they follow that *Church* as *infallible*, *pretend reason* for it, and will not say they would, if they thought they found none) and if they say, we doe *find* reason but will not *confesse* it, then pride hinders not our *assent*, but our *declaration* of it;

it; which if it do in any one, he is without question, *sufficiently condemned by himselfe*, and it must be a very pregnant advocate that would strive to acquit him.

One much prevailing argument which they make, is this, that whosoever leave them, fall into *dissention* betweene themselves, whereas *they* in the meane while are alwayes at *unity*. I answer, *first*, in *this* whereof the question is now, they *all* consent. *Secondly*, when there is *fire* for them that *disagree*, they need not bragge of their uniformity who *consent*. *Thirdly*, *they* have many *differences* among them (as *whether* the Pope be infallible; *whether* God predeterminate every action; *Whether* Election and Reprobation depend upon foresight;) Which seeme to me as great as any betweene their adversaries; and in the *latter* the *Jesuits* have Ancienter and more generall *Traditions* on their side; then the Church of *Rome* hath in any other question; and as much ground from reason for the defence of Gods *goodnesse*, as they can thinke they have for the necessity of an *infallible guide*; yet these arguments *must not* make the *Dominicans Heretiques*, and must *not*. *Section* 40.

If they say, The *Church* hath not *resolved* it (which signifies only, *that they are not agreed about it*, which is that we object) I answer, It *ought* to have done, if conformity to the *ancient Church* be required; in which *all* that ever I could heare of before Saint *Austin* (who is very various I confesse in it) delivered the contrary to the *Dominicans*, as not doubtfull; and to say, it is *lawfull* for them to disagree whensoever *they doe* not agree, is ridiculous: for they cannot doe both at once about the same point. *Section* 41.

And if they say, they meane, by the Churches *not having concluded* it, that a *Councell* hath not, I answer, that they condemne some without any, and why not these? *Never*, I say that the opinion of the *Diffused* Church is of more force then the conclusion of a *Representative* (which hath its authority from the other) and therefore if all extant for foure hundred yeare teach any thing, it is more Heresie to deny that, then any Canon of a Councell. *Section* 42.

But may not howsoever *any* other company of People (that would maintain themselves to be *infallible*) *say* as much, that all other Sects differ from one another, and therefore *should* all agree with *them*? Would those not (think they) ascribe all other mens dissentions, and learned mens falling into divers Here- *Section* 43.

ſies to their not allowing *their infallibility*? to their not aſſenting to *their* Decrees? and not ſuffering them, διδασκάλους ἀλλ' ζητουμένους καθίζοδς, τὸς δ' ἄλλους ἐν μαθητῶν μοίρᾳ. ἀναγκαίους ἔχειν, to ſit as *teachers* of thoſe things that come in queſtion, and to have all others in that place of Diſciples obedient to them? which is that which *Nilus*, a *Greek* Biſhop, profeſſeth, that becauſe the *Greeks* would not allow the *Romans*, was the only cauſe of ſeperation between them.

Section 44. They uſe much to object, How could errours come into the Church without *Oppoſition* and *mention* both of that oppoſition in Hiſtory? I anſwer, they *might* come in not at *once*, but by *degrees*; as in the growth of a child, and the motion of a clock, we ſee neither in the preſent, but know there was a preſent when we find it paſt. *Next*, ſo many Authors being *loſt*, who can make it *certaine* to me that from none of thoſe, we ſhould have had notice of this *oppoſition*, if they had come to us? *Next*, I ſay there are two ſorts of errours, to hold a thing neceſſary that is *unlawfull* and *falſe*, or that is but *profitable* and *probable*: Of the *ſecond* ſort that errours ſhould come in, it appears not hard to me, and eſpecially in thoſe ages where want of *Printing* made books, and conſequently learning not ſo common as now it is; where the few that did ſtudy buſied themſelves in School-ſpeculations only, when the Authority of a man of chief note had a more generall influence then now it hath, and ſo (as *Thucydides* ſaith, the Plague did in his time, ῥᾳδίᾳ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἐγενθὲν κακὸν, the diſeaſe that firſt ſetled in the head *eaſily* paſſed through all the body) conſidering how apt all men are to deſire that all men ſhould think as they doe, and conſequently to lay a neceſſity upon thee reciving that opinion, if they conceived that a way to have it received: And then if it were beleeved *generally profitable*, (as for example, *Confeſſion*) who would be apt to oppoſe their calling it *neceſſary*, for the ſame cauſe for which they called it ſo? *Beſides*, if this errour were delivered by ſome Father in the *hot oppoſition* of ſome *Heretique*, it may be none of his ſide would oppoſe it, leſt they might take advantage by their diſſention, and he that diſputed for the Orthodox ſide, might loſe by it much of his authority.

Section 45. The word [*neceſſary*] it ſelfe is often uſed for *very convenient*;

ent; and then from *neceſſary* in that ſenſe to *abſolutely neceſſary*, is no *difficult* change, though it be a *great* one. The Fathers uſe *Heretiques* ſometimes in a large ſenſe, and ſometimes in a ſtricter, and ſo differ in the reckoning them up; Some leaving out thoſe that others put in (though they had ſeene the precedent Catalogue:) The doubtfulneſſe of the ſenſe of thoſe words might bring in errour. Names, as an *Altar*, *Sacrifice*, *Maſſe*, may have been uſed firſt in one ſenſe, and the *name* retained, though the *thing* ſignified received change; which may have been the art of the Church of *Rome*, as it was once of an Emperour of *Rome*, *Cui proprium fuit nuper reperta* (I leave out *Scelera*) *priſcis verbis obtegere*, *whoſe property it was to cover things newly found out with ancient tearmes*. And the ſame Author tells us, that the ſame State was as it were cheated out of her liberty, becauſe there did remaine, *Eadem Magiſtratuum vocabula*, *The ſame titles of Magiſtrates*; and I believe that if the Proteſtants beyond the Seas would have thought *Biſhops* as good a word as *Superintendents*, (and ſo in other ſuch things) many, who underſtand nothing but *names*, would have miſſed the Scandall they have now taken.

Theſe waies (I thinke) things may have come, without much *oppoſition*, from being thought *profitable* to be done, and probable to be believed, to be thought *neceſſary* to be both: and how many things *little by little* may have been received under *old* names, which would not have been ſo at *once* under *new* ones? (the firſt of theſe being no ſuch ſmall fault but that part of the *Montaniſts* hereſie was thinking *uncommanded* faſting-daies *neceſſary* to be obſerved, which without doubt might *lawfully* have been kept.) *Section* 46.

But my maine anſwer is, that if for an opinion to be in the Church without known precedent *oppoſition*, be a *certain* note of being received from the beginning, let them anſwer, how came in the opinion of the *Chiliaſts* not contradicted till two hundred years after it came in. *Section* 47.

To conclude, if they can prove that the Scripture may be a certainer teacher of truths to *them* then to *us*, ſo that *they* may conclude the *infallibility* of the Church out of it, and *we* nothing; If they can prove the Churches *infallibility* to be a ſufficient *Section* 48.

Guide for him that *doubts*. Which is the Church, and cannot *examine* that (for want of learning) by her chiefe marke, which is *conformity* with the Ancient; If they can prove that the *consent of Fathers* long together (if they had it) is a ſtronger argument againſt *us*, then againſt the *Dominicans*; If they can prove that though the firſt of them affirme that ſuch a thing is *Tradition*, and believed by all Chriſtians (and this aſſertion till a great while after uncontradicted) yet *they are not* bound to receive it, and, upon leſſe grounds, *we are*; if indeed *any* can prove by *any infallible way* the infallibility of the Church of *Rome*, and the neceſſity under paine of damnation for all men to believe it, (which were the more ſtrange, becauſe *Juſtin Martyr*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* among the Ancients, and *Eraſmus* and *Ludovicus Vives* among the Modernes, beleive ſome Pagans to be ſaved) I will ſubſcribe to it, And

Sophoc.

Ὅστις σὺνους τῇδε τῇ πόλει, θανὼν
Καὶ ζῶν ὁμοίως ἐξ ἐμοῦ τιμήσεται.

Section 49.

If any man ſhall vouchſafe to think either *this*, or the Author of it, of value enough to confute the *one*, and enforme the *other*, I ſhall deſire him to doe it with proceeding to the buſineſſe, and not ſtanding upon any ſmall ſlip of mine, (of which ſort this may be full) and with that Civility which is fit to be uſed by men that are not ſo paſſionate as to have the definition of reaſonable Creatures in vaine; (remembring that *truth*, in likelyhood, is where her Author *God* was, in the *ſtill voice*, and not in the *loud winde*; And that *Epiphanius* excuſeth himſelfe if he have called any Heretiques in his anger, *Deceivers*, or *Wretches*, εἰ παροξυνόμενός τι λόγοι ἀπατεῶνας καλῶν ἢ ἀθλίους) and I requeſt him alſo to bring me to the *Truth*, (if I be out of it) not only by his *Arguments*, but alſo by his *Prayers*: which wayes, if *he* uſe, and *I* ſtill continue on the part I am of, and yet doe neither ἑκὼν τυφλόττειν, nor ἑκὼν ἀναισχυντεῖν, neither am wilfully blind, nor deny impudently what I ſee, then I am confident that neither *he* will have reaſon to be offended with me in this world, nor *God* in the *Next*.

FALKLAND.

A view of the Exceptions, which have been made by a *Romaniſt* to the *Lord* Viſcount *Falkland's* Diſcourſe, *Of the Infallibility of the Church of* ROME.

SEPTEMB. 11. 1645.

THis day there came to my hands, *A Treatiſe Apologetical, touching the Infallibility of the Church Catholique, in anſwer to another of the like argument lately publiſhed.* And although I have no temptation to ſpend any more time upon it then a ſingle reading hath coſt me, nor to think it ſo dangerous a piece, that I ſhould not venture it abroad with the weakeſt ſonnes of my mother, without an appendant antidote, or defenſative againſt the poiſon of it, eſpecially being not obliged (in any other notion, then that of the reſpect I beare to the honour and memory of that *noble Lord*) to *vindicate* his diſcourſe from the exceptions here offer'd; yet being not ſure, that I can excuſe the ſo exceſſive thrift of a few houres (which yet I could very gladly otherwiſe employ, then in drawing one end of a ſaw in a controverſie of this nature) I ſhall give the *Author* of the exceptions or Apology, (in as few words as is poſſible) the reaſons why I am not moved by them, much leſſe perſwaded that they are ſo extraordinarily lucky, as to give, as is pretended, full anſwer, to all that Maſter *Chillingworth's large Book hath ſuperſtructed on this foundation.* And this I ſhall doe in ſuch a manner, that it may appeare, that I deſire onely to ſatisfie his reaſon, and not make him payment *of his ſcoffes or triumphs*, in that ſpirit of meeknesſe, which is proper for the reſtoring of one *overtaken* in an errour, (hoping in *charity*

rity that he is such) of an *infirme*, not a *malicious* mistaker. And the first thing we have to view, is that which is entituled,

A note upon the title of the Adversarie's. C. 1.

We against whom this enquirer writes, or rather to whom he propounds his difficulties, with a pretending desire of procuring a satisfaction, are defenders of the Catholique Churches Infallibility; which Churches chief Pastour, or Metropolitan, though he be particular Bishop of Rome, *as of some one place or other he must be, yet nevertheless from that one portion of it is not the whole and universall Church aptly to be stiled the Church of* Rome, *as in the Enquirers title it is called, no more then the Church of* England *can be rightly termed the Church of* Canterbury, *or the Protestants of* England *the Canterburians, as the* Scotch *Puritans have called them, onely because the chief Bishop and Primate of the whole Kingdome hath his seat at* Canterbury. *By the self same reason then cannot we justly be called Romanists, as it hath pleased some Protestants to entitle us. The reason of this assertion, is, That* Rome *and* Canterbury *are but small, and onely materiall portions of either Church, and therefore no way sufficient to give a denomination to the whole. As then the Church of* England *is wrongfully called the Church of* Canterbury, *so, in like manner is the Church Catholique wrongfully stiled the Church of* Rome, *or as such, controverted to be fallible, or infallible, forasmuch as this perfection of being infallible is not claimed by her as she is Church of* Rome, *but as she is the Catholique, and, according to the appointment of Christ, governed by S.* Peter, *and his successours. For this cause we have altered the title, and stated the question in tearmes more proper and formall, enquiring not Whether the Roman Church, but Whether the Catholique be infallible, and this ought to be the title.*

But before we enter upon the examination of particular difficulties, the Reader may please to know, that this same Enquiry was written by the Author diverse yeares agoe, in his Catholique Mothers life time, and was by her mediation forthwith answered at large, and the answer sent unto the Enquirer fairly bound up; in whose hands, though it rested long, yet had it never any reply made unto it, though it was sometime threatned it should. At that very

time

time Chillingworths Booke began to be in moulding, and it may be that same new labour diverted the Enquirer, and altered his designe. Now at length in a time most unseasonable, by the frivolous officiousnesse of I know not whom, these old papers are forced to see the light, and to leave their answer behind them. After so meane and creeping a fashion doe they appeare now unto the world. But although no notice hath been taken of any answer made already, or of giving licence for any other to be made hereafter, or, if made to be published in print, and have the advantage to be dispersed abroad in many copies; yet are we not by this discouraged from composing one, for, though for want of the Printers helpe, it shall lye concealed, and in much restraint, yea and be in danger to perish, as the other did before it, yet may this small labour fall, at least, into some few hands, and remove out of their way such dangerous stumbling blockes as have beene cast into it by this Enquirer, who, by his casting of doubts, about the method of resolving faith, hath thereby, amongst all those who are not much versed therein, endangered the stability and safety of the whole fabrique, not of Catholique Religion onely, but of Christian in Generall.

As for the Papers themselves, and their particular contents, they, in a word, are Chillingworths Booke in little, and an Embryo of his large volume growne up after, made bigge and bolstered out with many new materials borrowed from Baron the Scotch Minister, and that impious author Volkelius, the veines of whose poisonous doctrines and discourses, are observed to runne branching throughout all Chillingworths worke. Wherefore this small collection containing the substance of the other larger booke, the confutation of this Enquirers allegations, cannot but in substance conteine a confutation of all Chillingworths delated errors and sophistications, wherewith so many soules have beene perverted, or brought into great troubles and perplexities.

C. 1. Answer to C. 1.

To the exceptions made against the *title* of the *Lord Viscount Falklands* discourse, I answer, by saying these few things,

First, that it is no news to heare of the *Catholique Roman Church*; it hath frequently beene used and avowed by your Section 1.

owne writers, and as I conceive, is by your selfe acknowledged, when you say, *the perfection of being infallible is not claimed by her (i. e.* the *Church Catholique) as she* is the *Church* of *Rome*, but *as she is the Catholique*; which words by the rules of discourse must suppose you to thinke the *Catholique Church* to be capable of a double appellation, *Roman* and *Catholique*, though the *perfection* there spoken of, belong to it onely under the second notion. And beside you say in another place, that the *Roman Church is the Catholique*; whence it will follow, that the *Catholique* is the *Roman*; And if this be not propriety of speech, his Lordship is not to be blamed for it, but you, whose dialect he is faine to use.

B.

Section 2. This then being presumed to be granted by your writers, and, as I conceive also by you, that the *Roman Church* is the *Catholique Church*, or that the *Roman* and *Catholique* are two names for the same Church, it will certainly follow, that he that affirmes the *Catholique Church* to be *infallible*, must affirme the *Roman Church* to be so too, though not *quatenus Roman*. For any particular man being affirmed to be a *Christian*, whatsoever will be true to be said of this *Christian*, will be true to be said of this man (by the rule of *quicquid prædicatur de prædicato, prædicatur de subjecto*) if this *Christian* have a promise made, a priviledge inflated on him, this man hath so also, and if any that yeilded the former, shall deny the latter, it will never be sufficient ground or authority for such denying, to affirme, that it was made to him as a *Christian*, and not as a man; for the whole man being a *Christian*, and not onely some part of him, even that which belongs to him onely for *Christianities* sake, doth as truly belong to him, as that which his *humanity* gives him title to.

C.

Section 3. Or 2 ly. If you have sprang a *subtlety*, and by helpe of that meane to disclaime the expression of other your friends, and therefore will not allow the *Roman* Church, to be in propriety of speech, the *Catholique* Church, and yet will agree with them in all but in the expression; truly you have revealed no great *mystery* to the world. And as long as you define (as you do) the *Catholique Church*, (as it is the subject of the pretended *Infallibility*) to be that which is governed by Saint *Peter* and his

Successours,

Succeſſours, we that meane no more by the *Roman Church* then that which is ſo governed, ſhall aſſoone beleive the *Roman Church* to be infallible, as the *Catholique* under your notion of it.

The ſhort of it is, we ſhall never agree upon any thing till the equivocall tearmes be explicated, and one ſingle ſence of this, as of all other phraſes, agreed on betwixt both parties. Tell us then plainly that by the *Catholique Church* you meane the *Univerſall* all the world over, without any kind of reſtriction, and not that onely which is governed by the *Pope of Rome*, which is a great reſtriction of the word *Catholique*, (and muſt be not onely affirmed but proved by you to be none) And then I ſhall thus farre conſent with you; *Section 4.*

Firſt, that the *Univerſall Church* is in *fundamentals infallible* (not from any thing inherent in it ſelfe, but by a *prerogative* acquired, i. e. by the promiſe of Chriſt, *that his ſpirit ſhall leade them into all truth, and that he will be with them to the end of the world*, and the like;) but then this *Infallibility* muſt ſignifie no more, or be no farther extended, then that Chriſt doth and will ſo defend his Church, that there ſhall be for ever, till the *end of the world*, a *Church Chriſtian* on the Earth, *i. e.* that the whole Church ſhall not at once make an *univerſall* defection, erre from the foundation, or doe any thing by which there ſhall ceaſe to be a Church on earth. *Section 5.*

But then 2^dly. I ſay that this very *Univerſall Church*, though it be in the ſenſe *infallible* in *fundamentals*, is not yet a *rule*, or *Canon*, or *guide*, or *Judge infallible*, even in *fundamentals*; *viſible* it is, *infallible* it is, but 'tis not a *viſible judge*, or *rule infallible*. And the reaſon of this aſſertion is this, that its *Infallibility*, explained as we have explain'd it, is all that can be certainly inferred from *Chriſt's* words, (and that belongs not at all to *judicature*) and ſo any other *Infallibility* that ſhall be pretended to belong to *judicature*, muſt be inferred from ſome other tenure, or elſe it will not be inferred. *Section 6.*

If you cannot be thus liberall to us, and tell us that by *Catholique* in this queſtion, you meane that *Catholique* without reſtriction; Tell us then Secondly, that you meane a repreſentation of that *Catholique*, *i. e.* a *Councell Generall, Oecumenicall*, and then I *Section 7.*

shall acknowledge many priviledges to belong to that; An *humble*, though not an *absolute* obedience, and in a word, that nothing is to be preferred before it, but the *Word* of *God*, or the *Church* truly *Universall*. Yet after all this, that it is not *infallible* or *inerrable*, I have the judgement of *Panormitan*, and shall adde his reason also to back it; *Because*, saith he, * *the Generall Councell is not truly, but onely by representation, the Universall Church, and supposing such a Councell to erre, it would not yet follow, that the Universall Church or multitude of all Christians doe erre, because 'tis possible that some out of the Councell doe not erre, yea, and in the Councell too, though a major part overcome the better.* In this I have the concurrence of *Occam. dial. p. 3. tr. 1. l. 3. c. 5. Cardin. Cameracensis. c. 1. Waldensis Doctrin. fid. l. 2. artic. 3. c. 26. & quest. vesp. arg. 3. ad lit. O. Antoninus, to. 1. de sacram. l. 2. c. 19. Card. Cusanus in summarum par. 3. tit. 23. de concil. general. c. 2. sect. 6. l. 2. Concord. Cathol. c. 4. Et Nic. de Clemangis, Collat. 2. p. 64. & 73.* with this farther confirmation of it from the opinion of the † Ancient Fathers, evidenced by their practice; *In that* (saith he) *it was solemnly accustomed by them at the beginning of such a Councell, by fasting and praying to implore the assistance of the Spirit, which had beene a piece of useleſſe diligence, if they had been before assured, that they could not be deceived or faile in those things for which they were assembled.* Which argument, if it doe not infallibly induce the conclusion to those that pray for those things which they are sure of; yet is it an evidence, that they that use it are of the opinion which they inferre by it, and will be of force to those, that from the mention of some of the Ancients praying for the dead, conclude them to be in a mutable state; as I conceive some of your freinds are wont to doe. To this assertion of ours I might also cite the *Concordance* of the *Jesuits* generally, who that they may fasten all *Infallibility* in the *Pope* alone, attribute nothing at all to a *Councell* but this, that the errour of a *Councell* cannot be confirmed by the *Pope*, which is in effect no more, then that *Councells* begin to be *infallible*, when the *Pope* confirmes them, *i. e.* when the *Councell* is at an end (which kind of *Infallibility* they will afford, I presume, to every *Heretique*, (and to me while I thus write) that my errour cannot be confirmed by the *Pope*) unlesse they

* *Licet concilium generale repraesentet totam ecclesiam Universalem, tamen in veritate ibi non est vere Universalis ecclesia, sed representative, quia universalis ecclesia constituitur ex collectione fidelium, & ista est ea ecclesia quae errare non potest. C. significasti. ext: de Electio.*

† *Antiquis patribus concilium celebraturis solenne fuit jejuniis, orationibus, spiritus assistentiam implorare, inutili sanè diligentia si exploratum habebant se non posse falli aut deficere in his propter quae fuerant congregati.*

they will be so bountifull to adde also, that such a *Councell* cannot erre, if it follow the instructions of the Pope, which will also be acknowledged true of any the meaneſt *Lutheran*, or *Calviniſt*, as well as of that *Councell*.

If neither of theſe two be it you meane, then be ingenuous, *Section* 8.
and tell us, you either mean the *Pope* of *Rome*, as the *Jeſuits* doe, or elſe that you meane thoſe parts of the *Catholique* that are governed by him, and then as we ſhall tell you, that it is the very thing which we learn't from you to meane by the *Roman Church*, ſo you that affirme that to be the notion of the *Catholique Church*, muſt acknowledge to affirme the ſame thing to be *Infallible*, which we ſay you doe affirme, when we propoſe the *Queſtion* of the *Roman Churches Infallibility*; and in this there is no matter of deceit or difficulty, but that that *Church* under the government of the *Pope*, which we affirme to be *fallible*, even in the higheſt degree, *fallible* in *fundamentals*, you undertake and conteſt to be *infallible*. 'Tis true, this we call the *Roman Church*, conceiving it to be your *Dialect*, and if you ſay it is not, we will conſent to you, and in obedience to your example, call it ſo no more; on condition you will be but as reaſonable, and give it ſome other title; whether that of the *Weſterne Church*, which were a good large Province, (and yet of that Saint *Baſil* complaines in no lower ſtile then this, That *they neither know nor endure the unity of Faith*) or any other title, beſides that of the *Catholique Church*, which we are ſure cannot properly be allow'd it, unleſſe it appear, Firſt, that all *Chriſtians* ought to be govern'd by the *Biſhop of Rome*; and Secondly, that all they which are not ſo governed, are no longer members of the *Catholique Church*; and if you affirme both theſe, we profeſſe to deny them, and then that muſt be the matter of debate; and till that be agreed, there will be no other queſtion *ſeaſonable* to be propoſed in this matter, and wen it is, there will be no other *needfull*. *Ep.* 10.

And for the parallel of the *Canterburians*, which you uſe to *Section* 9.
prove the unfitneſſe of the *queſtion* under theſe termes, it is but a thin fallacy (eaſily ſeene through) if it be thought to conclude any thing. To the clearing of which, be pleaſed to obſerve, that the *Biſhop* of *Canterbury* may be conſidered in a three-fold rela-

tion: First, to his particular *Dioceſſe* of *Canterbury*, of which he is *Biſhop*; Secondly, to the whole *Province* of *Canterbury*, of which he is *Metropolitan*; Thirdly, to the whole *Nationall Church* of *England*, of which he is *Primate*; his two former relations are terminated in *Canterbury*, under the two ſignifications of the word, but the third is terminated not in *Canterbury*, in any notion of that word, but in all *England*; and thence it followes, that the Church of *Canterbury* (whether as a *Province*, or a *Dioceſſe*, which are the onely two *Notions* we in *England* have of it) being not of the ſame latitude with the *Church of England*, it will be improper to call the *Proteſtants* of *England Canterburians*: But then on ſuppoſition that there were a third notion of it, whereby the *Church* of *Canterbury*, and the *Church* of *England* were of the ſame latitude, or to him that were confidently perſwaded that they are ſo, it were no impropriety at all to call all *Engliſh Proteſtants* by that denomination; and if to prove it were improper, it ſhould be affirmed that 'tis but an *accident* that he that is *Primate* of all *England* ſhould be *Biſhop* of the particular *See* of *Canterbury*, there would be no force in that proof; First, becauſe that which is *true per accidens*, is nevertheleſſe *true*, and denominations being *ad placitum*, are many times accidentall; yet for all that *denominations* as much, as if they had been by *nature* or *per ſe*; and Secondly, becauſe we are now upon a ſuppoſition (though it be but a ſuppoſition) that there is a *Nationall Church of Canterbury*, as well as a *Province* and *Dioceſſe*. And therefore I ſay on this ſuppoſition, if it had ſo happened, or been agreed on, that all that are under the *Primate of Canterbury* ſhould be called the *Church of Canterbury*, as it hath been agreed on, that all that are under the *Metropolitan of Canterbury*, ſhould be called the *Province* of *Canterbury*, we ſhould never challenge any man of improper ſpeaking, that ſhould call us *Canterburians*. As for the *Scotch Puritan* you ſpeak of, that calls us ſo by way of reproach; you cannot be ignorant of his meaning, or think it pertinent to the purpoſe, to which you apply it; It was uſed by him onely in relation to the preſent doctrines of the then *Biſhop of Canterbury*, (and onely ſome men ſcoffed at under that title, as followers of his (as they erroneouſly conceived) particular, or perſonall doctrines) which is quite another

another notion of the word, then that which you have occasion to speak of.

From all this it will consequently appear to be as unreasonable for you, who acknowledge a notion of the *Roman Church* equipollent with *Catholicke*, and affirme the whole *Catholicke Church* to be govern'd by the *Primate*, or *Pope* of *Rome*, and urge the necessity of *Christ's* precept, that the *Church* which you pronounce *infallible*, must be so governed, (or else that it is no longer *Catholicke*) to make any difference between the stile of *Catholicke*, and of *Roman Church*, or of *Catholicks* and *Romanists*; no man among us fetching the denomination of *Roman*, or *Romanist* (when he thus speaks) from the relative *Diocesse* of *Rome*, as the *Pope* is a *Bishop*, or from the relative *Province* of *Rome*, as he is a *Metropolitan*, but from the relative *Church* of *Rome*; the whole number of those *Christians* who acknowledge the *Pope* their *Primate* or *Partriarch*, which you that affirme him to be *Primate* of all *Christians* by full right and succession from Saint *Peter*, must acknowledge him to be of the whole *Catholike Church*; In which acknowledgement because we agree not with you (but contend that his *Patriarchate* is limited as well as his *Diocesse* or *Province*) as we cannot therefore speak throughout in your language, and call that the *Catholicke Church*, which is but a part of the *Catholicke*, or debate the *Infallibility* of the *Catholicke Church* with them, that meane by that phrase onely that are under the *Roman Communion*, or government of the *Pope* of *Rome*, whil'st we mean *Catholicke* without any restriction, (or if we should so speak, shall be guilty of leaving a maine equivocation in the words of the question, which ought of all things to be avoided by distinguishing, before we goe about to debate any thing, and after distinction made and agreed on, that by Catholick is to be meant onely those which are in *Obedience* to the *Pope*, we will then debate it under that title also) so may we very reasonably use your dialect, when we agree in the meaning of it, as in the phrase [*Roman Church*] we doe (meaning both of us, all those who are govern'd by the *Pope*) of which *Church* in that notion we now enquire, whether that be *infallible* or no? And so much for the phrase of the *Question*, or *Title* of that *Treatise*. *Section* 10.

And

Section 11. And then I ſhall adde no more to the ſecond part of the firſt Chapter, then by acknowledging the treatiſe of that *excellent Lord* to have beene written many yeares ſince, and now not unſeaſonably publiſh't at a time when ſome arts were uſed (though, bleſſed be God, improſperouſly) to pervert unſtable minds, and this pretended *Infallibility* a maine auxiliary call'd in for that purpoſe; As for any anſwer long ſince framed to it, I am perſwaded that that *Lord* thought it not ſuch, as that his reputation ſhould be concerned in providing an anſwer for it; And for the *Publiſher* 'tis very poſſible that he might never heare of any ſuch, (which I gueſſe alſo by my ſelfe, who had long ſince a copy of the one, but till I read it here, never heard of the other,) or if he did, had reaſons which he can juſtifie to any ingenuous man, why he did not publiſh it alſo. Which being now ſaid to you (and which you had before no ground of thinking to be otherwiſe) you will hardly give a civill account, why you ſhould charge (and now not aske pardon for charging) on the *Publiſher* a *frivolous officiouſneſſe, by which that anſwer is forced to ſtay behind* (though it were alſo ſufficient to tell you, that when you ſet out all your Bookes at *Rome* or *Doway*, with our anſwers annext to them, we will then publiſh this of yours at *Oxford*) or on the *Edition*, the ſtile of *a meane and creeping faſhion of appearing to the world*; which words being ſo contrary to truth, (which is punctually this, the Booke was licenſed by the *Vicechancellour*; Printed by the *Printer* to the *Univerſity*; the Authour's name put in the Title page; and all this proclaimed on every wall and corner of the City, on purpoſe that every one that had kindneſſe to the *Romane Church* might read it) if they ſignifie any thing, have onely this interpretation of which they are capable, that he that wrote them cared not how abſolutely groundleſſe his accuſation was, but onely was willing to accuſe.

Section 12. What you mean by the next words [*that no notice hath been taken of giving licence for any other anſwer to be made hereafter, or if made to be publiſhed in print, and have the advantage to be diſperſed abroad in many copies.*] I profeſſe I cannot tell, and yet was inſolent enough to thinke, that I could have conſtituted a piece of plaine Engliſh, of which I underſtood every word ſin-

gle,

gle, but now finde, I had overvalued my owne abilities, and ſhould be more modeſt hereafter, but that by finding in the * fixth line of the Book the nominative *Metropolitan* without any verb after it, I am inclined to thinke that it is part of your ſtile to neglect thoſe vulgar rules in which I had beene inſtructed.

* The place to which theſe words reply, are upon this admonition mended by the Apologiſt in his reviſall, by putting in after the word [*Metropolitan*] theſe words [*is the Pope, who*] and two lines after in ſtead of [*it*] [*His Dioceſſe*] he might as reaſonably have mended the other alſo.

As for the ſad newes that you acquaint us with, [that *this other anſwer of yours ſhall lye conſtrained, and in much reſtraint, yea and be in danger to periſh*] Though that be a heavy aggravation of the miſery of theſe wicked times, yet ſure this paper is not the onely ſufferer in that kinde, and may both be thought to have deſerved it aſwell, and be as able to beare it with ſome patience, as many other good ſonnes of the *Church Catholique* have been; and yet if it will but ſue out its *habeas Corpus*, I doubt not but the law will be open for its plea, and in the meane I have deſigned this preſent paper to offer it baile, and obtaine its enlargement through this City, ſo it will promiſe faithfully not to goe farther, then its ſurety is ready to attend it. By this meanes, if it be accepted, it ſhall have leave to viſite all its Catholique freinds, and others to whom it deſires to performe any civility, or from whom to receive any kindneſſe. *Section* 13. E

In the meane, how his Lordſhip's treatiſe [*hath caſt dangerous ſtumbling blockes, which may endanger the ſtability and ſafety not onely of Catholique Religion, but of Chriſtian in generall*] I ſhall promiſe to conſider with you when you proceed to any proofe of it, and till then onely adviſe you and all my fellow Chriſtians to conclude no more againſt any creature, then you produce premiſes to juſtify; For by ſo doing you will appeare not onely injurious to him with whom you deale, (in raſh cauſeleſſe anger and cenſure) and ſecretly reproachfull and contumelious to the Reader (by conceiving him ſo tame, ſo unworthy of the reaſonable ſoule, which God hath given him, on purpoſe to diſtinguiſh betwixt reaſon and no reaſon, betwixt proofe and libell, betwixt argument and confidence) but withall you will teach others an evill leſſon againſt your ſelves. If you pleaſe I ſhall give you an *Example* of each of theſe. *Section* 14.

Section 15. That which you adde in the bottome of the Chapter concerning Master *Chillingworth's* Booke, besides that it is utterly impertinent to the confuting of this, which is the present businesse (nay it is an argument on this side, both for the seasonablenesse of publishing it (as an *Epitome* usefull and gainfull to supersede the trouble of reading the larger Booke) and for the leaving the former answer behind, if the Publisher had knowne there had beene any; because, as you before intimated, the publishing of Master *Chillingworth's* Booke then was conceived to have taken away all force and considerablenesse from that answer) is first, very unjust to Master *Chillingworth*, in saying without any proofe, that he borrowed his new materials from *Baron* and *Volkelius*. Secondly, it is contumelious to the Reader's judgement, who is supposed to be so easy, as to conclude that to be an ill Booke, which is affirmed to borrow materials from a *Scotch Minister*, and an *impious Author*; from which contumely I conceive he is able to vindicate himselfe, by telling you, First, that what is supposed to be borrowed from the *Scotch Minister*, is very authentique *English* Divinity, and indeed that *Baron* is content to professe himselfe to have borrowed (and that in this particular) from our Writers, especially (if my memory faile me not) from Bishop *White*, and the first edition of the *Bishop of Canterburies* Booke under his *Chaplaine's* name, from whom also Master *Chillingworth* might borrow, if he were in any want, and not from him, and yet I believe would not, if he were alive, be ashamed to have profited by so worthy a *Scotchman* as *Baron* was. Secondly, that *Volkelius* his being an *impious Author*, cannot extend to every part of his worke, nor conclude, that that which is supposed to be borrowed from him, is therefore impious or poisonous (if it be, let it be produced and proved to be so by some other proofe, then that of the *impiety* of the *Author*) but rather that Master *Chillingworth* had the skill of discerning, and tooke nothing but *balsome*, and *antidote*, where if he had been apt to mistake, he might have fain on *poyson*. Thirdly, this will teach others, if they be apt to learn, an evill lesson against your selves; I meane not that of *repaying evill with evill* (God forbid that any injustice in others should so provoke us, ἐξομοιοῦσθαι, to be *like* them) but onely this particular lesson, which hath cost us little paines to peirce or construe, that if this

Tract

Tract of yours be a *ſatisfactory anſwer* to all Maſter *Chillingworths* Booke, then a *ſatisfactory anſwer* to this your Treatiſe, will be ſufficient anſwer alſo to the three great *Latine Volumnes*, which they ſay, you have written againſt Maſter *Chillingworth*. And this I ſhall be more glad to have obtained by your owne rule of concluding, then patient to try by reading them over, whether it be truly ſo, or no; eſpecially if thoſe that have taſted them, paſſe a right judgement upon them.

Thus farre I have given my ſelfe ſcope to take up almoſt every word you ſay in your firſt chapter, but am unwilling to thinke, that thereby I am engaged to doe the like in all that followes. Truely upon reading on, I ſee the ſubtilty of compoſure, and the particulars incident are not of ſuch weight, as that I can promiſe my ſelfe *patience* to examine it ſo ſtrictly; I meane not *patience*, as it is oppoſed to *anger* or *paſſion* (for by Gods helpe I ſhall not yeild to any temptation, that ſhall bring me into that) but as it is oppoſed to *wearineſſe* and *laſſitude*; and I muſt be pardon'd, if I thinke I could ſpend my time better to my ſelfe and the benefit of others, then in following the exceptions line by line, and giving them a large anſwer; for that any man may be *patient* to doe ſo, or to reade it when 'tis done; it is neceſſary, that the Text, which muſt beare that Comment, muſt have ſomewhat either of *difficulty*, or *ſubtilty*, or *profit* in it; either of which, whenſoever I can finde, I profeſſe I ſhall be moſt ready to enlarge upon it, (and now acknowledge it an obligation from the Author, if he will point out to me, where I ſhall have fail'd) and in other particulars be more mercifull to the reader, and my ſelfe. *Section* 16.

To the 1. §. *Chap.* 2.

True it is, and we grant it willingly, that every proofe that is ſolid and good, muſt be, a notioribus, *and that every ſure concluſion muſt alſo be deduced from no other premiſes or principles, then ſuch as be knowne, and, at leaſt, be as certaine as we deſire the concluſion ſhould be. Nevertheleſſe we doe abſolutely deny, that this aſſertion of ours touching the Churches infallibility, is by us offered to be proved by waies no better then our Adverſaries offer to prove that ſhe hath erred, as this Inquirer pretends we doe; for we affirme that our Churches infallibility is proved by reaſons which* *Section* 1.

are reall and true, and that on the other side, the adversary offers to prove the contrary, onely by such as be no more then seeming and pretended. Now true reason or authority is a way quite different from pretended, and much better then it, and therefore the Inquirers charge is false, or, at least, light and ineffectuall. Must all controversies in Philosophy be undecidable, because both sides pretend reason; or no suits of Law be judged, because both sides pretend Law? Certainly, whatsoever both sides doe pretend, yet there is but one side that hath it, as namely, but one side of Philosophers have true reason, and but one side of contendents have true Law, and so in like manner but one side of contending Christians have true reason for them, Scripture, or Tradition, howsoever both may pretend it, and therefore we doe not goe about to prove the Church is infallible by the selfe same wayes that you goe about to prove that she hath erred, but by wayes that are quite different from them, and the same but in name onely, and no farther; By which it followes, that, either you are deceived, or we, and it is not necessary that both. And so much for this great and principall difficulty which troubled the Inquirer so much as he writ to London *for the solution of it, which thing, surely, was more then needed, for it might have been done at* Great Tue *without consulting* London *about it, or either of our two Universities.*

We doe not maintaine, as he falsely supposes, that Reason, Scripture, and Fathers be all fallible, universally speaking but, in some cases only, as, namely, reason is not fallible in such verities as be evident, but in other that be not so, it is. Againe, Scripture is almost certain rule whensoever it is certainly expounded, otherwise it is not. Lastly, the Fathers be assured and undoubted witnesses of the Doctrines which were held in their time, though not undoubted definers of them. And, by this answer, all the three main propps of this Authors discourse are overthrown, and fall unto the ground. *

* In this place the Apologist in his revisal put in these words [*So that in fine all these three be infallible*] I must a little wonder to what purpose. For if they belong to the words immediatly precedent, they will then signify, that the three propps of his *Lordships* discourse are *infallible*. But if to the former part of the Section to signify *Reason &c.* to be *infallible*, they are then either to be understood, that they are *infallible* in all cases, and then that is point blanke contrary to what he had said [that they were *fallible* in some] or else that they are *infallible* onely in some; and then that he had said distinctly before, and needed not to have again anew repeated.

C. 2. *Answ.* to the 2. Chap.

To the second Chapter, I need only to put you in mind, that when his Lordship saith [*the wayes of proofe that the Church of Rome can never have any errours, are no better then those by which we offer to prove she hath erred, and* nameth *three heads of Argumenis, from Scripture, Reason, and Ancient writers, and* proveth *you to affirme all these are infallible, because nothing is in your opinion infallible but the Church; and from thence concludes that we can never infallibly know that the Church is infallible, because all the meanes proposed to induce that knowledge, being of necessity somewhat else beside that only infallible, must needs be fallible*] it will be very unsufficient in you to reply, that his Lordship hath not said true in the first particular, upon no other ground of proofe, but only because you [*affirme that the Churches infallibility is proved by Reasons which are really true, and that the contrary is by us offered to be prov'd only by such as be only seeming and pretended*] for this very thing that you affirme, *viz.* that those your *reasons are reall and true*, is a part of the very question in hand, and as much denyed by us, as the infallibility of your Church, and therefore, by your own rule of proceeding *à notioribus*, cannot be proper means to conclude, that his Lordship erred, to him that will farre more easily be brought to believe that your reasons are not reall, then that his Lordship erred in this particular, and that will as readily confesse he erres, as that those reasons are reall. *Section* 1.

It appeared strange to me that you should begin with such a *petitio principii*, untill by reading on, I discerned that this one meane Sophisme hath run through most *Paragraphs* of your following Treatise, which is a shrewd infirmity in a confutation, to take that for a principle granted, and so bestow no proofe upon it, which is by you known to be denied by us, and yet to conceive that this will be able to satisfy our other importunities. *Section* 2.

2^dly. You must observe that his Lordship had said only this, [that your Churches *infallibility is offered to be proved by no better wayes, than those by which we offer to prove she hath erred*] which is an undertaking of his Lordship, and not a bare *assertion*, and sure you cannot say he offers to prove it *by reasons onely seeming*, for you as yet know not particularly, what those rea- *Section* 3.

ſons are, any farther, then that they are from the ſame heads, by which you offer to prove the contrary.

Section 4. And Thirdly, if the Arguments which he offers be only *ſeeming* on his ſide, yet if you marke it, they are ſo *ſeeming* to him, and as long as they *ſeem* to *him* to conclude that the *Church* hath *erred*, the very ſame arguments, or thoſe that are no more ſeeming, cannot aſſure him, that ſhe is *infallible*; for by your own confeſſion every *ſolid proofe muſt be ex notioribus, i. e.* not only by *media* which are *more true*, but which are *more known* to him, to whom this proofe is offered; and, if you marke, that is it to which his *Lordſhip's* argument drives, that the reaſons by which you prove the *infallibility of your Church*, are ſuch as you confeſſe your ſelves to be *fallible:* Marke, not which you confeſſe to be *falſe*, but *fallible*, your confeſſing them *fallible* is enough to his *Lordſhip's* turne, though they ſhould have the luck to be *true*, becauſe the infallibility of your Church, on which, as on a foundation and principle, you muſt build in many after difficulties, had need be *infallibly* aſſerted and knowne, or if it be but *fallibly*, will it ſelfe be *fallible* (no concluſion aſcending higher, then the premiſes have aſcended) and ſo, though it were *true*, yet not fit to commence a *principle* of all other *truths*.

Section 5. Now that theſe reaſons or premiſes of yours are fallible and by you acknowledged to be ſo, his Lordſhip was not content to affirme (and ſo is himſelfe farre enough from giving you example of begging the queſtion) but proves it by this argument, *becauſe with you nothing is not fallible but the Church.* This may be diſſolved into an hypotheticall ſyllogiſme, whereof you muſt deny one propoſition, or elſe the concluſion is forfeited. *If with you the Church be the only infallible, then with you any other reaſons, by which you prove the infallibility of the Church, are not infallible, but with you the Church is the only infallible, therefore with you any other reaſons by which you prove the infallibility of the Church are not infallible.* Now if you look over your anſwer againe, you ſhall find that your only exception commeth not home to any part of this ſyllogiſme, for you doe not ſo much as ſay, that any thing is *infallible* but the *Church*; Or, if now you will ſee your want, and make additions to your anſwer, then ſay diſtinctly, is any other thing beſide the *Church infalli-*

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ble, or no? If it be, let it be named; if it be not, the conclusion is granted us. And till this addition be thus made (*i. e.* for this present answer of yours) 'tis, I conceive manifest, that you have said no syllable to the prime part of his *Lordship's* first Section.

As for your instances of *Phylosophy* and *Law suites*, they can prove nothing against his *Lordship*, unlesse you can name some sect of *Phylosophy*, that hath not only truth, but infallibility, and tell us which it is, and prove that by arguments which are confest to be *infallible*; till you have done that, your instance is not pertinent, and if ever you shall doe it, 'twill not be concluding against us, unlesse you produce the like arguments for the *infallibility* of your *Church* against us, which must be some other then are yet proposed. *Section 6.*

As for *Lawsuits*, that they are determined to one side by the Judge, doth not prove that that *Judge is infallible* (which is the only matter of debate,) and if the contenders are bound to stand to his award, it is, because the Law and supreme Magistrate have commanded them to doe so, and because this is evident and infallible, that they have done so, by the commission which the Judge hath from them. And when the like is produced for your Church, I hope all your Subjects will submit to it, but then it must be moreover proved that all Christians are such *Subjects*, or else we hope we shall not be involved under that obligation. *Section 7.*

As for your long deduction from whence you conclude that either wee are deceived, or you, and that it is not necessary that both should, we grant it, and professe our opinions, that though both you and we are *fallible*, yet only you are, or can be deceived in this particular, (which we conceive is cleare, because only you pretend *Infallibility*, which we not pretending, but affirming that we are not so, cannot in this be deceived, unlesse we be *infallible*) but see not what it concludes against his *Lordship*, whose argument depends not on any such assertion, that both parties are deceived, but only that your pretended *Infallibility* is by you proved by no other arguments, then those which you confesse are *fallible*. *Section 8.*

What you adde by way of *triumph* and *scoffe* I must not answer, but by yeilding you free leave thus to please your selfe, and *Section 9.*

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(if this recreation tend at all to your health) to adviſe you to do ſo ſtill, and (whenſoever it may be for your divertiſement) to reckon up the names of *London, Great Tue, and the two Univerſities.*

Section 10. After the *ὀμνίκιον* ſang, you at length bethinke your ſelfe that his *Lordſhip* had affirmed, that *Scripture, Reaſon and Fathers, are by you maintained to be all fallible*; and to this you anſwer by a diſtinction of *univerſally ſpeaking*, and *in ſome caſes onely*, and acknowledge that you affirme them all to be fallible *onely in ſome caſes*. Now firſt you ought to have given anſwer to his *Lordſhip's* proofe for what he ſaid, which was this, that you affirme that onely the *Church* is *infallible*; from whence it is a concluſion, that therefore *Reaſon*, and *Scripture*, and *Fathers*, are by you affirmed to be *fallible*, whereas you letting the *premiſes* alone, apply anſwer to the *concluſion*, which is as much againſt *Logicke* as to *deny* it, without denying the premiſes, or ſhewing the falſeneſſe of them. But then Secondly, that which is *fallible in ſome caſes onely*, is by that acknowledged to be *fallible*, and by that is proved unſufficient to prove another thing to be *infallible* in all things, for if it be *fallible* in any caſe, it may be *fallible* in this, that it pronounces that other to be *infallible*; and till there be ſome *infallible* argument produced that it is *infallible* in that particular pronouncing, its *Infallibility* in other things will availe nothing; or if it doe, it may availe alſo for us to prove what we offer to prove from it, that your *Church* hath erred.

Section 11. There is no poſſible avoiding of this, but by ſaying and proveing it *infallible* in inducing your concluſion, and falſe aſwell as *fallible* in inducing ours, (for if it be *true*, though it be *fallible*, it will ſerve our turne, but it muſt be both, or will not ſerve yours, you being obliged to prove the *Infallibility* of your *Church* by ſomething which is it ſelfe *infallible*, becauſe it muſt be matter of *faith* with you, which nothing is, but what is *infallibly* induced, but it is ſufficient for us to beleive you and your *Church fallible*, though we ſhould make it no matter of *faith* that you are ſo) which becauſe you endeavour not to doe in this place, it will be impertinent to examine the truth of what elſe you adde (concerning the caſes wherein you affirme *Reaſon, and Scripture, and Fathers to be infallible*) any farther then thus, that by your owne explication

explication of the distinction, and enumeration of cases, I shall conclude, that *Reason* doth not prove *infallibly* that your *Church* is *infallible*, because the *Infallibility* of your *Church* is not an *evident verity*; *Scripture* doth not prove it so, because it is not *certainly expounded* to that probation; *Fathers* doe not prove it so, *because it was not a doctrine held in their time*, and affirmed by them to be so. Each of which negations of mine though they were as sufficient proofe as what you have offered to the contrary, yet I shall undertake to make good against you, if you shall thinke fit to call me to it, by setting downe your reasons to the contrary.

And so if on your supposition, his Lordship's *three maine props were fallen to the ground* (which is another *boast* that had no more relation to the present matter, then ground in truth; and therefore I beseech you leave out such excesses hereafter) yet your supposition being not so much as endeavoured to be proved, the props stand as firmly as is desired. *Section* 12.

To the second §. *Chap.* 3.

The Enquirer is here much mistaken, for we are not at all offended with Protestants for their alleadging Scriptures, but for their doing of it after a way which is fallible and uncertaine; in which case we say Scripture can be no foundation of faith. Wherefore though they alleadge Scripture and we also, yet doth it not follow thence that the Protestants disprove the infallibility by the selfe same media or meanes, by which we endeavour to prove the same. It is true, they attempt to doe so, but that they doe it, is denied. The Scripture when surely sensed or expounded, is a different medium from the same Scripture sensed unsurely or expounded falsely. Now he that takes an unsure way, which no reason or discretion commends unto him, and leaves the sure, which Reason does perswade him to be such, if that man chance to erre, it is easie to understand why God should be more offended with him, then with others that doe not so but hold a prudent and contrary course.

The summe is, that holy Scripture, after such time as it comes to be knowne certainly for Canonicall and shall be expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, foundeth an argument strong and invincible; but when otherwise, one that is proba-

ble onely, or ad hominem; *and this latter we say is your case, and out of this give a reason why your resolves are temerarious and presumptuous, and,* in fine, *such wherewith God may be displeased justly, forasmuch as no man ought to goe about this worke unadvisedly, or expose his salvation without all need, to chance and uncertainty, as if he meant to build upon the sand.*

C. 3. *Ans. To the third Chap.*

Section 1. I answer, that through this whole Chapter the same fallacy returnes againe, of satisfying his Lordship's argument by a bare affirming (but not proving) a thing which is as much denied by his *Lordship*, viz. *that your alleadging of Scripture for the infallibility of your Church, is by an infallible and certaine way, but our alleadging of it for every part of our religion is by a fallible and uncertaine.*] (For though you in tearmes affirme onely the latter of these, that which is against us, yet in charity to you I shall suppose you imply the former, or if you will say you doe not, I shall then answer, that the granting of what you say, doth not vindicate your *Infallibility*, but onely accuse us, not cleare your selves) or if that which you adde by way of explication, may passe for a proofe of it, viz. *that Holy Scripture when it shall be expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, foundeth an argument strong and invincible, but when otherwise, onely probable and* ad hominem.] I answer, that this being applyed to the matter in hand to you and us, must, if it signifie any thing, have this importance, that the places of Scripture which you bring for the *Infallibility* of your *Church*, are *expounded according to the interpretation of the Church*, but the places which we bring for the severall parts of our religion, are not so *expounded*. And then I answer, that by the *Church* you may (and I conceive ought to) meane the *Universall Church* truly so called, without your ordinary clogge or restriction; and then all that we require of you is to make your affirmation good, and produce the places of *Scripture* which that *Universall Church* hath so expounded to the asserting the *Infallibility* of your *Church*, (which till you doe produce 'tis *petitio principii* againe) and then we shall shew our selves ingenuous, and (though we might reply something which *ad homines* might be answer) yet shall we

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part with all other advantages of defending our ſelves, and in plaine ground yeild you the cauſe, and contend no longer with you.

But if you meane by the *interpretation of the Church* the *interpretation of the Church* in the notion wherein we enquire, whether it be infallible, *viz.* that *ſociety of Chriſtians which have been govern'd by the Pope*; Though then we might deny, that you have any ſuch *interpretation* of *Scripture* for your *infallibility*, and juſtifie the deniall, (for if you pleaſe we will undertake to ſhew that ſome eminent *perſons* in the *Church* of *Rome*, perhaps *Popes* themſelves, never interpreted any Scripture to the aſſerting the *Infallibility* of your *Church*, and that many other differ among themſelves, what is that *Church* which they affirme from *Scripture* to be *infallible*, and that will amount to the ſame alſo) yet we ſhall content our ſelves with this other anſwer, that the *interpretation* of that *Church*, unleſſe Saint *Peter* himſelfe, or ſome other acknowledg'd to be inſpired, joyne in it, is not *Infallible*, and for you to ſay it is, and not to prove it, is a *petitio principii* againe; And for any other notion of the *Church* which ſhall be ſaid ſo to interpret, when you ſhall faſten on it, we ſhall undertake to make good either that it doth not interpret the Scripture to the aſſerting the *Infallibility* of the *Church*, or elſe that the *Church* in that notion is not *infallible*. *Section* 2.

As for the other part of your aſſertion which you principally inſiſt upon in this Chapter, that our caſe is contrary to yours, i.e. *that we found not our religion on Scripture expounded according to the interpretation of the Church*, we utterly diſclaime it, (and for you to affirme it without proofe, is *petitio principii* againe) and to put it to a faire iſſue, we make this offer, that what ever propoſition we affirme without ſhewing *Scripture* for it, and that expounded according to the *interpretation* of the *ancient Church*, we will preſently forgo on your firſt inſtance; and if you would pay us the like offer, and your party make it good, I doubt not but as turbulent a Sea as the ſtate of *Chriſtendome* is at this time, the whole Church might quickly be at peace, or at leaſt the diſſentient party not be conſiderable. I remember a paſſage in Saint *Hilary*, depredicating the *Biſhops* of *France* as very happy men, *quòd aliam non cognoviſſent confeſſionem*, &c. *Section* 3.

that they knew no other confeſſion then that ancient and moſt ſimple which through all Churches from the Apoſtles age had been received. And I am a little confident that that which firſt made, and hath ever ſince fomented the breaches of that pretious body, is the multiplying and impoſing of new *confeſſions* and *articles* of beleife from the ſuggeſtion of *private* or leſſe *publique* ſpirits, and that hath made the body like *Ariſtotle's inſects*, which for want of *bloud* runne out into a multitude of *legs*; every ſuch new *article* ſo multiplyed (above the number of thoſe which *Scripture* in the truly *Catholique interpretation* of it, will authorize, not onely as true, but neceſſary to be ſo acknowledged) being an effect of ſome want of *bloud*, I meane *charity* in the Authors, (for though to teach any man any certaine truth be an act of *charity*, yet to make an *article*, *i. e.* to require every man to beleive whatever we conceive to be truth, is a great uncharitableneſſe) and a cauſe or occaſion of more; the adding to the neceſſary *truths*, ordinarily being a forerunner of the abatement of the inventory of the neceſſary *performances*, I meane of thoſe which are indiſpenſably required of us under *Chriſt*. Theſe laſt few lines I confeſſe to be a παράγγελμα, which I hoped might not be unwelcome to you; If they be, I am ſorry you were troubled with it, the ſeeing that there was nothing more in your Chapter, which wanted anſwer, gave me temptation and liberty for it.

To the third Section Chap. 4.

The third Section is all true, but concerns us nothing, becauſe amongſt ours there is care enough taken for ſhewing which Church it is that is the true and infallible, and on the other ſide much negligence and partiality in the enquirers after it, in many of them, at leaſt, though not in every one.

C. 4. *Anſw: To the fourth Chap.*

Section 1. In your fourth Chapter, though you are juſt in acknowledging the perfect truth of his Lordſhips third paragraph, yet muſt you not be beleived on your bare word, that you are not concern'd in it. For I conceive it cleare that you are, becauſe that argument from *Reaſon* (for ſuch is that which is mentioned there, as in the ſecond paragraph the argument from *Scripture*, and in the fourth the argument from *Fathers* or *tradition*) which

you

you uſe to prove the *Infallibility* of your *Church*, viz. *that it is therefore ſo made by God* (or that it is *reaſonable* to thinke that *God* therefore ſo made it) *that all men may have ſome certaine Guide*] can never be able to conclude any thing, unleſſe it be made knowne by *God* as certainly (or ſo offered by *God* to our knowledge, that 'tis our fault if we know it not) both that there is ſuch an *infallible Church*, and which it is. Now that God hath ſo made knowne theſe two, it being impoſſible for reaſon to aſſure us any otherwiſe then by ſhewing us ſome *ſure Word of prophecy*, I meane ſome *revelation* from *God*, with ſufficient evidence that it is *revelation*, and this being not by you pretended to be ſhewed, it availes little that you tell us, that *among yours there is care enough taken to ſhew which Church it is that is the true and infallible*; for if by [*ſhewing*] you meane *demonſtrating* any way that it is ſo, this you know we deny, and ſaying it againe without proofe, is *petitio principii*; but if by *ſhewing* you meane the *pointing* us out that for the *true* and *infallible*, of which you are a member, we have little obligation or encouragement to beleive you ſay true, being a witneſſe in your owne cauſe; I am ſure no evidence that (if you ſpeake according to your judgement) you are *Infallible* in that ſhewing or telling; For if we had, we muſt be ſuppoſed to have that evidence of your *infallibility* without (becauſe before) your *ſhewing*, and ſo to ſtand in little need of it.

To the fourth Section Chap. 5.

The anſwer is, that people illiterate may have evidence ſufficient whereby to reſolve and ſatisfie themſelves without making any ſearch into Hiſtories, Fathers, or Scripture; and therefore this Enquirers ſuppoſition is falſe, and indeed it were a hard caſe, if no man might be able to underſtand what he was to beleive, without looking into all theſe; and yet as hard as it is, doth this Enquirer impoſe it upon all, if not in expreſſe tearmes, yet by the conſequence of his doctrine. As for our ſelves alone, what need can we have for ſeeking out the true ſence of Scripture, and a conformity of doctrine with the Ancient, more then other Chriſtians have? Surely according to this method of his, all true religion, whether in our Church, or any other, would be impoſſible to be learned by the illiterate, and very hardly by any other men.

But what evidence can the illiterate have, or rather from whence? Out of the present face, condition, and visible practice of religion in the Church, out of the antient monuments yet remaining that give in their depositions, out of common fame and unsuspected testimonies, out of the manifest perfections and excellencies both of the Church and Religion; out of all which, as from so many cleare signatures and characterismes of truth, ariseth an evidence of credibility that this Church and this Religion are the true, and whatsoever is once so creditable, cannot possibly be false, because for the verity of that, the veracity of God doth stand engaged, as Ric. Victorinus *hath long since declared. For it is a cleare case that all such things be true which God makes evidently credible and worthy of acceptance by the publique acts of his owne providence; for otherwise that providence should publiquely entangle and deceive us by obliging us, or, at least, publiquely and potently inducing and perswading us to believe that which were false; and so by following that way which God hath signed out for us, we should goe astray; which thing can neither be done, nor yet permitted to be done, without imposture, as all the antient Schoolemen doe observe. By this meanes then are prudent publique motives able to make a certainty, though not by their owne vertue, yet at least by the vertue of the Supreame veracity which goes annexed with them.*

Moreover, this measure of evidence perceptible by the illiterate and weake, though it be not so ample as others have, or stand in need to have, yet is it sufficient to sway their understanding, and to call in the divine assistance for the supplying of whatsoever by reason of ignorance or incapacity, is wanting in them. Cum simplicibus est sermocinatio mea? *saith the Wiseman.* Prov. 3. 32. *Therefore it is false and injurious to say, as this Enquirer seemes to doe; namely, That such men as these doe assent to truth upon no better grounds then others doe to falshood.*

The Enquirer's inference against the Church is this. We thinke she hath erred, therefore she may: The Inference is good, but the Antecedent is infirme, and ought not to have beene made, because he cannot have so great reason to judge she hath erred, as on the contrary that she hath not; in regard that it is farre more likely he himselfe erred in making that judgement of the Church, then that the Church erred in making that judgement of the truth, or that she

she hath contradicted her selfe; it being farre more probable, that a private man should be deceived, then a whole Church. Wherefore it is a great act of presumption and temerity in any single man, though never so intelligent, to judge the whole Church hath erred, rather then himselfe.

The Enquirer saith, that he tries the Church by her conformity with the Antients, as she her selfe appoints. But what then? Doubtlesse she is not that way to be convinced, forasmuch as every intelligent man will suppose that no particular man is able to examine that so well as she her selfe hath done before him, and therefore may be pleased to understand that this pretended non-conformity of hers ought to be discovered very clearly and perfectly before he adventure to condemne her; and this great discovery having yet not beene made and manifested to the World, may justly be thought an act impossible, and be judged in such as make pretensions of it, a worke rather of a strong apprehension, then of any solid judgement. If then our Enquirer in this case should be rejected, let him not complaine of us, as if we sent him to a witnesse, and after bid him not believe it, but rather bid him not believe himselfe, and his owne judgement more then the Churches; that is to say, more then he ought; nor suffer himselfe to be misled by the testimony of a witnesse to whom we did not send him, I meane himselfe, in hearkning unto whom self-love too much inclines him, and made him over credulous, as to their great griefe it hath made very many.

Now for the better understanding this point of conformity with the Antients, of which this Enquirer, and Chillingworth *his confederate doe talke so much, and seeke to urge against us; the reader may please to know, that they themselves are bound to solve this knot, as well as we; for it will be both as necessary and as hard for them to finde out the conformity of their doctrines with the Antients, as it is for us to finde out ours; and againe, the conformity of this moderne Scripture with the Antient; and these present copies of the Greeke and Hebrew with the Originall, or Archetype of the same languages, as it is to finde out a conformity of this Church and her Doctrines with the Antients; and so these Authors have made a rodde wherewith to whip themselves, as commonly wrangling people doe.*

Secondly, That there be other notes of truth besides this conformity,

mity, and therefore the enquiry after it is not necessary for any man.

Thirdly, That we may know this conformity by the truth a great deale easier, than the truth by conformity; because truth may be knowne by the present notes, and such as are before our eyes; but conformity must a great way off, and through a thick mist of many Ages, if it be sought after by examination of particulars.

Fourthly, That the enquiry after conformity by examining the Antient rites, and the innumerable darke passages and decisions of Antiquity cannot be a generall method for the instruction of all, or of the greater part of Men; for it is a long businesse, and so cannot be ready at all times, but rather after divers years: it is also so difficult, that few have learning or ability to go through with it; for the passages of Antiquity be very intricate, and require a great light of understanding for their discovery. You see the Enquirer, Sect. 37. confesseth he was much vext with the harsh Greek of Evagrius, and the hard Latine of Irenæus, and with distinguishing between different sences, and various lections, &c.

If this learned Gentleman found so much difficulty in the search; what must become of the greater part of Men, if there were no way but this? for in comparison of the rest, few have so much wit as he, or so much leisure; few understand Greek or Latine either, whether harsh or pleasant, few so painfull. Must no man that is not acquainted with Evagrius or Irenæus, come to the knowledge of the truth? nor any man be able to know the Creation of the World, and the Old law, without he can read in Hebrew, or learn the New law without reading the New Testament in Greek? These were very hard conditions, and certainly such as God never imposed upon us.

Doubtlesse we are not obliged to find out the Originall Copies of Scriptures and Fathers, of which sort, as I suppose, there be none extant, nor trouble our spirits with judging about various lections; we are not bound to impossibilities for our instruction and salvation, but have a ready way assigned us, which is the conspicuous body of the present Church, which body is like a City built upon a hill, and that hill is a rock not to be undermined.

It will be therefore sufficient that we can any sure way come to the knowledge of the truth without taking care whether it be conforme unto the Ancients or no; for sure we are, all truth is conforme to that it should be, abstracting from the consideration either of Antient or New,

New, and this alone may be ſufficient to content any Man.

Yet if he would know conformity, I will ſhew him a readier way than examination of places; let him but take the voluntary confeſſion of the Magdeburgians *in their ſeverall Centuries, and he need ſeek no further; for they acknowledge all that we deſire, and this acknowledgement of theirs cannot but ſatisfie, for they make it neither out of ignorance of the truth, nor out of affection to us.*

C. 5. Anſw. To the fifth Chapter.

Your fifth Chapter is a very long one, and by that length and the contents of it, puts me in mind of him that owing his Fellow Sixpence, being not able to pay him, offered him a hundred Counters one after another in a ſudden motion of his hand, in hope that at length his eyes might dazle, and take ſome one of them for coyne, or if not, yet rather chuſe to loſe his Sixpence, than to venture ſo many cheats by awaiting that payment. For I am perſwaded that when I have but repeated to you his *Lordſhips* Argument in the fourth Paragraph, you will ſpare me the paines of ſhewing that you have not anſwer'd it, by confeſſing you have not ſaid one word to the τὸ λοϛικὸν, or rationall importance of it. *Section* 1.

The intent of the Paragraph is to prove that *tradition* or *Authority* of the *Antients* is not a proper meanes to prove the *Infallibility* of the *Church*. The meanes of inferring the concluſion are, Firſt, the diviſion of men (to whom this Argument is ſuppoſed to be brought) into *ignorant* and *learned*. Secondly, the inſiſting on the propoſition in relation to each of them, to the *ignorant* becauſe they cannot *know*, to the *learned* becauſe they cannot *infallibly know* that *tradition* doth prove this *Infallibility*. *Section* 2.

Firſt, To the *ignorant*, proving that *tradition* cannot prove the *Infallibility* to them, becauſe the *ignorant* cannot know what is the voice of generall and conſtant *tradition*; Which if it be true, is an *infallible* argument to induce the concluſion; (for that *tradition* cannot prove another thing till it ſelf be proved, which it is not to him at leaſt, who neither doth nor can know it) and that it is not true, you doe not ſo much as pretend, but rather help to prove it more plainly, than his *Lordſhip* thought neceſſary to doe. And this is all that you doe returne to the firſt part of the proofe, ſave only by pretending that this knowledge or triall *Section* 3.

of tradition cannot be neceſſary to the *ignorant*; which as it is true, ſo is it nothing againſt his *Lordſhip*, who had no uſe of ſaying that it was neceſſary, but rather the contrary; and by ſaying it is impoſſible implies he cannot thinke it neceſſary; and therefore when you affirme of his *Lordſhip*, that by conſequence of his *Doctrine* he impoſes this impoſſible taske upon the illiterate, and doe not ſo much as pretend to mention that conſequence, this is ſo clear a prevarication, that you cannot take it ill at any friends hands, to call upon you to confeſſe aud retract it; and of that nature is that other ſuggeſtion here, that *his Lordſhip ſeems to ſay, that ignorant men doe aſſent to truth on no better grounds than others doe to falſhood,*] there being no ſuch ſyllable here affirmed, (and if afterwards there be, we ſhall there meet with it.)

Section 4. The ſecond part of the *Argument* is in relation to the *learned*, proving that *tradition* cannot to them *infallibly* prove the *Infallibility* of your *Church*, or be a rule by which to ſquare your beleife in this particular, ſo farre at leaſt, as to make it to them neceſſary to be beleived, (as your friends doe and muſt ſay it is) becauſe it is poſſible they may miſtake in it, and that miſtake will not be damnable in them, if they fall into it with a good conſcience, as poſſibly they may (*i. e.* if they uſe their beſt diligence to find the truth by tradition, and are not kept from it either by *prejudice* or *paſſion*) though it ſhould fall out they doe not finde it.

Section 5. This argument thus drawne out at length, his *Lordſhip* confirmes by a cleare and pertinent inſtance; ſuppoſe me in my inqueſt, whether the *Church* may erre, to enquire whether it ever hath erred, and in that inqueſt ſuppoſe me to meet with ſome motives which really perſwade me that the *Church* hath contradicted her ſelfe, (which if ſhe hath done ſhe hath certainly erred, becauſe both branches of a contradiction cannot be true but one of them muſt needs be falſe) in this caſe it followes, that I beleive ſhe hath *erred*; Wherein though it is poſſible that I may *erre* (becauſe the premiſes which I beleived true may be falſe) yet becauſe it is but an errour in my judgement that did ſo thinke (and that being reconcileable in this caſe with ſincerity, will not be damning to me) it will follow, that it will be pardonable in me, though never ſo learned, that Tradition doth not convince me of the truth of that, which I did really conceive

ceive it ſhewed me to be falſe; it being as pardonable in the *learned* to beleive that errour which they conceive *Tradition* tells them, as it was impoſſible for the *unlearned* to know what is *Tradition*.

The whole weight of this part of the *Argument* lies in this, that what ever is neceſſary to be beleived muſt be offered to be proved by a meanes wherein the learned at leaſt cannot erre pardonably, and therefore the *Infallibility* of the *Church* offered to be proved by *Tradition* (that *Tradition* being a thing wherein the learned may erre pardonably) is not proved by that meanes to be neceſſary to be beleived. Or in a Syllogiſme thus; That *wherein the learned may erre pardonably, is not a meanes to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be neceſſary to be beleived, but Tradition is a meanes wherein the learned may erre pardonably, therefore Tradition is not a meanes to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be neceſſary to be believed.* *Section 6.*

This is the ſumme of what his Lordſhip ſaith in the other part of that paragraph; and to no part of this Syllogiſme, or of the materialls there, out of which I have formed it, doe you returne the leaſt anſwer or deniall, but rather confirme the *Minor*, Firſt, by uſing Arguments to prove, that it is a difficulty and knot, *common to Papiſts with Proteſtants, to finde out the conformity of their doctrine with the Ancients*; which difficulty being granted, will prove that in that matter the learned may erre pardonably. Secondly, by aſſerting that there be *other notes of truth beſides this of conformity with the Ancients, and therefore that enquiry after that is not neceſſary to any man*; which ſeemes a diſclaiming of that as of an unfit Argument. Thirdly, by ſaying that *We know the conformity by the truth, much eaſier then the truth by conformity*. From whence it will follow, that conformity is a very ill Argument, and the worſe the Argument the more pardonable the errour in it. And fourthly, by the profeſſed unfitneſſe of this Argument, at large dilated on by you, with this concluſion, that the *conditions for the underſtanding of Tradition are ſo very hard, that certainly God never impoſed them on us*. On which grounds you offer us another meanes of proving it, (which ſhewes that this was unſufficient in your opinion) viz. *the conſpicuous body of the preſent Church*; which if it be *Section 7.*

not a very fallible meanes alſo (as in many reſpects I might prove it were particularly by this, that the compaſſe of Chriſtians that are of that *Church* of yours, is not by common computation a third part of the *Chriſtian* world) is certainly very diſtant from *Tradition*; which that it is not a meanes *infallible* in this matter, is all that his Lordſhip now contends in that preſent Argument.

Section 8. The onely thing that is by you produced againſt this difficulty of uſing this meanes, (and ſo pardonableneſſe of erring) is the laſt period of the Chapter, which commends the *reading of the* Magdeburgians *as a readier way to know conformity, then examination of places.*

Section 9. To which I anſwer, that if they have voluntarily confeſſed that there is conſtant Tradition for the infallibility of the *Roman Church*, then have you fitly cited them; if they have not, or if upon my preſent inſtance you doe not ſhew that they have either directly, or by certaine conſequence, then have you wronged them in this your affirmation, and left your ſelfe no meanes to prove your concluſion by that *medium*.

Section 10. This is all I ſhall ſay to that long Chapter, and in that I have ſhewed, that through it you much miſtooke the Argument propoſed in the title of the Chapter, the confutation of the fourth paragraph, of which there being two parts, you ſpake no word againſt either of them; and therefore if I ſhould allow every word of that Chapter to be true, though you would be beholding to me, yet would it be no advantage to you againſt his Lordſhip's preſent reaſoning, to which all you ſay is very extrinſecall and impertinent. But that I may not lay too great an obligation on you by ſo liberall a grant, I wil mention to you ſome infirm parts in that your diſcourſe.

Section 11. I have touched on three already; and your *evidences* (that your *Church* and *Religion* is the true) which you mention for the illiterate, and are no one of them *evidences*, may be added to the number; which I need not prove, becauſe you have not attempted to *prove*, but onely aſſert the contrary. And ſo alſo your Divinity cited out of *Ric: Victorinus*, if applied to your purpoſe: [*that whatſoever is once ſo creditable* (as you have there made the *Infallibility* of your *Church*) *can never be falſe*] Which beſide

ſide other falſities, muſt inferre other things to be *infallible*, beſide that onely infallible; for 'tis ſure that other things may by you be made ſo creditable, and as ſure, that what ever elſe cannot be falſe (God's veracity ſtanding engaged for it) is *infallible* alſo; and (not to mention your proofes of that Divinity) ſuch is your aſſertion, that the *Enquirer's* inference againſt the Church is, [*we thinke ſhe hath erred, therefore ſhe may erre*] for his inference is onely this; *if ſhe hath erred, certainly ſhe may*; which I ſhould ſay is another great injuſtice, by changing his Lordſhip's words, but that it is repaired and expiated with another act of more kindneſſe to us, though of as little force of reaſon; *that the inference is good, but the antecedent is infirme*; whereas in truth the Inference had beene nought, but the Antecedent either true, or onely in the power of the *Searcher of thoughts* to diſprove in him; ſo againe, that *the diſcovering the non-conformity of your Church with the Antients, may juſtly be thought impoſſible*; when if we had not *actually* done it, yet hereafter we might; and when in the preſent buſineſſe we affirme (and you goe not about to diſprove) that your pretending to the *Infallibility* of your *Church* is inconformable to the *Antients*, becauſe they did not ſo pretend; and ſurely ſuch is your affirmation, that *to ſend one to a witneſſe, and yet bid him not believe himſelfe in what he conceives that witneſſe tels him, is not as bad, as to ſend him in like manner, and bid him not believe the witneſſe*; there being no poſſibility of believing what the Witneſſe ſaith, but by believing himſelfe, affirming that that Witneſſe ſaid it: For if you ſay it be by believing of you (*i. e.* another Witneſſe) that that Witneſſe ſaid it; I anſwer, that that will include a believing himſelfe alſo, *viz.* himſelfe affirming that you teſtified that the other Witneſſe ſaid it.

I ſhall trouble you with no more at once, leſt you count me uncivill; one thing onely more I ſhall let you know I take notice of, that in the compaſſe of very few words you caſt off much of the reſpect due to Antiquity, by ſaying, that it is ſufficient, if we can by *any ſure way come to the knowledge of truth* (mentioning at that time onely the *conſpicuous body of the preſent Church* for ſuch) *without taking care whether it be conforme to the Antients, or no, &c.* By which as you acknowledge your preferring the *conſpicuous body of the preſent Church* (for the finding *Section* 12.

finding out of truth) before *Antiquity*, which is the ſtrangeſt ſpeech I could have look'd for from a defender of *Tradition*, ſo I confeſſe I ſee the reaſon why a Section that undertooke to prove that *Antiquity* was no *infallible* proofe of your *Churches Infallibility*, had in a long Chapter of anſwer to it, never a word ſaid in confutation of it; and ſo I very friendly take leave of it.

To the fifth Section, Chap. 6.

Out of that which hitherto hath beene ſaid, it appeares plainly how the concluſion which the Enquirer would inferre in this fifth Section, is no way applicable to our manner of probation of the Churches Infallibility: for we doe not, as he ſurmiſeth, maintaine that our Church the Guide of Faith, is to be knowne by ſuch markes by which the ignorant cannot ſeeke it, and the Learned may chance to miſſe, although with all diligence and without prejudice they enquire after it; for we affirme that our firſt principles of probation are certaine and manifeſt, and out of them, we with certainty, though not with evidence, evict the Church. By which manner of proceeding it is cleare, that our probations are Logicall and conformable to the rules preſcribed for the hunting out of truth by Ariſtotle *in his Analytiques, and the Philoſophers in generall.*

Some peradventure will deny our Churches verity to be evidently credible: If any doe it, the matter muſt be remitted to an equall triall betweene us. But, ſay you, who muſt be the Judge? I am no Socinian, nor inclining to that ſort of miſ-believers, yet nevertheleſſe, I ſay, right reaſon muſt be he, and every man's owne conſcience; and of theſe Judges, I hope all men will allow, and it is reaſonable ſure they ought to doe ſo, becauſe reaſon is in all queſtions the laſt and the interior Judge, without whoſe aſſent and approbation, no exterior is ſufficient and compleat. For exterior Judges be as ſpectacles to the eies; and as ſpectacles, be they never ſo good, cannot ſee without eies, ſo cannot revelation, be it never ſo manifeſt, give the laſt ſentence about any doctrine, nor be ſufficient without reaſon.

It may be further replied, that theſe principles of ours are alſo queſtion'd. Admit they be, yet nevertheleſſe may they be certaine and evident, otherwiſe we ſhould grant nothing to be certaine; for there is no one thing ſo evident, which is not queſtion'd by ſome or other.

C. 6. Answer to the 6. Chap.

That which you say to the fifth Section, is in effect the denying the *conclusion*, when the *premises* are either not deny'd, or not confuted; for that which his Lordship saith in that Section, you acknowledge to be a conclusion, and is so indeed of all that went before; all directly tending to this, That *the Church provided for the guide of faith, is offered by you to be knowne by such markes as the ignorant cannot seeke it by, and the Learned, though never so honest in his search, may chance not to finde it by.* This then being the conclusion of all the discourse you profesie to deny, upon no other proofe but by affirming, that *your principles of probation are certaine and manifest, i. e.* by saying the direct contrary to his conclusion, but not thinking needfull to prove it; And so beside that other absurdity in *Logick*, there is *petitio principii* againe. *Section 1.* A

In doing this you were, I conceive very much resisted by your owne spirit; for the satisfying of which you are faine to say this strange thing, that *your principles of probation are certaine and manifest, and out of them you evict the Church with certainty, though not with evidence:* where either you must affirme to thinke that [*evident*] and [*manifest*] are not all one, or else that the conclusion is not *evident*, when the *premises* are; either of which you shall have free liberty to take the choyce of, and maintaine in your reply. And when you have shewed your skill in so doing, you then shall have leave to boast that your *probations are Logicall and conformable to the rules of* Aristotle *in his Analitiques, and the Philosophers in generall*; but till then 'twas to no more purpose to say that of your selfe, then 'twill be to the edification of any that I have repeated it to you. *Section 2.*

Having thus confirm'd the conclusion with that great popular argument (that prevailes with so many) a bare confidence of affirming it, it is very remarkable what your next attempt is; why, in stead of that hard taske which lay so heavy upon your shoulders, to get an easier, if 'twere possible; and therefore you foresee that some may peradventure deny your *Churches verity* to be *evidently credible*. Good Sir, what is this but to suborne a weaker adversary to challenge you, that you may be excused from fighting with the stronger? we desire plaine dealing, that you will prove *your principles of probation to be certaine and manifest* (which *Section 3.* B

is the thing you affirm'd) and not to thinke to put us off with more obſcure and leſſe containing tearmes of *your Churches verity being evidently credible*. For firſt, your *Churches verity* (*i. e.* I conceive its being the true *Church*, for I hope you ſpeak not now of its *Metaphyſicall* verity, or its being truly a Church, for ſo it may be, and be very *fallible*, and very corrupt) is an equivocall phraſe, and, in what ever ſenſe, is not ſo much as your *Churches infallibility*; for it may be a *true Church*, and not be *infallible*, *i. e.* upon ſuppoſition, that what ever now it taught were actually true, 'twere yet poſſible it might erre, even when it doth not; nay, if its verity ſhould ſignifie that it were a *true Church* (as perhaps you meane) excluſively to all others, *i. e.* that the *Catholique Church* were the *Roman Church*, and the *Roman* the *Catholique*; yet ſpeaking of the preſent ſtate of the *Church*, *i.e.* of the preſent *Roman Church*, though it were ſuppoſed to be the preſent *Catholique* Church, yet may that be fallible again, becauſe thoſe that are now in the truth, may fall into errour, and others riſe up, as they fall, to be defendors of the truth, and ſo the promiſe of God of keeping his *Church* from finall or totall falling, be made good ſtill.

Section 4. As for that other largeſt notion of the *Catholique Church* (under which we confeſſe it to be infallible) that of the *univerſall Church* all the world over, without any reſtriction; I conceive it impoſſible, that by your *Church* (which is the *Church* with an eminent reſtriction) you ſhould meane that; and upon that ground it was, that I affirm'd, that the verity of your Church, in what ever ſenſe, is not ſo much as its *infallibility*.

Section 5. Then againe your phraſe of *evidently credible*, is not ſure ſo much as *certaine and manifeſt*; for though *evidently credible* ſound ſtrangely, (and if it have any ſenſe in it, hath alſo ſome obſcurity) yet I ſhall ſuppoſe you meane by it, that which is *credible*, or may be believed; and of which it is *evident* that it may, the words Grammatically can beare no other ſenſe then this, that it is *evident that they are credible*; now certainly to be *evident and certaine*, is much more then to be *credible*, though it be never ſo *evident* that it is *credible*. For ſuppoſe me actually to acknowledge that you have ſome probable arguments that your *Church* is the *true Church*; nay ſuppoſe it is ſo evident that you have ſuch arguments,

guments, that every man that hath common understanding will be ready to acknowledge you have so, doth it thence follow, that I, or all others, doe and must acknowledge that you have demonstrated it? this is to make no difference between the two sorts of Arguments in Logick, Topicall and Demonstrative; or in a word, to conclude that to be *infallible*, which you durst not say was any more then *credible*; for as for the word [*evidently*] added to it, it cannot have such an influence on the word, *credible*, as to make that quite another, or higher sort of things then it was; *Credible* in the clearest or highest degree is but *credible* still, as the eminentest or excellentest man in the world is a man still; and therefore in briefe, if we should helpe you to fewer adversaries then you have, and take off that suborn'd enemy of yours, whom you suppose to deny your *Churches verity* to be eminently credible, you would have gain'd by it but little peace from his Lordship, who would still require you to make good your pretension of *infallibility*, which will be a much harder theme to declaime for popularly, (I am sure Logically) then the credibility of the verity of your Church.

As for your way of answering that objection, because the objection is not needfull for us to make, Any reply, or confutation of your answer will be as unnecessary. I shall onely report to other men from your owne pen, one notable decision of yours, that in a triall of huge importance, concerning the *credibility* of the verity of your *Church* (I must be faine to use your phrase) *right reason and every man's owne conscience must be the Judge*; which being so great an act of complyance and favour both to those which assert *reason*, and to those that maintaine the private spirit to be the Judge of Controversies, *i. e.* to two sorts of men, which have hitherto beene believed opposite enough to your *infallibility*, it will be but gratitude to reward so great a bounty, with a favourable interpretation of a good meaning, and he should be very rude and uncivill, who would not grant upon such your demand, that you are no *Socinian*, nor inclining to that sort of *mis-believers*; for sure he that makes *right reason* the *Judge* of his very principles, must needs be so *rationall*, and ingenuous, that he can never be an *Heretique*, though he say the very things that *Heretiques* doe. *Section 6.*

Section 7. As for your very excellent similie of the *eies* and the *spectacles*, I shall not have a word to say to it, save onely this, that although you have gotten the incloſure and monopoly of *ſpectacles*, (I meane of impoſing of an *exterior Judge* upon us) yet other men may be allowed to have *eies*, as well as you, *i. e.* to have *reaſon and conſcience* to Judge of your Judge, and then the iſſue (according to your premiſes being granted to you) will be this, that they whoſe reaſon and conſcience tels them, that 't is not *evidently credible*, that your *Church* ſhould be the *true Church*, excluſively to all others, ſhall not be obliged to believe it is ſo (for *their owne reaſon*, ſay you, *and Conſcience is to be judge*) that they whoſe *reaſon*, *&c.* tels them it is ſo *credible*, may believe it, if they pleaſe; nay, if they have no arguments as credible to the contrary, and upon impartiall ſearch can finde none, it is very reaſonable for them to believe what to their conſcience is ſo *credible*; but if they have ſuch arguments to the contrary, or if it be their fault that they have not, they are ſure no farther bound to believe it (if they are not Subjects of your Church) then thoſe dictates of their conſcience doe extend to oblige them, or (if they are Subjects, yet) no farther then the doctrine of obedience rightly ſtated (which will be too long a worke for a parentheſis) hath influence on mens opinions; but then ſtill, what ever their caſe be for believing the *verity* of your *Church*, they can no way from thence be obliged to believe your *infallibility*.

Section 8. You confeſſe there may farther reply be made to you, that theſe principles of yours are alſo queſtion'd, but take no notice upon what grounds of reaſon or Scripture they are queſtion'd, and ſo thinke you can deale with ſo unarm'd an adverſary, as you pleaſe, by telling him they may be certaine and evident, though they be queſtion'd; and perhaps I ſhall confeſſe to you, that if they were onely *queſtion'd*, and no *reaſon* that were not by you eaſily anſwered, brought to juſtifie ſuch *queſtioning*, it were ſufficient which you ſay, that *queſtioning* doth not diſprove *certainty*; (and yet if every man's *conſcience* be the *Judge*, as you acknowledge, then unleſſe you can make it *evident* that that man's *queſtioning* is againſt *conſcience*, you will have no way to keepe it from being *certaine*, and *evident* to him) but when there be arguments produc'd to backe that queſtioning, which you have no way to anſwer,

answer, but by saying they may be *certaine* and *evident* for all that; he that disputes with you, will be excus'd to thinke he hath more reason to say (and that you say must be judge) that it may be otherwise.

To the 6. & 7. Sections, Chap. 7.

No doubt there can be, but God will reveale his truth to all such as seeke it with sincerity of heart; and though both sides, as the Enquirer objecteth, may make use of this for an exterior allegation, yet not as of interior helpe and preparation; and therefore this sincerity is not a disposition unprofitable, though it be a proofe inefficacious, and thus much we grant willingly, neither doe we challenge it as an argument of truth.

We grant him also, that before such time as we can believe the Church, we are to acquire sufficient principles for informing us which is she; and also before we can believe upon her determinations, we must have principles of knowing she is infallible, and all this we make profession we doe, de facto, *know. Neither doe we take this Church to be a* Proteus, *that is to say, sometimes of one shape, sometimes of another, but a conspicuous body constantly adorned with the robes of truth, and annexed to a Succession of Pastours legitimate from one age to another.*

C. 7. Ans. to Chap. 7.

Your answer to the sixth Section is by giving a distinction to tell us how both sides make use of the *pretence of seeking truth sincerely*] and concludes, that *sincerity is not a disposition unprofitable*, though it be a *proofe inefficacious*; which because you are willing to grant, I will containe my selfe from springing any game or recreation for the Reader at this time (of which he that were playsomely disposed, would finde abundant matter in the review of your distinction here applied) and give you present payment for your favour by acknowledging, that that which you grant, is all that is begg'd from you, *viz.* that God's promise of revealing of truth to those who seeke it sincerely, is not at all an argument, that they that pretend to the benefit of that promise, must have reall title to it; or consequently, that they that have no other arguments to prove their Churches *Infallibility*, but that they seeke truth *sincerely*, and yet after that *sincere* search are of that opinion, are to be heeded in their pretensions. This justifies *Section* 1. A

his Lordſhips ſixth paragraph, as fully as if you had ſubſcribed it without your diſtinction.

Section 2. His Lordſhips ſeventh Paragraph conſiſts of two things; Firſt, a reſuming of a part of his former argument, which had beene onely mentioned, but not inforc'd before, that [*ſuppoſing the Church were proved to be infallible, yet were not that ſufficient to give any man certaine knowledge which were it:*] Secondly, a ſolid proofe of this affirmation, by plaine reaſon, becauſe the granting the *Infallibility* of the *Church* did onely conclude, that God would alwaies have a Church that ſhould not erre, but not that this was appropriated to any particular *Church*, to ſuch a Succeſſion, to the *Biſhop* and *Clergy* of ſuch a place, &c. Thirdly, by a lively inſtance of the *Greeke Church*, which though it were now in the right, might hereafter erre, and ſo the *Greeke Church* be now fallible, and yet at the time that that erred, another *Church* might ariſe the Champion of truth, and ſo ſtill the *Church* be *infallible*.

Section 3. To theſe two parts of the *Paragraph* your diſpatch is ſhort, (and annext to the nothing that was replied to the former Section) to the firſt, a liberall Grant of that which no man thankes you for, (that *it is as neceſſary to know which that infallible Church is, as that the Church is ſo*) but then ſaying and profeſſing, that *you doe*, de facto, *know which is the Church, and that ſhe is infallible*;

B which (beſide that it is your old beloved *petitio principii*, to ſay you know it, & offer no proof for it, but your profeſſion and a Latine word, (when the very thing that his *Lordſhip* was juſt a proving, was, that you neither did nor could know it) comes not at all home to his Lordſhip's matter of ſhewing, that the acknowledgement of the *Infallibility* of the *Church* doth not evict, which is ſhe: For if 'twere acknowledged that you did know it, yet might it be by ſome other meanes, and not by proving or confeſſing the *Church* to be *infallible*.

Section 4. As for his Lordſhip's proofe and inſtance added to his propoſition, 'twas ſo deſpicable a thing, that 'twas not worth taking notice of; but inſtead of any ſuch thing, you give us a declaration of your owne opinion, that *the Infallible Church was not a Proteus, but a conſpicuous body conſtantly adorned with truth, &c.* which is againe the meaneſt begging of that which

was

was just then denied, and disprov'd; and must so stand, till you can annex reasons to your opinion, and answers to his Lordships reasons.

To the 8. *Section. Chap.* 8.

We never goe about to prove our Church to be the true, therefore, because it holdeth with the truth, or teacheth true doctrine, as this Enquirer seemeth to suppose we doe; but rather contrariwise, because it is the true Church of Christ, therefore we inferre it teacheth true doctrine; but that it is the true Church, we prove first of all and originally by reall revelations, called in the Scripture, Verba Signorum, *that is, by signes, ostensions, or motives of credibility; which motives for a great and sufficient part of them, are the same by which we prove to Infidels the truth of Christianity it selfe. For these same motives, though when they are considered but in generall, and as it were afarre off, doe perswade Christianity but in generall, without designing out in particular this or that Individuall Christianity; yet nevertheless the selfe-same being understood distinctly, doe designe out a distinct and individuall Christianity, and are applicable to none else; as for example, the same Species which shew me a man in generall afarre off, the selfe-same afterwards, when he comes nearer, being distinctly perceived, doe shew me that man is this individuall; as* Plato *for example, and no other: For reall Species doe not represent unto us,* Entia rationis, *or,* Individua vaga, *but determinate Individuals, namely, as often as those Species are distinctly and compleatly understood. As for the Circles into which both this Enquirer and* Chillingworth *would cast us, and make us dance within them whether we will or no, they are but Chymericall conceptions of fidling and trifling dispositions, which love to have toyes wherewith to entertaine themselves, and in this point of resolution, as we have declared it already, have no semblance of reality.* Psal. 104. 27.

C. 8. *Ans. to the* 8. *Chap.*

His *Lordship* supposing in *charity* that you had attempted to prove the *Roman Church* to be the *true Church* by its agreement with Scripture and Antiquity, which is in effect, by holding the truth; You plainely tell him he is mistaken in you. It seemes you defie such meane waies of proving yours to be the Church, as accordance with *Scripture* or *Truth*, you must have it by some more noble way of demonstration; and if you would stand to *Section* 1.

A

this peice of gallantry, and never urge *Scripture* or Fathers to prove your opinions, but content your selfe with your being the *true Church*, to prove all after it: As I confesse I should not charge on you that *Circle* which his *Lordship* doth in this particular (supposing, as he thought favourably to you, that you had proved the truth of the *Church* by the *truth* (and consonancy to Scriptures and Fathers) of your *doctrines*) so I should have two quarrels more against you, in stead of that one composed. First, that you would disclaime *Scriptures*, and fly to *miracles*, (for such
B are your *reall revelations*, as you interpret them by the *verba signorum*, in the Psalme, the *signes* being there interpreted by the *wonders* that follow) that you would fly to Gods extraordinary providence, when I presume you conceive his ordinary would have served your turne; for sure if at another time a man should have asked you, is not your accordance with the *Scriptures* and *Fathers* a prime proofe that you are the *true Church*, I doubt not but you would be so well natured as to confesse it; and why now should the *Devils* infirmity, the feare of a *Circle*, make you so cowardly, as not to dare to owne so popular an argument, especially when your fire comes downe slowly, or your *bath Col the voice from Heaven*, (which is the onely proper notion that I know of a *reall revelation*) is not very audible to us that are a farre off: nor if we were, to be put upon the racke; doe we know, or can confesse at this day, that we or any of our Fathers ever heard that 'twas so ever revealed, that the *Roman Church* is the *true*, or the *infallible Church*. And besides when you know, we Protestants are a little hard of beliefe, and dare not credit your owne report, that you have such *ostensions*, and *revelations*, and *signes*, when you neither produce witnesse, nor tell us, when or what they were, but give us farther ground of jealousie, by an odde phrase let fall by you, that those *reall revelations* of yours are *motives* (no more then) of *credibility*, when as true *miracles* acknowledged to be such, are *grounds of Faith*, and he is an *Infidell* that *believes* them not; and to be but a *motive of credibility*, is but a petty thing that every topicall argument will take place of, *probable* being more then *credible* in the ordinary notion of the words.

Section 2. The second quarrell that your words have brought upon you,

is

is your telling us (without proofe that it is ſo, but onely by giving a ſimilitude to ſhew it may be ſo, and ſo, in your phraſe, *to be a motive of no more then credibility*, which in him that concludes it is ſo, is *petitio principii* againe) that the *ſame motives you uſe to prove the truth of Chriſtianity againſt Infidels, will prove yours to be the true Church*; which being confidently ſaid, we are ſo vile in your eies, as not to be vouchſafed ſo much as the mention what they are, (unleſſe by your former words we conclude you meane *miracles*) much leſſe any *evidence* concerning them; And yet by the way, the miracles by which we prove the truth of *Chriſtianity* to *Infidels*, muſt be thoſe which we meet with in Scripture, and not thoſe other in your *Legends*; and upon a ſtrict ſurvey and recollecting of all them (and ſo *comming* as *neare* to them as can be) I muſt profeſſe I cannot ſee your Churches being the *true Church* in thoſe *miracles*, neare ſo clearly and diſtinctly, as I can ſee the man afarre off to be one of my acquaintance, when he comes neare me, which you undertooke I ſhould, and made me try; and therefore I hope will recompence me for the loſſe of my labour, by giving me your reaſons next time for your aſſertion, that I may try againe whether your proofes are more lucky then your experiments. C

But then I cannot ſee why you ſhould be ſcurrilous upon both his *Lordſhip* and Maſter *Chillingworth*, for thinking you were in danger of the Circle, in which *ſure* Baron *had deprehended* your Friend *Turnbull*, and in which you had beene engaged infallibly, if you had but gone about to prove your *Church* the true *Church* by the *truth* (or conſonancy to *Scriptures* and *Fathers*) *of your opinions*; which way of proving methinkes 'tis poſſible you may ſtand in need of, before you come to the end of your anſwer. In the meane, as the calling downe *Hercules* upon the Stage, was wont to be a *Character* of a *Tragicke* Poet, *i. e.* of a fabulous, wonderfull undertaker, *Cum fabula exitum explicare non potuerit*, ſo to fetch us in *miracles and oſtenſions*, to prove that divine truth that you confeſſe muſt not be proved by the Scripture, will paſſe for a peice of *Poetry*, I feare, inſtead of a motive of *credibility*; and thoſe that are chearfully diſpoſed, will be apt to tell you, that you were faine to *conjure* hard, and doe, or pretend *miracles*, or elſe you had beene encloſed in that *Circle*. *Section* 3. D E

To

To the 9. and 10. Sections, Chap. 9.

To theſe I anſwer in a word, that neither the Greeke, nor any other Church can pretend the Primacy or Principall ſucceſſion of Paſtours, that is to ſay, from the Preſident of the Apoſtle Saint Peter; *none, I ſay, beſides* Rome, *can pretend this; and without this one, none can be authenticall or ſufficient to prove a Church, or a ſucceſſion of Paſtours Eccleſiaſticall; and ſo the Enquirers ſtarting-hole in the Greeke Church, into which he alwaies makes his retreat, is prevented and ſhut up againſt him.*

By this alſo is the 10. Section anſwered, for whatſoever Churches claime unto ſucceſſion ſhall be alleadged, it can no way evacuate that of Rome, *as hath before beene ſhewed.*

Ch. 9. Anſw. to Chap. 9.

Section 1. Your anſwer to the 9. and 10. Sections, ſignifies a great deale, *viz:* that you were ſo put to it by the conviction of his Lordſhips argument, that to diſ-intangle your ſelfe you have ventured to vent a peice of very ſevere divinity, which my charity to you makes me hope you will not juſtifie; and if you will, yet your no argument produced, gives me nothing to anſwer, nor otherwiſe to reply, then by denying as mercifully and obligingly to the world, as you doe cruelly affirme; *viz:* that *without ſucceſſion ſufficient from Saint* Peter, *there is no ſucceſſion ſufficient to prove a Church, or a ſucceſſion of Paſtours Eccleſiaſticall*] and this is ſo ſtrange a newes to our eares (who were confident that what ever you deeme of the other two parts of three of the *Chriſtian* world at this preſent, you had allowed liberty to *Apoſtles* to ordaine *Churches*, as well as (and without ſucceſſion from) Saint *Peter*; and indeed that that which in the *ſecond* and *eighth* line of your Chapter, you call the *Greeke Church*, might have beene acknowledged to be a Church in the *ſeventh*) that had you not ſaid it in the moſt evident tearmes (*None beſide* Rome *can pretend this, and without this one, none can be ſufficient to prove a Church, &c.*) & had there been any way imaginable but this, to anſwer his *Lordſhip's* argument, I ſhould never have thought this had beene your meaning; till I ſee you againe owne this ſevere doctrine, I ſhall not take paines to confute it; and when I ſee that, I muſt ſay, that his *Lordſhip* preſumed you had not been ſo bloudily minded when he propoſed to you the argument in thoſe two Sections.

And

And yet after all this, I doubt not but with a little change, his *Lordſhips* argument will ſtill hold againſt you, even after you have ventured on ſuch ſtrange practices, to ſecure your ſelf from it, Thus; ſuppoſe you had evinced that the *ſucceſſion* from S. *Peter* were infallible, and ſo proved the *Roman Church* to be ſo, becauſe none elſe pretended to ſucceed S. *Peter*, yet this can be no ſufficient ground of belief to the *ignorant*, who cannot have any infallible foundation of *belief*, that the *Greek Church* doth not pretend from S. *Peter*, whether by S. *Mark* at *Alexandria*, who might be ordained by S. *Peter*, whoſe right hand, they ſay, he was in the penning of the *Goſpell*; or by *Evodius* at *Antioch*, where S. *Peter* was *Biſhop* ſeven yeares (as your owne *Baronius*) or by any other, or (to the ignorant it matters not) by no other known way; and even to the learned it is but an accidentall argument, becauſe if any other company had likewiſe claimed *Succeſſion from Saint Peter* (as they of * *Antioch* do) it had overthrown all that probation; nay it is but an arbitrary argument which the adverſary can confute by but denying; for if any ſociety of Chriſtians ſo called, would pretend to be from Saint *Peter* ſome other way, then by ſucceeding him at *Rome*, or ſubmitting to his government, your *Church* could make uſe of it no longer. *Section* 2.

* *Euſeb. hiſt. l.* 3. *cap.* 36.

As for that which you adde in a word of anſwer to the 10 Sect. that what ever *Churches* claime unto ſucceſſion, ſhall be alleadged it can no way evacuate that of *Rome*; if it be applied to his *Lordſhip's* argument, it is abſolutely falſe, for if *Rome's* claime to *Infallibility* together, and to *ſucceſſion* to Saint *Peter*, be to be proved by this, becauſe none elſe pretends to it (which is the argument which his *Lordſhip* here confutes) then ſure any other *Churches* claime, or pretending to it will evacuate that claime or title, that by that argument is pretended, and contrary to this there is yet nothing ſhewed. *Section* 3.

To the 11. *Section, Chap.* 10.

What mercy God will uſe in pardoning the errours of thoſe men who doe ſeeke ſincerely and yet miſſe, makes nothing at all againſt the ordinary proviſion and neceſſity of a guide, becauſe thoſe miſſes or miſtakings be caſes extraordinary. Beſides, I would know why any pardon ſhould need for ſuch innocent errours which be defects

involuntary, and ſo can be no crimes; Wherefore methinks the diſcourſe of our Enquirer in this Section is not coherent.

C. 10. *Anſw: To the Chap.* 10.

Section 1. His *Lordſhip's* argument Sect. 11. is very ſtrong againſt the collecting a neceſſity of an *Infallible* guide for the interpreting of *Scripture* from the *topick of God's goodneſſe*, by propoſing another way of reconciling *God's* providence with his goodneſſe in this matter, (which if it may be done, concludes that other unneceſſary) *viz.* by mentioning a doctrine of more *Evangelicall* œconomy; in which errours may be reconcileable with mercy, when *God* doth give grace to the diligent ſeeker to finde out truth, or by this *dilemma*, that without ſuch an *infallible* guide, upon the uſe of Reaſon in the interpretation of *Scripture*, and ſearch for *tradition*, God will either give grace to *finde what is ſo ſought, or pardon if he miſſe*; and ſo though it ſtand not with Gods goodneſſe to damne him for every errour, to whom he hath aſſigned no *infallible* way to finde out all truth, yet to him that is confident that God will not damne any man upon ſuch tearmes, as the ſervant laid to his charge, when he told him he was an *auſtere man, &c.* to him that teaches not ſuch legall bloudy doctrine againſt God, this argument of the *Romaniſts* will not be preſſing at all; this expedient of the *Goſpell-grace* or *Goſpell-mercy* being as fit for the turne of infirme ſoules, as an infallible guide would be; as indeed the ſtate of imperfection wherein we are placed, is as fit for our turnes, when the ὀπτείλια of the Goſpell is revealed, and proportioned to it, as *Adam's Paradiſe* of *Supernaturall* all-ſufficient *ſtrength*, and innocence would be.

Section 2. To all which all that you returne is only this, that all this is nothing againſt the ordinary proviſion and neceſſity of a guide; *becauſe thoſe miſſes or miſtakings are caſes extraordinary*: To which I anſwer, Firſt, that if it were ſuppoſed that againſt the *ordinary proviſion of a guide* the argument were not of force, yet ſure it might againſt the *neceſſity* of it, and then that is all that is pretended to by his *Lordſhip*, and that which alone is deſtructive to you; and therefore 'tis ſtrange you ſhould couple them together as ſo ſociall things, which are ſo diſtant and ſeparable, for ſure though *Evangelicall* grace and mercy doe not exclude an

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ordinary provision of an *infallible* way, but leave it *in medio*, that *God* may if he will make that *ordinary provision*, yet notwithstanding this, it followes not that such a provision is required, or neneſſary; There is a wide diſtance betwixt [*poſſible if God pleaſe*] and [*neceſſary to the vindicating of God's goodneſſe*] now againſt the latter onely it is that his Lordſhip argues, and is not at all concern'd in th'other, and therefore I ſhall not need to examine whether the firſt be true, it being ſo cleare, that the ſecond hangs ſo looſe from it, and will alone ſerve our turnes as well.

Section 3. But then Secondly, I profeſſe not at all to underſtand what you meane by that reaſon of your aſſertion, [*becauſe the miſſes or miſtakings be caſes extraordinary*] for firſt, how can it be denied in this imperfect infirme ſtate of mortality, that now we are in, but that *errours* and *miſtakings* are very *ordinary*? That they are common there is no doubt, and as little that they are agreeable to that order or courſe that is now among men, and to you that ſay in the next words, that you know not why ſuch defects ſhould need any pardon (and to us that acknowledge that they that reforme all other, and pray daily, *demitte debita*, ſhall through Chriſt have pardon of courſe for theſe) ſure they cannot paſſe for *extraordinary caſes* in either ſenſe, for that would imply, that now under the Goſpell it ſhould be ordinary, or regular to puniſh *involuntary* errours (which you ſay can be no *crimes*) and *extraordinary* either for us to *commit*, or for *God* to *pardon* them. B

Section 4. But then Secondly, if it were true that theſe *miſſes*, *&c.* were *caſes extraordinary*, yet can I not ſee how theſe words can be annext to your former, as a proofe of their being anſwer to his *Lordſhip* (becauſe how extraordinary ſoever the miſſes may be, the pardon for miſſes may doe as well for you, as an *infallible* guide) unleſſe you meane ſomewhat elſe by *ordinary* caſes, then what my capacity hath reacht to, and till you pleaſe to inſtruct me better, I ſhall ἐπέχειν, and by exerciſing my charity in not judging what I doe not underſtand, invite yours to inſtruct me that I may.

Section 5. As for the *Coherence* of his Lordſhips diſcourſe, you have little temptation to doubt of that, when you have ſaid that he conceives *that ſuch errours or miſſings ſhould need pardon*, for to that, all that he ſaith is *coherent*; It ſeemes you are not of his o-

pinion for the truth of that; and whether is in the right I ſhall not now examine, or enlarge to any ſo accidentall and extrinſecall diſcourſe, but onely tell you, that believing as you doe, you
C ought to have ſaid [*not true*] when you miſtooke, and ſaid [*not coherent.*]

To the 12. *Section, Chap.* 11.

To this charge we anſwer, that our proofes of a ſure guide, are themſelves alſo ſure; and what proofes thoſe are, we before have ſignified, Chap. 8. *&* *Sect.* 8. *and before Chap.* 5. *Sect.* 4.

Ch. 11. *Anſw. to the* 11. *Chap.*

Your next Chapter being but a reference to what you had before ſaid (and that before examined by us) my anſwer ſhall be anſwerably onely a reference alſo, without taking more paines, to put you in minde, how unfit your *Verba ſignorum* (which you there affirmed to be motives of *credibility*) are now to proceed or commence *infallible* proofes, for thoſe are they which his *Lordſhip's* argument requires in his 12. Section.

To the 13, 14, 15, 16, *Sections, Chap.* 12.

The Infallibility of Popes or Councels is no point of doctrine neceſſary to be knowne diſtinctly, before any reſolution of faith can be made, becauſe it is ſufficient to learne out of Catechiſmes and the common practice of the Church, What is to be believed: Neither is there any more probable feare of miſſing which is the See Apoſtolique, and which the Churches living in communion with it, then there is of a Subjects being ignorant to what Kingdome he belongs; and, as for doctrine of beliefe, it is found out as readily, and as ſurely as the other, by thoſe meanes of inſtruction which we have ſignified already. As for the Simony objected, Sect. 14. *it is no impediment of his power, ſo he be received peaceably by the Church, and not called in queſtion for it. The like may be ſaid of the decrees and definitions of Councels, together with the ſenſe or meaning of them. And by this the* 15, *and the* 16 *Sections are anſwered.*

C. 12. *Anſw. to the* 12. *Chap.*

Section 1. His Lordſhip, *in queſt.* after your *infallible* ground of faith, tooke into conſideration the *Popes Infallibility, Sect.* 13. the *Infallibility of a Councell by him called, Sect.* 14. and produced arguments, I conceive, convincing againſt each.

Section 2. To theſe your onely anſwer is, that neither of theſe *Infallibili-*

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ties are neceſſary to be knowne diſtinctly before any reſolution of faith can be made, and you give your reaſons for it, *becauſe*, &c. which is in plaine tearmes to grant and prove the thing which his Lordſhip deſires, and proves; for if they were the ground of *faith*, they would be neceſſary to be knowne diſtinctly before any reſolution of *faith*, the foundation being abſolutely neceſſary to the ſuperſtruction in *materiall* edifices; and in *intellectuall*, the diſtinct knowledge of a ground of faith being as neceſſary to a diſtinct reſolution of faith, as the ground it ſelfe, which workes not upon any man's underſtanding (the ſeat of this *Faith*) any further then it is *knowne*. This conceſſion of yours being all that is demanded of you at this time, we ſhall not need inſiſt on, nor debate farther, what influence the caſe of *Simony* may have upon the *Popes Infallibility*; If he be *infallible* at all, He, or He and a *Councell*, you ſay 'tis not neceſſary to ground *faith*, (which is the onely uſe we have of it in this preſent enquiry) for it ſeemes the *Catechiſmes*, or common practice of the *Church*, are ſufficient to teach what is to be believed.

What? Is the *Popes* and *Councels Infallibility* made unneceſſary? and is a Catechiſme and common practice of the Church ſufficient for the grounding of *faith infallibly*? Certainly we are growne very low, and are ſuppoſed men of very moderate deſires, if it be thought we ſhall thus be content with the *Infallibility* of a *Catechiſme*: For whatſoever is ſufficient for the grounding of faith *infallibly* (remember [*infallibly*] muſt come in, for otherwiſe 'tis not to his *Lordſhip's* diſcourſe) muſt it ſelfe be acknowledged *infallible*. Which if you ſhall pleaſe to affirme of any of your *Catechiſmes*, as I ſhall firſt deſire to be directed which *Catechiſme* it is, that of *Trent*, or what others, (that I may not miſtake in the choice of my Guide) ſo I ſhall make bold to demand whence this *Infallibility*, or authority of this prime guide of *faith* is to be fetcht? It will be ſure from the authority of the *Pope* (or *Councell*) of that time when 'twas compiled and confirmed, and then ſtill we fall backe to the infallibility of the *Pope*, or *Councell*, which it ſeemes in the laſt reſolve is become neceſſary againe to the grounding of *Faith*, and ſo againe muſt be knowne before any reſolution of *Faith* be built (even upon the *Catechiſme*) which was the thing you juſt now denied: As for the common *practice* *Section* 3.

of the *Church*, that that ſhould be a ground of *Faith*, or ſufficient for us to learne by it, what is to be believed (beſides that this is a weaker ground then *Catechiſmes*, as much as errours are more likely to get into the practice of the many, then into the Bookes of the Learned, or *Authentique* Writings of the *Church*; and accordingly 'tis obſervable in the particular of *images*, that the common practice of men is much more groſſe, then the Writings of the Learned) 'tis impoſſible that that ſhould ever be a guide, *quâ eundum*, *which way we are to goe*, till it be ſome other way proved, that we ought to goe that way.

Section 4. For the improbability of miſſing the *See Apoſtolique*, and which be the *Churches* that live in communion with it, we have no obligation lying on us to deny it; his *Lordſhip's* words gave you no occaſion to aſſert it; nor can we ſee what at this time you can get by it, when you acknowledge the *Infallibility* of Pope or Councell unneceſſary to be knowne before any reſolution of faith can be made.

Section 5. You adde [*and as for doctrine of beliefe*, *&c.*] This I ſhould conceive you had ſpoken of before in thoſe words [what is *to be believed*] and then your memory was ſhort to put it in againe within five lines, as if it had beene a new matter.

Section 6. I told you 'twas not neceſſary, after you had confeſſed the cauſe to inſiſt on the matter of *Simony*, which was an argument of his Lordſhips to defend it. Yet that you may not complaine that any word of yours is neglected, or loſt upon us, I have conſidered that alſo, and aske you whether it be not true what his *Lordſhip* ſaith, that a *Pope* choſen by *Simony* is *ipſo facto*, no *Pope*, you (durſt not, I conceive, becauſe you) did not before deny it; and if now you will take more courage, let your minde be knowne, and we ſhall not doubt to bring as *Claſſicke Authors* as your ſelfe againſt you. If it be true, then is your anſwer of no validity, becauſe of no truth; for either that infallibility, or whatever other power, muſt be annex'd to him as a man (which he may be indeed, though he be not *Pope*) or under ſome other relation, which *infallibly* belongs to him, (neither of which, I conceive, you will affirme, for then ten thouſand to one, ſome other will communicate with him in that claime) or elſe he muſt be *Pope*, when he is, *ipſo facto*, no *Pope*; or elſe that power muſt

muſt be annext to him by ſome body, that may thinke him *Pope* when he is not, and then either *God* muſt runne the errour, or that power be given him from ſome other, for that *God* ſhould know him to be no *Pope*, and yet give that power of *Infallibility* (for if you ſpeake of any other power it is not pertinent) to him, as long as he is peaceably received, muſt, Firſt, conclude that a *no-pope* may be *infallible*. And Secondly, that whoſoever is ſo received by the *Church*, is ſo; which unleſſe there be ſome promiſe of *Gods* to aſſure me that he hath promiſed it to the *Churches* blind reception, will, for ought I yet ſee, conclude againe, that either the *chaire* or the peoples *errour* gives him that prerogative.

To the 15, and 16, Sections, you reply no one word, but referre it to your former anſwer, whether, if I knew which part of your anſwer it were (for that immediately precedent I conceive 'tis not, for I hope the *Simoniacall* election hath nothing to doe with the decrees of *Councels*) I ſhould attend it, but the ſcent being cold, I am at a loſſe, and ſo muſt be content to give over the game. *Section 7.*

Yet ſeeing I am on this matter of the *Popes Infallibility* (becauſe you have wholly avoided that queſtion, and by a kinde of ſtratagem diverted it, and ſo not given me any occaſion to defend his *Lordſhip* in that matter) I ſhall a little conſider the reader, (to whom I am much obliged, if he ſhall have had patience to read thus farre, *i.e.* to endure the penance of ſo much *Nothing*) and give him a few collections of my owne, to this purpoſe of the *Popes* infallibility; not that I conceive they will from me finde any better entertainment then his *Lordſhip's* reaſonings had done, but becauſe they are for the moſt part the conceſſions of your owne men, from whence I here tranſcribe them. *Section 8.*

That the Pope is not onely *fallible*, but even judicially ſubject to *errour*, deviation, defection, and (in *Ocham's* phraſe, *hæreticabilis*) to hereſy, apoſtacy, Atheiſme, and in his practice to ſinne of any the moſt hainous kinde, and conſequently to damnation irreverſible. I ſhall aſſert no farther then theſe honourable Names will avow and authorize me. Among your owne Writers, (I meane *Pontificians*) *Lyra in Matth.* 16. *Waldenſis, l.* 2. *doctrin. fidei antiq. Gerſon. de exam. doct. conſid.* 1, 2, 3. *Adrianus Sextus* *Section 9.*

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the Pope, *in 4. sent. de confirm. qu. ult. Driedo de libert. Christ. l. 2. c. 2. Cardin. de Turrecrem. l. 2. c. 16. Almainus de author. Eccles. c. 8. ad 6. & c. 10. & de dom. civ. nat. & Eccl. concl. 3. Archidiaconus Bononiensis, in Grat. gloss. in dist. 19. contra Auxentium. Catharinus in Gal. 2.* Yea and the *Councels* of *Constance* and *Basil*, and the Fathers generally there assembled, which I hope tooke not up this doctrine from *Luthers* or *Calvins* dictates.

Section 10. To this purpose is it that we reade of *Childebert* King of *France*, that he sent *Ruffinus* his Legate to *Rome*, to enquire of *Pelagius* the *Pope*, whether he had violated the Faith, as (*a*) *Baronius* testifies; the same was suspected of him by the *Bishop* of *Tuscia*, and other *Bishops of Italy*, to whom he sent his *Apologie*, saith the same (*b*) *Baronius*. So *Gregory* the first, being under the like suspicion, wrote his (*c*) *Apologie* to *Theodolinda Queene* of the *Longobards*. So the *Popes* generally laboured to approve themselves to the *Emperours*, and purged themselves before them; *Sixtus* before *Valentinian* concerning the crime laid to his charge by *Bassus Symmachus* upon an accusation of forgery, saith an (*d*) Author in *Goldastus*; all which are arguments that the *Popes* infallibility was in those daies unknowne to the world, and the *Popes* themselves were not very perfect in it; if they had, they would have beene more confident then to have made *Apologies*.

(*a*) *Ad ann. 556. n. 25.*

(*b*) *Ib. n. 30.*

(*c*) *Greg. l. 2. ep. 4.*

(*d*) *Anonym: de stat. eccles. c. 7. ap. Goldastum in monarch. t. 1. p. 29.*

Section 11. Farther yet, the *Bishops* of *Germany* met at *Brixia*, the *Bishops* of *France* at *Mentz*, condemned the *Pope* for a disciple of *Berengarius*. Or if the condemnations of such will not be of value against the *Pope*, you gave reason even now leave to be the *Judge*, and that, and common sense may be so in this matter, if you will but read the (*e*) Epistle of *Pope Zachary* to *Boniface*, *è Cathedra*, a *Papall* and definitive *rescript*, wherein he condemnes one *Vergilius* for an *Heretick*, for affirming that there were *Antipodes*; which whether it were an errour in him, I leave you to judge, and professe my self to be of opinion, that though it were, 'twas yet more tolerably discreet and pious, then that of *Gregory* the seventh, that *there is but one name under Heaven, that of the Pope, to whose Seate whosoever paid not obedience, became presently an Idolater and a Pagan*; and if you will undertake to defend this, I will reward you by adventuring to justifie the other. That speech of *Gilbert*, *Bi-*

(*e*) *Inter Epistolas Hyber. p. 49.*

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ſhop of *Rhemes*, that after was *Pope*, ſhall with me be ſufficient to expiate for either; *Audaciter dicam, &c. I ſhall boldly ſay, that the Biſhop of Rome himſelfe, if he have offended any Brother, and will not heare the admonitions of the Church, ought to paſſe for an Heathen and a Publican.* *In Epiſt. ad Sequinis Senonenſem.*

But all theſe are but trifles, if they be compared with other knowne paſſages of ſtory, how *Stephanus* was reprehended by *Cyprian*, *Liberius* by *Athanaſius*, *Honorius* almoſt by all *Chriſtians*, of no leſſe crimes then Hereſy it ſelfe. Or becauſe that is but one piece of *carnality*, and there be many others beſide that, as probable, and conſiderable errours, and carnalities, I beſeech you review either in your memory, or in *Onufrius*, and *Platina*, the lifes and manners of the *Popes*, the *inceſts*, and *ſorceries*, and *cruelties* of *Alexander* the 6. the *Idolatrous* ſacrifices of *Marcellinus*, *Caleſtin's* uſing the helpe of *Magitians* and *Devils* to come to the *Papacy*, and then tell me your opinion, whether *Popes* may not *erre*; and when you have replyed, by way of diſtinction of *manners* from *Doctrines*, be then pleaſed to anſwer † *Nilus* (by ſome more ſatisfactory way then by calling him *prating Greeke*) this queſtion, πῶς ἔργοις ἐνδέχεται τὸν Πάπαν ἀρνεῖσθαι θεὸν, λόγοις δ' ὐδαμῶς, *how it falls out that the Pope can deny God in his Workes, but cannot by any meanes in his words*; (what charme or amulet kept his tongue inerrable, when his whole body was ſubject to thoſe darts of Satan) and when you have done that, I beſeech you to phanſy to your ſelfe what kinde of crimes you conceive thoſe *Popes* would have committed, if they had beene fallible. *Section* 12. † *De Papatu.*

I ſhall not enlarge this ſupernumerary trouble any farther, or expect your anſwer to every of theſe paſſages in Bookes; if I have wronged any by miſciting, I ſhall be glad to heare of it; and if they make not all together one probable argument or proofe of the *fallibility* of the *Pope*, I beſeech you pardon me for this unneedfull importunity. *Section* 13.

To the 17. *&* 18. *Sections, Chap.* 11.

I noted before, that the knowledge of all theſe particulars recited by the Enquirer, are no way neceſſary to the Believer, and therefore both this Author and Baron *the Scotch Miniſter ſtruggle in vaine, when as with ſuch care and vehemency they preſſe them againſt us.*

I conclude then, that in the Church of God Councels *doe not multiply doubts, but diminish them.*

C. 11. *Answ. to Chap.* 11.

Section 1. To the 17, & 18, Sections, the answer is a reference againe to a note dropt from you before, which truly I should not have been likely to apply to this businesse in hand, if you had not given me that seasonable admonition. Your *note*, I conceive, referres to your discourse in the precedent Chapter, how *Catechismes*, and the *common practice of the Church teach all, what is to be believed.* And (as then the *Popes infallibility*, so now) that of *Councels* is unnecessary to be knowne, and by that meanes all these particulars also; for if the *infallibility of Councels* were necessary to be knowne (as it must be if they were deciders of questions) then all these particulars mentioned by his *Lordship*, would be *necessary* to be knowne also, because they are incident to every *Councell*, and the knowledge of its *infallibility* (because of its decisions, and even being it selfe) depends on these.

Section 2. And the fitnesse of *Councels* to decide Controversies being the thing his *Lordship* had now in hand, and which *Baron* treats on, when he uses the like arguments, sure neither of them struggle in vaine; but you rather (who 'twas thought in reason would have beene no wiser then your fellowes, and so would have asserted that fitnesse of *Councels*) have become a very slippery Wrestler, gliding out of their hands, when their arguments began to lay hold on you; and after such an escape as this, I confesse 'tis matter of wonder to me, how you could thinke fit to end with a θειαμβευλικὸν, *triumph* presupposing *victory*, and *victory resistance*, and none of these here are to be heard of, but onely a conclusion, that what his Lordship had said and proved, he had said falsely (a *petitio principii* againe) that *Councels doe not diminish doubts, but multiply them.* Which proposition and proofe of his Lordships, having no need of defending any farther, I shall onely interpose one caution, which I desire may be observed in his *Lordships* discourse, that it being supposed, that *Councels* are dot deciders of controversies, (meaning thereby *infallible* ones) they be yet of good *authority* and *use* in the *Church*, to helpe to decide them, and (notwithstanding all the doubts that his Lordship saith they doe multiply) be onely denied by us the priviledge of *infallibility*, not

that

that other of being very *usefull* and *venerable* in a lower degree, and (such the *Councell* may be) even next to the *Word* of *God* it selfe.

To the 19. Section, Chap. 13.

He maintaines here a strange paradox, and one very improbable, namely, that to define any thing of new, is to bestow upon the Devill one path more for us to walke in towards him. If you aske why, he tells you, because, before the definition made, it was lawfull to hold either side, but after, it is damnable. Belike then with this Author the manifestation of divine truths is the high way to damnation; but I suppose few men are of his minde. Certainly most are of opinion, that every such verity we learne, had rather beene a new steppe towards Heaven, because knowledge of things divine doe enable men for the attaining of salvation; and therefore the Apostles by their instructing our understandings in them, shewed the world so many more paths to Heaven. It may be indeed that by accident minds blowne up with selfe-conceit, may by their resisting such revealed truths, take an occasion to transgresse, but that is their owne faults, not the fault of them that teach, or of the verities that are declared, and therefore this cavill of the Enquirers against the definitions of Councels was very frivolous. It would seeme he had a great minde to be quarrelling with Councels, that was content to take such a frivolous exception as this against them.

C. 13. Answ. to Chap. 13.

Your great quarrell to his *Lordships* 19. Sect. comes now to be considered; wherein the paradox in, and improbability of his *Lordships* conclusion will not be so great, if you observe but one thing, that the matter of definitions of *Councels*, which he speaks of, is not *divine truths*, (as the following words suppose them, and upon that presse them with absurdity) but, as I conceive, such things as have beene defined by *Councels*, being not before defined by *Scripture*, and so though affirmed to be *truths*, yet not as *divine truths*, at least of which it is not *infallibly* true, that they are so: of which nature I might instance at large in your Councels of *Lateran*, *Constance*, and *Trent*; for to the *antient generall* Councels I confesse to beare such reverence, that I shall challenge any of you to exceed me. *Section 1.*

Now to cleare his Lordship from the guilt of a frivolous quir- *Section 2.*

rell at this time, I muſt adde, that in ſuch deciſions of Councels, the worth of the matter, and inconvenience of leaving it undecided, are the maine things worth conſidering; and ſo it is poſſible that the deciſion may be ſuch, that it may tend, Firſt, to ſome publique end, whether the clearing of obſcure Scripture, or the recovering of ſome venerable and uſefull practice, or doctrine of the Church. Secondly, to the ſetling and eſtabliſhing of peace, by interpoſing ſuch a judgement which may probably ſway with both pretenders; And in theſe, and the like caſes, the advantages being ſo intrinſecall to the deciſion, and withall ſo great, the inconvenience mentioned by his Lordſhip ought not to prevaile to the diſparaging of Councels, becauſe though it be an inconvenience, yet is it over-weighed with other conveniences, and therefore the argument I confeſſe is not infinitely or unlimitedly true.

Section 3. But then the caſe may be, that the matter of the definition is of no ſuch great weight or uſe, that there is no ſuch aſſurance acquirable from Scripture, that either ſide is true, (nay it may be audacious and untrue) and as little from any other *κριτηρια*, that either ſide will peaceably ſit downe and acquieſce in the deciſion, (but in matters of *opinion* probably prove *opiniatour*) and ſo the deciſion will then rather widen the breach then compoſe it.

Section 4. In this caſe, or when indeed in other reſpects the ballance is even ſet, the good of defining counterpoiſed with the ill, then there is place for his *Lordſhip's* argument, and 'tis true that then upon that preſent ſuppoſition (that before deciſion 'twere lawfull to hold either way, and damnable after) it were uncharitable to define; my reaſon is, becauſe when *charity* doth not move to doe a thing, *i.e.* when no advantage ſhall ariſe to mankinde by it, but on the other ſide *charity* ſhall adviſe to abſteine; ſome one, (though accidentall) hurt, being foreſeen to ariſe on the other ſide, there to doe that thing is uncharitable.

Section 5. Thus have we heard of an expreſſion of *Biſhop Tunſtall* of *Durham*, who died in your communion, that if he had beene *Chaplaine to Pope Innocent the Fourth*, he would have begg'd on his knees, that he would not define *Tranſubſtantiation*, as knowing it would tend to the breach of the peace of the Church; and thus in matters of controverſy about *Predeſtination*, *&c.* you know the

the *Pope* hath in *charity* abſtein'd to define, and the *Apoſtles* (or whoſoever elſe were the compoſers of it) in their Creed defined but a few things; and generally thoſe Churches that have avoided multiplying of articles, have by wiſe men beene thought the moſt Chriſtian, becauſe the moſt *charitable*; and even in matters of rites and humane lawes, the rule is, that they muſt not be *multiplyed* unneceſſarily; and the reaſon is, becauſe they would conſequently *multiply* ſnares on mens conſciences, as unneceſſarily, which is juſt his *Lordſhip's* reaſon in this place.

Which you will rather gueſſe, becauſe 'tis cleare his *Lordſhip* ſpeakes of *thoſe things in which before a Councell hath determined, it is lawfull to hold either way*, perfectly *lawfull*, (not excluding alſo that other circumſtance that I have added, *viz:* when there is no reall gaine expectable by defining) And when the [*thoſe things*] are by his Lordſhip ſo *limited* and *reſtrained*, I know not how (to make up your *paradox*) you could thinke fit to change the phraſe from [*thoſe things, &c.*] to [*any thing*] and after to [*divine truths*] and [*things divine*] and [*verities*] in generall, when 'tis improbable that he did (I am ſure very poſſible and probable that he did not) ſpeake of any ſuch, as are *new ſteps toward Heaven*, but ſuch as onely fill mens braines, puffe up their phanſyes (and oft make men to thinke themſelves pious men for being of ſuch opinions, and to neglect workes of *piety* and *charity*, as not neare ſo conſiderable) and ſo are to them even that believe them, accidentally *pathes to damnation*, much more (if the doctrine of the deciſions of Councels be to be extended to whatſoever uſeleſſe *definitions*) to thoſe that doe not *believe* them. *Section 6.*

Having ſaid thus much for defence of this ſuppoſed *paradox* of his Lordſhips, I muſt deſire (once for all) theſe two things from the Reader, which *Equity* will require of him to *grant* me; Firſt, that his *Lordſhip's* arguments be not extended *infinitely*, but onely be ſuppoſed to undertake to conclude as farre as is neceſſary to the preſent matter, and no farther, (an example of which this Chapter hath afforded you) Secondly, that his arguments being by him brought onely to enervate the *Infallibility* of the Roman Church, be ſo cautiouſly taken, as that they be made uſe of onely to that end, and not at all inclined, or wreſted to the leſſening the *authority* of the *Church* or *Councels univerſall*; for *Section 7.*

this would be very unjuſt, and ill inferred, there being a wide difference betwixt *authority* and *infallibility*, as alſo betwixt *univerſall* and *Roman*, though (by reaſon of the manner of his Lordſhips diſcourſe, being, according to the deſigne, wholly *deſtructive* of the one, and not *aſſertive* of the other) the Reader may perhaps be tempted to thinke otherwiſe; and therefore I thought it not impertinent thus to fortify him againſt this prejudice.

To the 20, 21, 22, *Sections*, *Chap.* 14.

It is true, We condemne ſome doctrines which generall Councels have not condemned, and we have great reaſon for it, becauſe though Councels be one rule of faith, yet not the onely. Againe, theſe we hold to be infallible, becauſe they are the Compendium *and quinteſſence of the Church, and the body repreſentative thereof, as a King and the three States be of the Whole Kingdome.*

The cauſe of Pope John *the 22. is cleared ſufficiently by* Ciacconius *in his life, by* Caeffeteau *in his learned anſwer to* Pleſſye's *iniquity, and by many others, and therefore needs not be argued any more. I grant it a point of faith that the ſoules of the juſt ſhall ſee God before the laſt judgement, and doe deny that this doctrine was generally contradicted at any time. Nevertheleſſe I doe not know it to be of faith that all of them ſhall enjoy the ſame viſion before that great day, and that none of them ſhall be detained in ſecret receptacles, as the Antients hold, till they, together with their bodies, ſhall be compleatly purged in the great fire of the Worlds conflagration, as I have treated elſewhere.*

It was not needfull that Councels ſhould define in tearmes their owne immunity from errour, becauſe a Councell both in ſubſtance and ſemblance is the Church, who needs not define her owne infallibility, and therefore needs not, becauſe that ſame is to be preſuppoſed to all her definitions as a thing knowne without them, before hand; for otherwiſe ſhe would not be believed in any of them at all, either touching her ſelfe, or any other matter. Nevertheleſſe though this definition be not in tearmes, yet it is vertually done, and in actu exercito, *as often as a Councell defineth any thing, by the pronouncing of* Anathema *againſt ſuch as doe not ſubmit, and counting them as Heretiques; It is done againe in the uſing continually this old forme,* Viſum eſt Spiritui Sancto & nobis.

For a concluſion I demand of theſe eager impugners both of Church and

and Councels, what thing it is must regulate our beliefe, and keepe us in discipline and unity; for if they let all men loose upon themselves, and make all men Judges in the Court of faith, as they, de facto, doe, controversies will multiply apace, and no meanes left to reconcile them; and while all men have authority of deciding, no man hath it. Reason alwaies did teach us, that confusion would be the effect of this new licence; yet could we never understand it, till that now costly experience, the mistris of the improvident, hath laid it open before our eies. And now at length we smart for our leaving the venerable decrees and definitions of Church and Councels, and doe behold all brought to misery and ruine, both Church and State; yet such is our blindnesse, as we are not able to discerne the true causes of all these evils. The daily growing up of new and new devices in stead of the old faith, and the continuall discords and dissentions thereupon ensuing, evict unanswerably the weaknesse and inaptitude of the rule of faith, and our young and presuming wits may see how farre short they come of their forefathers wisedome, and how much more unhappy then those who were governed by Church and Councels.

C. 14. *Answ. to Chap.* 14.

The first part of this *Chapter* in the *Apologist*, is answer onely to one of three or foure proofes of his *Lordship's* argument, Section 20. *viz.* to that against the *Councels* being a rule of *heresy*, [*when some passe for Heretiques that are not condemned by any Councell*] To this I confesse it were satisfactory (if it were proved) to say that *Councels* are a *rule*, but not the *onely rule*. But then, First, there is no other rule specified. And Secondly, this argument of his *Lordships* is complicated with three others, being joined with which, it is of force to strengthen one of them (though of it selfe it were not sufficient to conclude) and then neither of those are taken notice of. Thirdly, 'tis meant but as a proofe against this rule, not against any other. And yet Fourthly, his *Lordship's* method being to confute every one of them single, as they lye; all others being disproved, this must be concluded the *onely* one, or none at all; and however, no more can here be required, then that here he disprove this from being the rule, not that he disprove all others in this period. *Section* 1.

For your way of proofe [that *Councels* are *infallible*] First, that is not answer to the contrary proofe; And Secondly, it is by a *Section* 2.

medium

mediums as much denied, as it ſelfe (the *Infallibility* of the *Church* whoſe *quinteſſence* it is) and ſo your old acquaintance, *petitio principii* againe.

Section 3. Your ſecond part about *John* 22. puts us off to *Ciaconius* and *Caeffeteau*, whom in obedience to your direction I ſhould adviſe with, but that I ſee from what you have learned from them, that either you have proved an ill Schollar (and 'twere inſolence in me to hope to be better) or elſe that their reſolutions are not pertinent to his *Lordſhip's* argument; for the three things that you adde (I conceive from their Writings) are nothing at all to it.

Section 4. Firſt, not that which you grant, for his Lordſhip grants it. Secondly, not that which you deny, for his Lordſhip had not affirmed it (unleſſe from theſe words [*he was not alone*] you conclude, that that which he contradicted, was *generally contradicted*; and then what his *Lordſhip* ſaid, may be as truly ſaid to be generally *granted*, for he is not you ſee alone in ſo ſaying.) Thirdly, Not that which you ſay you *doe not know*, for his Lordſhip knowes it as little, and indeed ſayes never a word of it. Whereas the onely thing wherein the force of that part of his Lordſhips argument conſiſted, *viz. Bellarmines* excuſing *Pope John* (in his denying of that which you believe) from the *no-Councell* that had defined againſt him, hath no title ſaid to it, but continues in great ſecurity, to make good the argument, [*that you doe amiſſe* (and withall either you or *Bellarmine* are very partiall) to *condemne thoſe that are condemned by no generall Councell.*]

Section 5. Your Anſwer indeed to the 21. Section, is nearer to the mark, but yet it hits it not; The argument is, that no *Councel* ever decreed a *Councell* to be *Infallible*, therefore as farre as the argument is drawne for beliefe, from the *infallibility* of the *Councell*, I am not bound to believe it *infallible*. To this you anſwer, 1. *That for Councels ſo to define, was not needfull, becauſe a Councell is the Church, and the infallibility of that is a præcognitum in all her definitions, otherwiſe it would not be believed in any.*

Section 6. Here is excellent contrivance, 1. *For Councels to define that Councels are infallible is not needfull*; which ſure is *needfull*, if nothing be to be believed, but what the *Councell* defines to be ſo, and that muſt be granted, 1. if the *Councell* be the rule of beliefe; and 2. if the *Councell* be the *Church* (as you ſay it is) for that is the

the *onely rule infallible*, if you be not deceived. 2. That the *Councell is the Church in ſubſtance.*] I thought it had beene in *repreſentation* onely, and that nothing is the Church in ſubſtance, but the Church in its full extent, of which you ſaid before, the Church is onely the *quinteſſence*, which ſure is not the ſame in *ſubſtance* with that whoſe *quinteſſence* it is, but onely the *repreſentation of it*. 3. That the *Infallibility of the Church is a præcognitum*; if ſo, then it is a *principle*; and if ſo, then I am ſure I muſt not looke to ſee it prov'd, and then as long as we deny it, (as we doe, you know) that is *petitio principii* againe. 4. That *unleſſe the Church were preſumed infallible before its determination, it could never be believed in any*: this ſuppoſes men very hard-hearted, that never will believe any thing, but what ſome preſumed *infallible* tels them.

There is a *beliefe* (as well as a *certainty*) *cui non ſubeſt dubium*, of which a man doth not doubt, as well as *cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum*, in which there can be no falſity; and the *Schooles* have told you of a *certainty* of *adherence*, where there is none of *evidence*; and let me tell you, this is the difference betwixt *beliefe* and *knowledge*, the latter onely is inferr'd *demonſtratively*, or by premiſes that cannot be otherwiſe, the former being content with *probable* arguments, ſo they be *ſtrongly probable*, and ſuch as have not any the like, or of as conſiderable weight to be ballanced againſt them. And this ſure is the reaſon that *Faith* is by *God* thought fit to be *rewarded*, as being an act of the Believers *choyce*, (and knowledge not, becauſe it is *neceſſarily* and irregably induced) and yet ſuch, as that it will be all obſtinacy and perverſneſſe to *reſiſt*, when it comes well provided with arguments *extreamly probable*. *Section 7.*

For, if you marke it, the moſt weighty actions of our lives, and thoſe which we doe moſt conſtantly, and moſt confidently, are founded no deeper then on *probabilities*. We eate and drinke for the ſtrengthening and refreſhing of our bodies, and yet conceive not our ſelves to have any certainty of *evidence* or *demonſtration*, that every bit we eate, or drop we drinke, may not *choake*, or *poyſon* us; yet having *probabilities*, on which to grond a beliefe, that they are *wholſome*, and no ſtrong contrary *probability*, that our *table ſhall become a ſnare*, or death unto us, we doubt not to *Section 8.*

feed as securely, as if *Euclid* had beene our surety by one of his *Demonstrations*.

Section 9. So in every piece of land I buy, or estate I enjoy from my Ancestors, 'tis possible (and the contrary not *demonstrable*, or certaine in that sense) that there may be some flaw which may undoe me, and yet when I have searcht my evidences, and have the opinion of wise men upon the matter, I sit downe, and trade, and live securely, and all this but upon probabilities, without the παναπλία, or full armour of *infallibility* or *demonstration*.

Section 10. And so in all matters of fact, which we see or heare not with our owne eies or eares, but as with *perspectives* and *otacoustickes*, I meane where we are faine to trust the relations of others, be it that there was a *Julius Cæsar*, or a *Henry* the eight, the ground of our beliefe is but a *probability*, *viz.* the *topick ab authoritate*, the argument taken *from the authority of the relators*; which though it be never so strengthened by the universall concurrence and nondissenting of all witnesses, cannot yet ascend higher, then to be *extreamly probable*, and yet sure is as firmely believed of us; and although it may *possibly* be otherwise (the contrary implying no repugnance, or contradiction in nature, and he that should be so mad to affirme it, being not confutable either by *rationall*, or *ocular demonstration*) yet as little *doubted* of by any man in his right wits, and as little lyable to any scruple, or matter of doubt, as what is most visible before our eies.

Section 11. This I have said perhaps *ex abundanti* (yet shall not repent of it because it is usefull to be considered in order to other difficulties) to shew you the falsnesse, and inconsequence of that argument, that unlesse the *Church were presumed infallible before its determinations, it could never be believed in any*. For hereby it hath appeared, that that may be *believed*, nay cannot sometimes without pertinacy and sinne be *not believed*, (as in case the arguments, though but probable, be excessively so) which brings not with it *demonstration*, or any thing of equall power or force with it, and such is *infallibility*.

Section 12. And from thence you will easily discerne, how possible it may be for us *Protestants* to believe the *universall Church* in all things, wherein the testimony appeares to be *universall*; nay to believe the *Church of Rome* in many things, wherein the arguments produced

duced by her, doe actually *perſwade* with us, (ſuch are her conſonancy with *antiquity*, and the like) and yet to remaine conſtant to our preſent undertakings, that ſhe is not *infallible*.

But it now appeares that I might have ſpared this paines, in preſſing theſe inconveniences on that firſt anſwer of yours. For it ſeemes by what followes, that all that anſwer was needleſſe; For now upon better conſideration, 'tis true (with a diſtinction) that the *Councell* doth *virtually*, and *in actu exercito*, define its owne *infallibility*; and that you prove, Firſt, becauſe it pronounceth *anathema's* againſt thoſe that ſubmit not; Secondly, it doth it by ſaying [*Viſum eſt Spiritui Sancto, &c.*] *Section* 13.

Not to examine your phraſe of *actus exercitus*, as 'tis here applyed; To your arguments we anſwer, Firſt, that our *Councels* denounce *anathema's* too, yet you know doe not pretend to *infallibility*. *Section* 14.

That forme, I conceive, ſignifies not, that all are damned that believe not what we *believe*, but that all they that ſhall *diſ-believe* may be excommunicated, if they be refractory; and that againe onely in reference to thoſe that are under dominion; but not that all others that are not under us, ſhould by us be ſo handled; or that thoſe that are not excommunicate, are in that other danger; or if theſe are, yet not for the ſinne of diſ-believing an *infallible* doctrine, but for not believing our lawfull ſuperiours; which may be a damning ſinne, though they be not *infallible*, their being in the truth, when they make ſuch conſtitutions, is ſufficient for that. Secondly, the forme of [*Viſum eſt Spiritui Sancto*] is onely a forme tranſcribed from the *Acts*, arguing it their opinion (that uſe it) that this particular is the dictate of the *Holy Ghoſt*, not at all their beliefe, that the *Holy Ghoſt* was bound to *aſſiſt irreſiſtibly*: which he muſt (as well as *aſſiſt*) to make the *infallibility*; for otherwiſe when he *aſſiſts*, we may poſſibly not make uſe of his *aſſiſtance*. In plaine, 'tis an evidence that they thinke they are in the truth, not that they cannot be in the wrong. *Section* 15. *A*

To the 22. Section, though you anſwer not a word, yet you are as diſcreet as if you did, you doe another thing in ſtead of it, you aske a queſtion, and harangue upon it at large; the *Queſtion* is pertinent enough (though not to this Section, yet) to the buſineſſe *Section* 16.

in groſſe, and we anſwer it in a word, that the Word of God muſt *regulate our beliefe*, and reaſon, in the uſe of all the meanes that you will commend to us, and you have given us a pledge already, that you will not quarrell with us for this anſwer; as for diſcipline, and keeping in unity, we had, bleſſed be God, meanes very ſufficient to that end, till the ſword wreſted them (as all other our lawfull poſſeſſions) out of our hands; and I believe the *Infallibility of the Church* is not *Weapon-proofe*, or able to keepe *Reſiſters* in *obedience*, or *Schiſmatiques* in *unity*.

B

Section 17.

As for your uncharitable judgement, that want of an *Infallible Church* (which muſt be but want of that *inſolence* to undertake our ſelves to be *Infallible*) is (that and no other) the * cauſe of all our preſent miſeries; and his Lordſhips doctrine in this Book, (although never ſo remote) the cauſe of his death: This is but to let us ſee your change or variety, that you can uſe *non cauſa pro cauſa*, and not deale onely in *petitio principii*; thus was *Tenterden* Steeple the cauſe of *Goodwin Sands*, and that is all I ſhall returne to your State-obſervation; the cauſe of our preſent calamities, I conceive, came not out of the *Church*, but when it was infamous, it fled to it for a Sanctuary, to give it an honeſt Name, and a protection together; and I could tell you that the League in *France* was once pretty parallel to ours, and then 'twas the obſervation of a knowing man, that if a true ſtory of the cauſes of that Warre ſhould be written, the buſineſſe would be traced into ſuch or ſuch a brothell houſe, that made as if it came out gravely from the *Church*; a competition or animoſity, the *αἰτία*, or *true cauſe*, when religion was onely the *πρόφασις*, or the *pretended*. Beſides, let me tell you, that deciſions and anathematizings have ſometimes done as much hurt toward occaſioning of breaches, as licence and acknowledgement of *fallibility* hath done; (and if you marke, the onely colour of *charge* at this time againſt our Church, hath beene the impoſing *too much*) and truly whatever your opinion is, I conceive *meekneſſe* hath the promiſe of *this life*, and I never knew that pretending to *Infallibility* is the onely Symptome of that.

* That paſſage in the *Apologiſt* to which this was returned, is by him in his laſt thoughts held better to be omitted, and accordingly I have left it out there.

To the 23, 24, *&* 25, *Sections, Chap.* 15.

The argument of theſe three Sections, is, how an ignorant illiterate man cannot be able to trace out all traditions which be truly Apoſtolicall:

ſtolicall: and this is ſought to be perſwaded and made good, by ſundry intricate diſcourſes, all which I willingly doe pretermit, and onely ſignifie that they all fall wide of the marke; for, in a word, our anſwer to them is, that private men ſtand in no need at all of having any particular information of them, but, that it is ſufficient for them if they doe learne what is the common doctrine of the preſent Church, without looking any higher to the Primitive and elder times: becauſe this doctrine now taught is credible and perſwaſive enough for ſatisfying of any wiſe mans underſtanding, and the ſetling of his judgement upon it: as for example, it is ſufficient for any man deſirous of knowing which is the River Thames, *to ſee it at* Graveſend *or* London, *without any laborious aſcending by it higher and higher, and tracing the ſhoares thereof, till he come unto the ſprings; and more then this would not be needfull for the diſtinguiſhing of it from* Severne, *or* Trent, *or any other River. For if this kinde of aſſurance might not be ſufficient, then certainly few or none could ever have come to know which Water was the famous River* Nilus, *of which few have ever ſeene the ſprings, and which, as it is very likely, doe lye conceal'd in* Æthiopia, *and wholly undiſcovered even to this day.*

Againſt the poſſibility of ſearching out traditions Apoſtolicall, and diſcerning them from others that be ſpurious and falſe, his principall inſtance, and that in which he moſt confides, is the doctrine of the Chiliaſts or Millenaries; and the ſame example is vehemently preſſed and repeated often by his Friend Chillingworth. *The ſubſtance of all they ſay conſiſts in this, namely, that their doctrine, although now generally received to be erroneous, was received in the firſt* 200. *yeares with one conſent, as a tradition Apoſtolicall. For making of this charge good, they both of them doe jointly alleadge Saint* Juſtin *as their witneſſe. But that we may judge moſt favourably of this their allegation, we needs muſt tell them they are miſtaken groſſely, for Saint* Juſtin *ſpeaking there of three ſeverall ſorts of Chriſtians which were in his time, affirmes, that of thoſe three but one of them held the doctrine of the Chiliaſts: The firſt of theſe three ſorts was, as he deſcribeth, οἱ καθὰ πάντα ὀρθογνώμονες, Thoſe, who as he conceived did in all points hold aright. The ſecond claſſe conſiſted of ſuch other, who although they did not, like the former, in all things hold aright, yet nevertheleſſe were, τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς γνώμης: men of pure and pious judgement or*

Juſtin in Dialcum Tryphone.

beliefe, for so he expresſely ſtileth them; the third and laſt ſort were ſuch as denied the reſurrection, and were therefore cenſured by him to be Chriſtians rather in name then in reality, and juſtly to be compared with the Sadduces amongſt the Jewes. Thoſe of the firſt ſort he telleth did hold the doctrine of the thouſand yeares. The ſecond ſort, as he expreſſely witneſſeth, although they were orthodox and good, yet did not hold that doctrine. Thoſe of the third ſort, as he ſaith, were Chriſtians, but feignedly, and in name alone, and reſembling the Sadduces, yet not for their denying the errour of the thouſand yeares, for what relation could that have unto the Sadduces? But, contrariwiſe, for their denying the reſurrection, as the Sadduces did, and all this appeares clearly, within the compaſſe of a few lines, in the Greeke text of Saint Juſtine; Beſides, if all at that time had beene perſwaded of the truth of the Millenaries fancy, what needed Saint Ireneus have laboured ſo much, as he did, and ſpent ſo many Chapters in the proving of it? This being ſo, it appeares as plainly that the Enquirer and alſo his Partner Maſter Chillingworth, were both of them deceived in ſeeking to father upon Saint Juſtin, that all Orthodoxall Believers of his time received the doctrine of the Chiliaſts, and that ſuch as did not, were held as Sadduces, or Heretiques; for, in the Text of Juſtin, there is no ſuch matter, but rather the quite contrary to it, as may appeare fully by the Text it ſelfe, and partly by the words before recited out of him; for, without all doubt, Saint Juſtines many of pious and pure judgement or beliefe, and were no Chiliaſts, muſt needs be Orthodox, and could not be Heretiques, nor as the Sadduces amongſt the Jewes, unleſſe we will ſay that with one breath, he called them by both contrary names. Againe, if, as theſe men ſay, all the whole Church were Chiliaſts during the firſt, ſecond or third hundred yeares, how could or durſt Dionyſius of Alexandria have oppoſed them, either without forcing his owne Conſcience, or incurring the blame of Hereſy? Now, it is certaine he was not counted an Heretique; and againe, very unlikely he would ſtraine his Conſcience, by oppoſing any doctrine, received as orthodoxall by the whole Church. Againe, it is probable Saint Dionyſe the Areopagite oppoſed that doctrine, therefore it cannot be certaine, that during the firſt 200. yeares, it was not oppoſed: that Saint Dionyſe did it, appears by the Workes now extant bearing his name; and that theſe works be

be his, is very probable, first, because they are received for such by the major part, both of the Westerne and the Easterne Church; secondly, because they were cited for his a thousand yeares agoe, and numbred amongst the rest of the Fathers antient and undoubted Monuments, by an intelligent Author, Philoponus, l. 2. de Operib. Creat. c. 21. & l. 3. c. 9. & 13.

The like may be said of the pretended tradition of the Quarto-decimanes *touching the celebration of Easter after the manner of the Jewes, which was wholly rejected and forbidden in the first* Nicene *Councell, and before that time opposed by many, and principally by Pope* Victor, *who, as* Ciacconius *conceives, did not cut* Polycrates *and his Associates from the body of the whole Church, but only threatned it, or, as* Eusebius *seemes to say, did doe it, but, yet at the instance of Saint* Ireneus, *and some others, if he had once put it, did not prosecute the censure against them, but let it fall; and, that it was so, is very probable, because there is no memory made how the sentence was received, whether with obedience, or otherwise; which particular, doubtlesse, would never have beene omitted by Historians, no more then the sentence it selfe, or the intention of it was, if there had beene any thing to register; and besides, because we finde not by any record, but that all proceeded with those Asian Churches, as formerly it had done, without any note or alteration. And, by this, is solved all that* Chillingworth *with so much animosity, objecteth against the learned Cardinall* Perone.

Salvian lib. 5. de Gubern. Dei, *where he speakes in excuse of some Arian Gothes, speakes not at all in excuse of their Heresy, but supposing that sundry of them might have beene innocently misled, conceiveth more hope of such mens salvation, then of such Catholiques, who lived carelesly and lewdly. Now, what can this make against the tradition, or definition of the Church? Onely this Inquirer must say something to his Mother, and be making difficulties where none is.*

Ch. 15. *Answ. to the Chap.* 15.

To the three next Paragraphs, 23, 24, 25. you professe it needlesse for you to give any answer, and doe it so willingly, because, as you say, the discourses are intricate, *i. e.* such as you cannot easily accommodate answer to; but especially, because it is *sufficient for private men to learne the common doctrine of the* *Section* 1.

preſent Church, and therefore there will lye no obligation on me to reply any thing, ſave onely this, that his Lordſhips arguments doe ſtill prove ſufficient to the end, to which he deſigned them, to ſhew that Tradition is no infallible guide, which that you acknowledge, your diverſion ſeemes to intimate, and your many proofes, that 'tis not needfull it ſhould be.

Section 2. But then it is in you a great injuſtice, not to take notice of his Lordſhips deſigne, to which his arguments are concluding, (but to impoſe another on him, to which he never thought himſelfe engaged, nor could have foreſeene your pleaſure without the ſpirit of divination) and yet, to chide him for impertinence, and pretermit and deſpiſe all that he hath ſaid upon this onely ground of diſpleaſure, becauſe he hath not proved what you now thinke fit to ſet him for his taske.

Section 3. This onely you muſt pleaſe to note, that the appointing the ignorant to learne their beliefe from the common doctrine of the *Church* (as before you did from the *Catechiſmes*) doth intimate your opinion, that your *preſent Church is infallible*, but is no ſhew of proofe that it is ſo (and ſo *Petitio principii*) nay if your words ſignifie, as they ſound [that your *doctrine thus taught is credible and perſwaſive enough*] I may conclude that your *Church* is not infallible; for whatever is taught by ſuch an one, is more then credible and perſwaſible.

Section 4. Your ſubtilty about the way of knowing the River *Thames* will as little come home to the buſineſſe of Infallibility (though to Credibility it may) unleſſe every Water-man on the River be as infallible as your *Church*, for of him it is that I learne it; and though his credit be great enough for a matter of this moment, and in it I would as willingly be ignorant or uncertaine, as be at the trouble to ſeeke out a better ſecurity: In matters of greater moment, I may be excuſed if I am not ſo credulous, if I chooſe not to believe them, whoſe intereſts are concerned, at leaſt if I thinke every *Catechiſme* on the ſtall to be ſomewhat leſſe then infallible.

Section 5. Having now ſufficiently diſclaimed Tradition (at leaſt ſhewne your opinion of it, that you have little need of it to ſuſtaine your *Churches* infallibility) and ſo granted as much as his Lordſhip attempts to prove, yet for ſome former profeſſion of kindneſſe

to

toit, *you* will now take its part a little (rather then his *Lordſhip* ſhall be permitted to ſay any thing true) and vindicate it from the argument about the *Chiliaſts*. In which I muſt tell you, that what you here affirme of his *Lordſhip* and M. *Chillingworth* is not true of his *Lordſhip* (whether it be of M. *Chillingworth* is not *tanti*, as that not having the booke by me, I ſhould take the pains to examine it.)

As Firſt, this, that he ſeekes to father on Saint *Juſtin*, that all *orthodoxall* beleivers of his time received the doctrine of the *Chiliaſts*, whereas all that his *Lordſhip* ſaith, is but the repeating of *Juſtin's* owne words (wherein he cannot be deceived in your opinion, for you before recite the ſame) and tranſlating them (wherein he is not deceived, for he doth it *ad literam*) and in a word affirming, that *Juſtin ſaith he holds it, and ſo doe all that are in all parts orthodoxe Chriſtians*, which phraſe [*all that are* (*i. e.* which he ſaith are) *in all parts orthodox*] that it differs from this other of yours [*all orthodoxall beleivers*] I ſhall appeale to no other judgement then that of your owne conſcience, who in the former page affirme, that *Juſtin* ſpake of three ſorts of men; Firſt, Thoſe that did as he conceived in all points hold aright; the ſecond, which though they did not ſo in *all* things, yet were τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς γνώμης, *of a pure and pious judgement*, (and thoſe which are ſuch I ſhall ſuppoſe to be orthodoxall beleivers, though as it appears by your acknowledgment, they did not hold right in all things.) Or if your analyſing of the place doe not ſufficiently convince you of this difference, (and the injury that conſequently you have done his *Lordſhip*) I ſhall then, (having long agoe ſeriouſly weighed that place) Firſt, give you an account of it, ſuch as I doubt not will ſatisfie you; and when I have done ſo, Secondly, confeſſe the weakeneſſe of that place to conclude any thing againſt *Catholique tradition*; and yet Thirdly, make it cleare, that you have wronged his *Lordſhip* in your report of his citation. *Section 6.*

Firſt, For the doctrine of the *millennium*, I profeſſe to beleive, that it appears not to be *Juſtin's* affirmation, that it was not oppoſed by his *contemporaries*, but rather the contrary, which I conclude from theſe words, Πολλοὺς γὰρ ἄν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς ὄντων χριστιανῶν γνώμης ταῦτα μὴ γνωρίζειν ἐσήμανά σοι. *I* *Section 7.* P. 306. C.

have signified to you that many doe not acknowledge this doctrine of the 1000 *yeares, and those many, Christians that are of pure and pious opinion or judgement.* And that you may be beholding to me, I shall also professe, that I am not of the opinion of those learned men that have conceived that period false written; and that either ἂν should be changed into ἅ, (which would be a strange and bold Criticisme, of very ill example, if it were admitted against the consent of copies; and then Secondly, it would leave a very perplexed period of it) or that μὴ should be left out; For first this would be as dangerous a Criticisme, and of as ill example, which would make Authors opinions mutable into the quite contradictory; and yet such, as is not without example among you, witnesse the disputation between the *Regulars* and *Seculars* in the controversy about the necessity of having an *Ordinary* here in *England*, upon occasion as I remember, of a *Canon* of a *Councell* concerning *Confirmation*, one side contending that [*non*] should be in, the other that it should be left out, a controversy about a word, nay a syllable, but yet that of some concernment. Secondly, if either of those emendations should be admitted, the antecedents and consequents would not naturally and in good stile connect, but the sense of this period would be just all one with that that went before immediately.

Section 8. A Second proofe of what I said I shall fetch from this, that *Trypho* in that place (though *Justin* had told him that he denied not the *Millennium*, yet) suspected that *Justin* had equivocated with him on this ground, because other *Christians* were not of this opinion, and therefore begins with εἰπὲ μοι εἰλικρινῶς, *tell me whether you confesse it sincerely*, ἵνα γνῶ εἰ πεπεισμένος εἶ, &c. and *Justin* answers, *that sure he would not say it if he had not thought it*, and thereupon repeats, that he had confest to him, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ταῦτα φρονοῦμεν, and promises he would set out a Booke of this disputation, and professe it openly to others as well as him, and adds, that he *means not to follow men and their doctrines, but God*; all which argues his acknowledgment that the opinion was not uncontradicted by men, nor generally consented to by *Christians*.

Section 9. A last proofe shall be, that those words which seeme most to the contrary [ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τινὰς κατὰ ὀρθογνώμονας καὶ πάντα χε-

P. 397. σιανοὶ]

σιανοὶ] will not come home to the proofe of it, nor indeed of any more then this, that he was of that opinion, *and some others in all things consenting with him*; for it being supposed that he was of that opinion, it cannot be expected of him that he should affirme any that hold it not (though never so orthodox in other things) to be κατὰ πάντα ὀρθογνώμονες, *of right opinion in all things*: because every honest man supposing his owne opinions to be right, (for else he will *change* them) must also suppose, that they that differ from him in one of those are not in that, (and so not in all things) of *right opinions*.

For the truth is, he speaks of three sorts of men (wherein I shall not differ much from you) the first, that *denyed the resurrection and the* 1000 *yeares*, and those he calls λεγόμενοι χριστιανοὶ, ἀρθροι, ἀσεβεῖς, ἀιρετισάτται, *nominall Christians, Atheists, impious, hereticall leaders*; the second, those *that acknowledged the resurrection and denyed the Millennium*, and those are contained under καθαροὺς καὶ εὐσεβεῖς γνώμης ὄντες χριστιανοὶ, *Christians of pure and pious opinions*; the third sort, those *that held both*, as himselfe, ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, *many others*, and εἰτινὲς κατὰ πάντα ὀρθογνώμονες, *if there were any that were orthodox in all things*. *Section* 10. P. 306. P. 307.

This being thus set downe (if you please) by way of compliance with you in the first place, I shall make no scruple to adde in the second, that by *Justin* it cannot be concluded, that the 1000 yeares was a matter of *Catholicke* beliefe in his time, but only favour'd by him, and many others, and consequently, though that were after condemned in the *Church*, would it not be from this testimony inferr'd, that a *Catholick* doctrine, (much lesse a tradition) were *condemned*. *Section* 11.

And therefore (which was the third thing I promised you) you may observe, that his *Lordship* spake very cautiously, and (as any man will now conceive) very *critically*, according to the importance of *Justins* words, that *Justin held it, and said, that all that were in all parts* (that is in all particular points) *Orthodox Christians did so too*, but no more, which is much lesse then what you lay to his Lordships charge, in the first place, that he *fathers on Justin, that all Orthodox all believers of his time received the doctrine of the Chiliasts*; And infinitely lesse, then that which you lay to him in the second part of the charge, that he *fathers* *Section* 12.

againe *on Justin, that such as did not receive that, doctrine were held as Sadduces or Hæreticks*; To which I answer in a word, that sure your memory of things is confused, and so apt to betray you to write things, which are apparently false, for so this particular is, his *Lordship* not saying one word to this purpose in this paragraph.

Section 13. Which three things being thus cleared, I shall now proceed to view your dealing in that which his *Lordship* mentions from *Irenæus* in this matter.

Section 14. Of him indeed it is true, his *Lordship* saith, that he *sets downe the doctrine of the Chiliasts* directly for a *tradition, and relates the very words that Christ used, when he taught this.* And to those words of his *Lordship's*, I shall make bold to adde the words of

P. 497. *Irenæus* on which they seeme to be grounded: *Presbyteri qui Johannem viderunt, meminerunt audisse se ab eo. & hæc Papias Johannis auditor, Polycarpi contubernalis vetus homo, testata reliquit. The Presbyters that saw John, remember that they heard this of him: and Papias, Saint Johns Auditor, that dwelt with Po-*

P. 498. *lycarpus, an ancient man, left these things testified.* This surely sounds somewhat towards a testimony of *Apostolick Tradition*, and if it be capable of an answer reconcileable with your doctrine of *Tradition*, may yet certainly be acknowledged a difficulty worth your taking notice of. And yet you that were so large on that of *Justin* to little purpose, have not vouchsafed to take notice of this of *Irenæus*, but on the other side affirme, that *Irenæus* laboured very much, and spent many Chapters in proving of it. From whence, I confesse you are willing to assume, that all at that time were not perswaded of the truth of the *Millenaries* fancies; but as that is a strange way of concluding, from his spending pains and Chapters to prove it, to inferre that it was not generally believed in his age (when 'tis possible his so large a proving did make all men then of that opinion, and his proving it positively, and not against any adversary, though it doth not prove he had then no adversary, doth much lesse prove that he had) so is there not added by you any other, or indeed, any tittle of answer to what is brought by his *Lordship* out of *Irenæus*.

Section 15. His Lordship saith also in this Paragraph, that they that were afte

after against the *Millenaries* never quoted any for themselves before *Dionysius Alexandrinus*, who lived 250 yeares after *Christ*: this indeed sounds somewhat toward concluding, that that was the doctrine of the first age not opposed by any prime *Doctor*, and might be worth your pains in answering too, but you endeavour not that neither, but would make it improbable, that if it were so generall a doctrine, *Dionysius* should dare to oppose it. This is very ill arguing against a matter of fact, to aske how could or durst he? there is nothing done so many yeares since, but some *probability* may, by a witty man, be brought against it; I confesse I acknowledge my opinion, that there were in that age men otherwise minded (as out of *Justin* it appeared) and his *Lordship* saith nothing to the contrary out of any other evidences, (no more then we made it cleare he did out of *Justin*) all that he saith is, that *Papias* had gotten the *Prime Doctours* into the beleife of it, and that no one of those two first ages opposed it, that is, wrote or interposed in any considerable manner against it.

And if I were apt to change my opinion in this matter, on easy tearmes, I should goe neare to doe it upon the view of your proofe of the contrary, so exceeding feeble and weake is it. For supposing all the eminent men for those ages had beene for it upon the strength of some places of *Scripture*, and *Papias* his report from Saint *John*, it would not yet be very difficult for a learned man, *Dionysius Alexandrinus* (when no act of *Councell* had interposed or bound up that doctrine) in the degree that he thought that those places of Scripture were misunderstood, and that *Papias* had abused them, in the same degree I say, to declare his opinion and the grounds of it, and never force or *straine his owne conscience*, or incurre the blame of heresy by so doing. *Section 16.*

For what thinke you of another opinion that *Irenæus* tooke up just upon the same tearmes, of Christs being betwixt 40 and 50 yeares old, for which he vouched Scripture, as he did for tother, and the authority of *omnes seniores* (larger then *Presbytery* in tother) *testantur qui in Asia apud Johannem discipulum Domini convenerunt; id ipsum tradidisse eis Johannem &c. All the Elders witnesse it, that were in* Asia *with* John, *that he delivered it to them; & qui alios Apostolos viderunt, hæc eadem ab ipsis audierunt, & testantur* *Section 17.* *Adverſ. hær. l. 2. c. 39.*

testantur de ejusmodi relatione, they that saw the other Apostles, heard the same of them, and beare witnesse of such a relation. This is as high an expression of *Apostolicall Tradition* (if we will beleive *Irenæus*) as universally testified to be so, as any could be thought to be. And yet sure you would not thinke it a *sinne against Conscience*, or obnoxious to the censure of *Heresy* for any man of meaner parts and authority then *Dionysius Alexandrinus* to have opposed this *phansy*, and profest his opinion to the con-
C trary; you must know that there was not that perfect yoke of tyranny gone out upon all mens necks as now your *infallible Church* doth glory of, that no man must oppose any the meanest assertion or opinion of the Doctours of the Church, (though not at all defied) but presently he must be an *Heretick*; at least *divinity* was not turn'd into such an *art*, that it must receive no grouth, or sensible *change*, but all goe on in the same tracke, beleive (nor understand) no more in Scripture, then the *present Church* understands, and so in effect have all their skill in *tongues* and *fathers*, and even their judicative faculty as so many unprofitable burthens upon them, that must not be made use of to the discovery of an errour, to the helping of the world to more light, reforming any thing that is amisse in it.

Section 18. This which is one of the greatest moderne crimes in *Christianity*, was not so ancient as those purer daies, wherein life was as censurable, as now false opinions, (I meane such as though supposed false, are yet perfectly *extrinsecall* to the *analogy of faith*) wherein ἀσέβεια and εὐσέβεια, impiety and piety, divided the Church into erroneous and true members, and teaching of opinions not before embraced (so it were not with pride, or judging of others) could be well enough endured. And so (according to the old rule of *distingue tempora*) doe but consider how distant those times are from these amongst you on one side, and your opposite extreame (that runne from you so farre, till they meet you againe at the *Antipodes*) on the other, and you will give *Dionysius Alexandrinus* leave to dare oppose that doctrine of the *Chiliasts*, though it had (more generally then it did) prevailed amongst them.

Section 19. Another argument you have against the generall reception of
D that doctrine, [*that 'tis probable Saint* Dionysius *the Areopagite opposed*

oppoſed it] I wonder one that aſſerts an *infallible Church* ſhould deale ſo mightily in *probabilities*, juſt as if a profound *Geometer* ſhould uſe but *Topicall* arguments. Now to ſee how you prove this *probability*, *'Tis proved by the workes now extant bearing his name.*

What workes thoſe are, and how improbable to be his, I could give you a large account by ſome hints which I remember *Photius* in his μυριοβιβλον helpt me to, but I ſhall ſatisfie my ſelfe onely with anſwering your argument out of *Philoponus*, briefely E thus. That in the places by you cited, he mentions onely an *Epiſtle* of *Dionyſius* to *Polycarpus*, in which you know, or may know, there is no word of the *Chiliaſts*, and then that will be a very aliene teſtimony, and very unable to countenance the bulke of thoſe bookes under *Dionyſius* his name; which may all be ſpurious, (and in them the teſtimonies againſt the *Chiliaſts*) though that letter ſhould be canonicall; and now ſee, I pray, what your probability is come to.

For your diſcourſe about the *Quartodecimani*, I will not di- *Section* 20. vine how it came in here, but am ſure it hath no right to be taken notice of by me; his *Lordſhip* having not ſaid one word of them, nor of any friend of theirs, whoſe intereſts lye common with them; and therefore ſhall I returne no word to that part of your diſcourſe, till you ſhew how I am obliged to it.

What his *Lordſhip* ſaith out of *Salvian* you confeſſe to be true, *Section* 21. but ſee not what it makes againſt *Tradition*; If you be not mo- F deſt in concealing your knowlekge in this matter, but really ignorant, I ſhall then tell you. His *Lordſhip* proves by this, that the *Church* that ſuffers *Salvian* to be a member of it while he refuſes to paſſe ſentence of condemnation upon *Arrians* (after they were condemned by a *Councell*) either differs much from your *Church* (that will condemne any man for an *Hereticke*, that ſhall profeſſe not to condemne all Proteſtants) or elſe muſt ſuppoſe and admit the plea for *Salvian*, that he was ſo earneſt againſt *ill* men, that for aggravating of their crime he leſſens that of *Herettckes*. And then if it may be accepted in one *Fathers* behalfe, that he could ſpeake *hyperbolically*, or paſſionately, why may it not be admitted in *another*, that one of thoſe, or ſome other collaterall conſideration might have influence on any ſpeech that

ſhould

should be cited from them, and then the authority of fathers will cease to be *infallible*.

Section 22. For this, by the way, you may please to observe of his Lordship's reasonings about *tradition* and *authority of fathers*, (which before I gave warning of) that they are not designed, or fitted to the taking away all *authority* from them, to make them vile or meane to any, but onely to reduce them *in ordinem* to prove them not *infallible*: the *Topicke à testimonio humano*, is but a *Topicke* still, and though sometimes being heightened with circumstances (of which it is capable) it is a very convincing *Topicke*, yet is not for all this a *demonstration*; and so there is a *difficulty* which may exercise you in stead of *scoffing* of his *Lordship* in the close of the Chapter.

To the 26 Section Chap. 16.

The Enquirer seemes to be troubled not a little, because we will not say with him, that men may be saved in a false religion, or because we doe not thinke our religion false, or any other religion true besides our owne; and in the same veine Chillingworth *his Commentatour runnes very fluently, and upon this ill sounding string is harping continually. Yet for all this harping, it will not be easily understood what offence against Charity it can be for us to judge, either that Christianity alone is the saving religion, or that our religion is the onely true Christianity. For say we should be deceived in making this judgement, yet this same at the most can be but a want in our selves of right understanding, and not any breach of charity towards others, or any matter of exclamation, as some frivolous men of late have made it. Wherefore, if we will state the question rightly, we are not to enquire whether we want charity in holding that none but Catholickes and true Christians can be saved, or in our holding that we onely are of that sort; or againe, whether our adversaries for their accusing us, want not wit and charity together, or at least one of them; but the question betweene us ought to be, whether there be more saving religions then one? or whether ours be not that one? and this is the old controversy in* Bellarmine *and others, and may be disputed without any anger, or without disguising, or multiplying of controversies on set purpose, done by these Novellists, as it seemes, for making more businesse then needed, or causing more distast and alienation then was before.*

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The Enquirer is much displeased with us for damning, as he cals it, all that are not of the Church of Rome. *But for pacifying of his angry spirit, I demand of any for him, what sinne he thinkes it in us to judge that all who die out of the Church of God, die in an evill state; or what other, to thinke that our Catholique Church, which he diminitively cals the Church of* Rome, *is the only Church of God. Let him satisfie me in this, and I will easily satisfie him in the other. In the meane time we are not nice to declare, That there is but one saving Religion. That there is but one true Christianity, and that one is the saving religion. That there is but one Catholicke Church, and that this one Church is, by the institution of Christ, and according to the consent of antiquity, to be governed by the See Apostolique, and by the Successour of Saint* Peter, *as chiefe Pastour and President of the rest. Now what hurt is there in all this, or what want of Christian charity? It is not uncharitable to say that some offenders shall be damned, and if any, then why not those who are truly and really Sectaries and men obstinate, for it is like that they deserve it as well as any. There wanted not one of this Enquirers confraternity, who fancied sometimes to himselfe, that all the damnation that was to fall upon the wicked, was an annihilation of them and extinction, and not a perpetuity of torments; which conceit is so charitable, that it exceeds the charity even of God himselfe, and controules his revelations made to the contrary in the Holy Scripture, and condemnes them as guilty of too much rigour and severity, and therefore no marvaile though we poore mortals cannot escape their censure.*

But now, lest any man should thinke our doctrine to be harsh and rigorous, he may please to be informed, that we doe not hold every man for a Pagan and an Infidell who embraces Paganisme, but only so many of them as be guilty of their errour through affected, or culpable ignorance; which defect though it be a formall ignorance of the truth, yet it is a virtuall knowledge of their errour, and an interpretative rejection of the truth, and also a resistance to God and his divine veracity, manifested in his revelations; and therefore all these, whether Pagans or Heretiques, be hainous offenders, and civilonaldnelos, that is to say, judged and condemned by their owne consciences, of which doctrine it seemes both this Enquirer, and after him his second Master Chillingworth, *were ignorant,*

by their insinuating that no man is an Heretique, or selfe-condemned, but onely such as adhere to a doctrine which he formally knowes to be erroneous, that is to say, onely such as doe that which is impossible to be done; which conclusion is a covert affirmation that there be no Heretiques at all, nor can be any; and so all is safe, whether sound or no.

In like manner we doe not hold to be an Heretique, or to be out of the Catholique Church every one who embraces an heresy, but such a number of them onely as doe it with an obstinate mind, and without preparation to be reformed, or to hearken unto reason when it is told them. By which doctrine it appeares, that we are not so strict as we may seeme, nor yet so large as some would have us. For on the one side, we doe not maintaine that Heretiques can be saved, or that heresy is not a deadly or damnable sinne, as some Socinians and other Libertines would have us thinke; And on the other side, we dilate the spaces of the Church Catholique farther then every body conceives we doe, and by that meanes comprehend within it many that in the eye of the world, seeme aliens unto it; so that our charity is not irregular in judging Heretiques to be in good state, but it is rather in concluding that very many are not Heretiques really and interiourly, though outwardly they seeme to be. And thus you see we doe not cry all men downe to hell, not yet any more then we are compelled to doe by the doctrine delivered to us about that point in Holy Scripture.

After this damning and firing men in the other world, of which the Enquirer hath wrongfully accus'd us, he proceedeth to blame us for sending Heretiques to the fire in this, and therefore saith that he beleives that throughout antiquity we shall not finde the putting to death of any (for religion) but onely of such as began to kill first.

This provocation to antiquity, howsoever the matter be, can be of no force, unlesse antiquity did condemne that practice as unlawfull, because antiquity did not all it might doe, but left divers things for posterity to adde as it should see expedient.

Besides forasmuch as concernes punishment of impious men and innovatours both by death and other wayes, if the Authour had looke better into antiquity, he could not but have beleived otherwise, as our Authours doe shew at large; for it is cleare that amongst the Jewes in was the practice to punish impious people very severely, and all such

as

as with new doctrines ſought to infect others, puniſhing according to the preſcript of Moyſes *Law, ſome with death, other ſome by other temporall puniſhments.*

The Canon law alſo and the Imperiall decree the ſame, to all which the practice of the Church accords; and laſtly, reaſon her ſelfe, and the common rules of equity and juſtice doe permit, yea and preſcribe the ſame: and theſe ſuffrages are ſo powerfull and prevailing, as they ſuffice, not onely for the juſtification of the Churches preſent practice, but alſo for the condemnation of high preſumption and arrogance of all who ſhould be ſo hardy as to impugne or queſtion it.

Nevertheleſſe this ſame practice of infliction of temporall puniſhments upon offenders againſt religion, is not generall without any limitation or reſtraint, as ſome may imagine it to be, as if forſooth none of a different religion from ours could be exempted from them; but contrariwiſe it admits exception in many caſes, as we are about to declare preſently.

Know therefore that whereſoever any Kingdome or Commonwealth is ſetled in a juſt and a peaceable poſſeſſion of Catholique religion, without any notable commixture of contrary profeſſions, as for example, in Italy *or* Spaine, *at this preſent. In this caſe it is no cruelty or rigour to inflict temporall puniſhments upon all ſuch as ſhall adventure to diſturbe that ſetled peace by introducing thither any new doctrines upon pretence of whatſoever reformation; and that this may be done ſtands with ſo much reaſon as cannot be probably contradicted. Neither is this courſe of ſeverity any defence unneceſſary, foraſmuch as vitious and over-weening ſpirits are moſt efficaciouſly repreſſed and withheld from evill by feare of temporall puniſhments in this life, becauſe their chiefe aime is at temporall contentments in the ſame, being moved more with the preſent, then with thoſe other that are Spirituall and to come, conſcience and religion having little influence into what they doe.* In fine, *they are governed more with ſence then reaſon, with ſtripes then with Philoſophy, inſomuch, that neither the ſchooles of Philoſophers, nor the Temples of God, can worke halfe ſo much with theſe Wormes of the earth, as temporall tribunals can. Now though the enemy be never ſo deſpicable, is he therefore to be neglected becauſe the meaneſt Seducer may doe miſchiefe, as we finde by the effects of*

the Turkmen; and againe, because the grosseſt errours, if they tend to liberty, or be but new, may be perſwaded to the multitude, as, by the ſucceſſes of Mahomet, it is manifeſt; and the rather in this caſe of ours, becauſe we experience daily, that our people having been once poſſeſt, that the Religion of the See Apoſtolique, and of their own forefathers was ſuperſtition, they are eaſily perſwaded, that the farther they depart from that Religion, the more pure and reformed they ſhall be, and ſo will be forward to run blindly on, till they paſſe all the bounds of Chriſtianity, and reforme all to nothing; for with ſuch bewitched minds as theſe, every new nonſenſe will be more acceptable, and be received ſooner, then any old ſenſe, and this is the effects of thoſe raylings againſt Rome which they have heard continually out of the Pulpits now for ſo many yeers together, without any intermiſſion.

But, although this courſe of ſeverity be neceſſary for the preventing of diſturbances by innovation, yet nevertheleſſe it is not to be extended unto all that any where amongſt us doe teach, or profeſſe erroneous doctrines, or Religions different from our own, but only againſt corruptors or invaders, that is to ſay, ſuch as break in by fraud or violence, and diſturbe the quiet of the Church. For, after ſuch time as the invaſion is paſt, and the invaders gone, and that they are ſucceeded by another generation, which is not guilty of making any irruption, but, with whatſoever errour they are tainted, it is contracted by the vice of education from their Parents and other ſuch inſtructors, and withall doe behave themſelves peaceably, I ſay that againſt ſuch as theſe the Church doth not proceed, nor execute the ſeverity of the Lawes in force againſt Heretiques; of this ſort be at this day, the deſcendents of firſt Proteſtants in this Kingdome, whoſe anceſtors that were the invaders lived about King Edward and Queen Mary. Againſt theſe deſcendents the Church doth not preſſe the Canon Law, though againſt the former ſort it did, and had juſt cauſe given ſo to doe. Conformable to this difference between Proteſtant and Proteſtant, doe the Catholiques in France and Polonia ſuffer the Proteſtants to live with them, without moleſtation, and to enjoy the liberties and Priviledges of the Kingdome, as formerly they had done in Auſtria, Stiria and Carinthia, till ſuch time as they became ſeditious, and conſpired againſt thoſe who gave them freedome.

But

But now let it be noted and borne in memory, that notwithſtanding this gentle proceedings of Catholiques towards the Proteſtants after ſo many loſſes and injuries ſuffer'd from them, the ſame Proteſtants being themſelves but juniors, and living by ſufferance, fall hotly upon perſecution of Catholiques whereſoever they grow to be the ſtronger ſide, and that alſo in moſt Provinces, after a very violent, mercileſſe, and deſperate manner, ſlay, impriſon, robbe, baniſh, defame, in fine ſuffer Catholiques in no place where they are predominant, and this againſt all right and common equity. Which manner of proceeding I muſt tell the Inquirer, is much worſe and more unreaſonable then Turkiſh, for the Turkes though aliens, Barbarians and Conquerours, are ſenſible of the right the Chriſtians of their conquer'd Provinces have for the free exerciſe of their Religion, and therefore do not goe about to reſtraine them from it, but let them continue quietly in that right of theirs, and ſo they doe even to this day, to the great ſhame of Proteſtants and Puritans here in theſe Kingdomes, may it be ſpoken without offence, being, as all men ſee plainly exceeded in juſtice and civility by the Turkes. Wherefore no marvaile that our Inqui-

"*rer is forced to confeſſe that* Calvin *is too blame in this point,*

"*and the Church of England a little, which is a little too much for,*

"addeth he, Negare manifeſta non audeo, & excuſare immo-

"dica non poſſum. *Sure this Inquirer came with very little indifferency to give his judgement here, when he ſaith, the Church of England is guilty but a little, I would know of him what is a great deale, if all that we have ſuffer'd from it be but a little. But it is well he would acknowledge thus much, for it is more then others have done, and more ingenuity appeares in him, then in them, and perhaps he would have ſaid more, if it might have beene well taken, though in confeſſing this little he inſinuates all. Doubtleſſe, no manner of proceeding can be more unworthy then for a latter generation to forget from whoſe loynes they came, and to become harſh and contumelious to their owne fore-fathers children, and perſecute them with all rigour, as if they were enemies and invaders, and aliens, onely for their honourable continuing in that faith which their Anceſtours did leave them and commended to them as chiefe inheritance in that faith, which hitherto they which aſſaile it have never beene able by any argument to prove*

it false; nor yet on the other side, to evict by any unanswerable demonstration that their owne new faith was true. Wherefore since, if any have more right one then another for the exercise of their Religion in this Kingdome, it is We, and this right cannot be taken from us by any power under heaven, and againe were your reasons never so good, yet you are not to school us, or to be our Tutors, or to compell us unto change. Therefore the severity that hath been used over us hath no warrant for it, no president or example, nothing wherewith to countenance it in the sight of the World, or to justifie it in the sight of God, but is every way abominable and foul, such in fine as neither the Christians used to the Pagans their predecessours, nor Catholiques to the descendents of the formost and invading Protestants, nor any civil man would offer to another.

" *If the Religion, saith the Inquirer, had alwayes remained the* " *same, it would not be defended by wayes so contrary to those by* " *which it was propagated. But now what wayes are these? he means force and violence, and saying,* To the fire with him, *and* To hell with him, *for these are the Inquirers owne expressions. To these I adde the slanderous and diabolicall charges of* Chillingworth, *who knew much of the Inquirers minde, although in all things he did not follow his direction.* " *You professe, saith* Chillingworth, *c.* 2. §. 101. " *that it is lawfull for you to use violence and power whensoever you* " *can have it for the planting of your Doctrine, and extirpation of the* " *contrary. Thus he, but because he cites no Author for this so heinous an accusation, We may justly suspect that you your selves hold it lawfull for you to slander and calumniate for the defence of your own bad cause, and the overthrowing of the contrary whensoever other means of doing it does faile you, as indeed it falls out continually. The same heavy charge he in foul tearmes reiterates, c.* 5. §. 96. " *You, saith he, teach plainly you may propagate Religion whensoever* " *you have power, by deposing of Kings, and invasion of Kingdomes,* " *and think when you kill the adversaries of it you doe God good ser-* " *vice.*

For clearing of us against this malitious charge, I call into the Court Saint Thomas *of* Aquine *and all his with him in* 2. 2. *q.* 10. *art.* 8. *as witnesses sufficient to justifie our cause, and shew our innocency, even against the Devill himselfe that great calumniator of our Brethren, and to them I adde* Acosta *in his booke* De procuranda

randa Indorum salute, and Mariana in his history of Spaine in sundry places, and might adde many more sufficient to confute the Adversary, and make him hatefull to every honest heart. Besides though in some cases we, as other professions also doe, make use of penall Lawes wherewith to keep off invaders, and yet not for any interior preservation or defence: In like sort we seek, by the help of the sword and force of Armes to keep the Turkes out of Christendome, shall we all be blamed for doing so, or shall it be said therefore, that we defend the Christian Religion by Armes and violence, and by other meanes then it was propagated at the first? nothing lesse, we use reasons to perswade and plant our faith, we use the like to defend it against Infidels, Socinians, and all other Sects, how then is our Religion planted, propagated, or defended by violence? It is one thing to be fenced exteriorly and a farre off with Statutes of temporall severity against invaders, which course is a thing expedient and avowed both by us and all, and it is another thing to defend it interiorly by the same meanes, that is to say, to justifie the right truth of Religion by them, and this We disavow, neither doe We practice it any where, as it is most manifest.

The Inquirer was very provident when he desired that, in these accusations of violence, no recrimination should be used, for he must needs see there was more matter returnable, then either could be gratefull, or they could justifie, yet since he will needs talk of killing, and cast the blame upon our side, he must be content if We make some reflection upon the misdemeanors of the Adversary, as well as upon our own innocency. I desire therefore, the intelligent reader to consider, whether in this last age, the Catholiques have put to death more Ministers or half so many, as the Protestants of England have done Priests, Who it is well known they have slaine and butchered with great barbarisme and immanity.

But setting aside these heavy crimes of bloud deliberately shed, Who is it have afflicted others more in their Estates and Fortunes, they, or we? and for proof of this, We will offer fair, let them restore all they have taken with a strong hand from us in livelyhoods, both spiritual and temporall in all the Provinces of Europe, and we will restore all We have taken from them, and in that goe no farther then this Seventeenth age which is now passing, be it in this Kingdome, or in those about it. It is well knowne that in all those Pro-

Provinces, where both Religions are professed and live intermingled, none be on the suffering hand but We, none persecutes but they; and it is We who are the Aborigines, as I may so tearm us, and thereby have as much right for all indemnity as our Ancestours could divolve upon us. We are not insensible of the wrong We suffer daily by having it printed and pronounced in publique Assemblies, on purpose to countenance injuries, and to excite against us the ignorant multitude, that our religion is destructive of all others, and that amongst us it is a maine principle or maxime, that all other are to be invaded and destroyed by us, and this is affirmed confidently, though against all probability and experience. It cannot indeed be denyed but truth is destructive of falshood by the owne power, as light is of darknesse, and one contrary of another, but for externall coaction or violence, We leave that to the Accusers, and doe not owne it.

Master Pym in the Parliament House.

By this it is not hard to make a judgement who have been the encroachers, and who have propogated and maintained themselves by violence, you, or We? And who are the destructive party and live by the spoiles and oppression of others, let not those who possesse other mens goods cry out of wrongs, or make any brags of just dealing, for neither of these can come well out of their mouthes.

This Enquirer confesseth both sides are in fault, but we in more, and for this assertion of his brings in some light sophistry, because forsooth Protestants hold that they may erre, but We maintaine We cannot, and so will be sure never to mend. That Protestants may erre is granted him, and needs no other probation then experience, whereby We finde they have filled all this Kingdome with dissentions, and these dissentions with civill warres, so that by this that you have erred, We know you may. But so frequent possibility of erring doth not extenuate but aggravate your crime. For if you may erre so foulely, how dare you undertake to tutour others? how prescribe Lawes? With what face Persecute? If your rule be so weak as it cannot containe you all in one body, but lets you disperse into multitude of Sects, and fall in pieces as now you doe; Why doe you not forsake it and seeke a better for it, or else have none at all; if you can finde out a surer, Why doe you not learne wit by experience, but wallow on still in the same mire? If this Enquirer speake so ill for his Clients, We will not entertaine him for our Advocate.

The

The Protestants side sets downe for a rule of religion every ones private judgment in the interpretation of Scripture, and so doth Master Chillingworth *the disciple of* Volkelius. *We doe all that, yet we doe not please them; nay more, we must be punished by them for the result; what is this but to bid us doe a thing, and then punish us for doing it? Is not this extreame perversity? certainly if the rule they give be a sufficient warrant for their receding from the faith of their Ancestours, and for their breaking off from the Church, and standing in defiance of her, then doubtlesse much more may it warrant us to continue on and to keep off from any new doctrines, either of the Protestants, or any other Innovatours whatsoever, and sure this is great reason and cannot be gainsayed.*

Besides if we were to yeild, to whom were it to be done? There is a world of distracted Sectaries now in this Kingdome, all sprung from the same roll, or from the rule of faith which is common to you all, of which one sort imagines there is no Papacy, and these were the first ring-leaders of all the rout; another, that there is no Episcopacy; a third, that there is no Clergy, but that Lay-Elders is all in all, and must rule the roast; a fourth, that there is no Church nor Church-government at all, but that the Church is like a Schoole of Philosophers, where every man may believe and doe what he pleases without being accountable to another, or any obligation of conformity; and peradventure the Inquirer was one of this number together with his confederate M. Chillingworth; *a fifth sort that there is no Trinity; a sixth that there is no Sacrament, or at least none necessary, or effectuall. Is it not fit thinke you that these divided Christians should come and write Lawes to others, or punish any man for non-conformity? nothing more improbable. It is a Comedy to see D.* Featly *a Protestant, and* Page *a Puritan make Catalogues of Heretiques, and when they have done, can finde no way whereby to exempt themselves, nor give a reason why they themselves should not be of the number, as much Sectaries as any other of the Catalogue.*

The Inquirer charges us that because we pretend to be infallible we have lesse reason to prescribe to others; but on the contrary, me thinkes we should have more, for, as he who is really infallible is fittest to guide and governe others, so he that thinkes himselfe to be, is at least in his own judgement more fit than he that does not.

He addes that this pretence of infallibility makes us ſure never to mend, or as his Schollar Chillingworth *ſpeaketh, makes us incorrigible. True if it were a meere pretended one, but that is not yet proved, either by him, or any, although he ſay here in this 28. Section, he undertakes to give reaſons why the Church of Rome is fallible. But, if, on the other ſide, it be a reality, and that the Inquirers reaſons are but pretended, then ſurely will not this infallibility keep us from mending, but contrariwiſe from erring or having any thing to mend, or, which is all one, from any errours to correct. And thus we ſee that our Religion is maintained by the ſelfe ſame arts that bred it, that is to ſay, not by force, or violence, but by reaſon, and revelation, and ſpirituall induſtries, contrary to the ſurmiſes of this Inquirer.*

C. 16. Anſw: to Chap 16.

Your doctrine of damning all that are out of the *Church* of *Rome*, you have enlarged much above the occaſion that invited you to it, for all that his *Lordſhip* had ſaid on that theme was onely this, that *your certaine and undoubted damning of all out of the Church of* Rome, *averſeth him from it.* Which if it be true, you cannot blame him; (for ſure they that heare the puniſhment of *judging*, *Mat.* 7. [*being judged of the Lord*] will have little love to that piece of *ſenſuality*, (or conſequently to the religion that requires them to runne upon this danger.) And that the charge is true of you, you doe at firſt acknowledge, by labouring to prove that there is no *uncharitableneſſe* in it. Secondly, that it is neceſſary for you to maintaine, or that otherwiſe you muſt fall into ſome great abſurdity, particularly this, that there is any *Church but that which is governed by the See Apoſtolique*; which is a rare *petitio principii* againe, and ſaves us the paines of ſaying one word more in defence of the truth and juſtice of thoſe true words of his *Lordſhip*.

For indeed that encloſure of the *Church Chriſtianity*, and *Salvation*, to thoſe that are under the *Roman* ſubmiſſion, is the *uncharitableneſſe* that you are charged of. The envy of which it ſeemes (after all your confidence) you are willing to remove from you, and therefore adde an handſome lenitive, to keepe any from thinking that your doctrine is rigorous or harſh. And truly if you might be taken at your word, he were very unkind

kind that would require more charity of you then you yeild even to *Pagans* themselves, whom you will not hold *Pagans*, unlesse they be *guilty of their errour through affected or culpable ignorance*; and then sure you will be as good to us, (that would be a little above *Pagans*) and till you can prove us to be guilty of *errour*, and that through *affected or culpable ignorance*, with an obstinate mind, without preparation to be reformed, or hearken to reason when 'tis told us, (which till your arguments are more convincing, undoubtedly this discourse of yours will not evidence us to be) we are in full capacity of your *charity*, and therefore shall not follow you any further; (lest we provoke you againe) in this point.

Section 3.

Especially since you are at last in so good humour, that you utterly disclaime this damning and firing men in another world. I beseech God to confirme you in this temper, and desire you may be taken at your word, and that witnesse may be called of this charity of yours, for sure there be others of your brethren that have not used to grant so much.

On occasion of this or the like speech of mine answer, the *Apologist* in his review thought fit to adde these words at the end of his 16 *Chapter*: [*Three propositions there are which we maintaine*; *First, that none but true Christians can be saved. Secondly, none but true Catholiques can be saved, for true Catholiques and true Christians be all one. Thirdly, none be true Catholiques but such as live under the obedience of the See of* Peter, *and many doe so that through ignorance doe not seeme to doe. The Gentiles find fault with the first proposition, divers Sectaries with the second, and now the Protestants with the third. All these have beene pretended by some or other to be false, but how to be uncharitable is very hard to be understood.*] To all which being onely said not attempted to be proved, I shall onely say that I am sory to see him out of his good mood so soone, and desire he will not expect we shall be so tame as to thinke him *charitable* that saith none of any other See but Saint *Peters* can be saved.

Section 4.

As for that of burning men here for religion, you seem unwilling to be tryed by *antiquity* in this point, because, say you, *Antiquity did not all it might, but left somewhat to posterity to adde*; yet sure this was a little unlucky that your additions to antiquity should be of this bloudy complection; *Christ's* addition to the Ancients was to *love and blesse and pray for enemies*, not to retaliate injuries upon any tearmes, and your ἄκρον φιλοσοφίας, your improvement of the ancient doctrine and practice, is of somewhat a distant making, your *Sermon on the mount* (*Ebal* it seemes) to your disciples, is persecuting and massacring

of friends, which never provoked you but by not being entirely of your opinion.

Section 5. But it seemes you meane to prove it too, that this bloudy doctrine is no stranger to *antiquity*, and your first proofe is from the *Jewes*, whose *practice* it was to punish impious people, and such as with new doctrine sought to infect others; To which I answer, that those against whom those *Jewish* severities were in force, were *Atheists*, and *Idolaters*, and *false Prophets*, that would take men off from the acknowledgment of the one *God* to *Gentilisme*, which is sure somewhat a distant state from that of *Protestants* at this day.

Section 6. Your second proofe is from the *Canon*, and your third from the *Imperiall law*, of which seeing you give us no tast in either, and yet because some men may have appetite to see what grounds you had for such affirmation, I conceived it a probable course to know your mind by looking into *Bellarmine* your great *Champion*; from the view of whole *Collections*, *l.* 3. *de laicis. c.* 21. this will be the result.

Section 7. That for the *Canon law*, the authorities are not fetcht from the ancient *Canons* of any of the first or generall *Councels*, but onely *c. ad abolendam*; *cap. excommunicamus. ext. de hæret. & cap. super eo, de hæret. in* 6. (all which is no more then if you had cited it from your *Popes* (who must not looke to be so authenticall in this case) and yet will hardly come home to the burning of your fellow *Christians*, onely because they will not submit to the *Pope of Rome*, the onely thing for which we were even now to be damned) and from the *Councell of Constance*; which besides that it is of a short standing about 200 yeares ago is made
A infamous in this matter, by that vile resolution of the [*no Faith to be kept with Heretiques*] the grosseneſse of which position may make it reasonable to expect this bloudy doctrine from them, but withall to deprive it of all authority with others.

Section 8. As for the *Imperiall* law, these places he produces; First, *L. Manicheos, cod. de hæret.* and to this I answer, that that law makes not *heresy capitall*, but at the utmost makes it capable of an action after death, such is the action of *infamy*, *&c.* and so they that have died *Heretiques*, may for the warning of others be proceeded against, (as you know Traitors after death are infamous,

famous, *i. e.* their children deprived of their honour, though the Father dyed unpuniſhed, becauſe undiſcerned) but that comes not home to our preſent purpoſe of burning or killing. Then *L. Arriani, Cod. eodem.* where indeed death was the puniſhment of the *Manichees*, who you know were a high ranke of Heretiques, making two principles (which is in effect *two Gods*) the *good* and the *evill*, *God* and the *Devil*. But for others, *viz. Arians* and *Macedonians*, though thoſe were Heretiques, condemned by the firſt generall *Councels*, and are expreſſely there named, there is yet no ſuch puniſhment appointed them; and Laſtly, *L. quicunque eod. eodem.* in which ſaith *Bellarmine*, *jubentur occidi omnes qui prava docere tentant, all are commanded to be put to death who attempt to teach wicked things.* But you muſt obſerve that that law being againſt the *Eutychians*, many penalties are there aſſigned to the ſeverall degrees of the guilt of that hereſy; *pœna exilii, ſi Epiſcopos & Sacerdotes conſtituerint, ſcripta eorum nemo habeat ſub pœna deportationis perpetuæ, nemo eos audiat ſub pœna* 10 *librarum auri, ultimo ſupplicio coerceantur qui illicita docere tentaverint. Baniſhment if they conſtituted Biſhops or Prieſts, perpetuall baniſhment upon having any of their books,* 10 *pounds or libres of gold to any that heard them, and capitall puniſhment to thoſe that attempt to teach unlawfull things.* Which laſt clauſe (that cited by *Bellarmine*, and by him extended to all *falſe doctrine*) belongs peculiarly to the *Eutychians*, for of them onely before the diſcourſe was; and beſide the rule is, *odioſa reſtringenda, lawes of puniſhments, &c.* muſt alwaies be taken in the moſt *reſtrained* ſence; and ſo the utmoſt that any of theſe extends to, is onely in theſe two *hereſies* of *Manicheiſme* and *Eutychianiſme*, and that in caſe of teaching the contrary to *law*, and abuſing the people, and that after faire warning and prohibition; and all this, if it were granted (as truly I know no obligation that lyes on all *Chriſtians* to thinke themſelves regulated by the lawes of the *Emperours*) would amount to very little againſt *Proteſtants*, who may well paſſe for as moderate *Heretiques*, as *Arians* and *Macedonians*, who were not puniſhed with death.

Tis true indeed, there is ſomewhat of this nature to be found againſt the *Donatiſts* (though *Bellarmine* mentions it not (*L. Si* *Section 9.*

quis rebaptizare C. ne ſanctum baptiſma iteretur; but this was not againe for opinion, but onely in taking upon them to *rebaptize* any, and peculiarly on the *Circumcellions*, which were a bloudy kinde of people, and their vileneſſe of this nature, guilt enough to owne that ſeverity: whereas on the other ſide we finde that *Idacius* and *Ithacius* were condemned by the Biſhops of *France* for being authors of puniſhing ſome *Pricillianiſts* with the ſword; and in the *Eaſt* a whole Synod was condemned for conſenting to the burning of *Begomyle*; and ſo much for your authorities, or more whenſoever you pleaſe to produce them. From whence will appeare the wide diſtance of your practices in theſe and other Kingdomes from that, that the moſt *Popiſh Canons* or *Imperiall Conſtitutions* were bloudy enough to determine; there neither *Arians*, nor *Macedonians*, but that prodigy of *Manichaiſme*, and the *Eutychians* teaching, and that (as I conceive by *præva & illicita*) things *contrary* not onely to *wholſome doctrine*, but to the *lawes* of the *Empire*; This I ſay, becauſe if the crime were onely their *opinions*, I cannnot imagine
B why the *Arians* and *Macedonians* ſhould fare ſo much better then the *Eutychians*, nay why *Apoſtates* ſhould onely be fined, and *Jewes* onely under ſome reſtraints (as from *Polygamy*) and payments, and not put to death, ſave onely in caſe of keeping there *Purim* (which was for the great contumely done to *Chriſt* in that feaſt, the hanging *Haman* in *effigie*, and *Chriſt* next to him) and I ſay, onely *Eutychians* put to death, unleſſe there were ſomewhat elſe in it beſide their doctrine. And then if you will make the compariſon to goe no farther, then our ſelves, what ſholes of poore perſons (farre enough from the *docere illicita & prava, teaching illegall things*, even from teaching at all) were in *Queene Maries* daies *πυρὸς τροφὴ, whole hecatombes* at once offered up to your fury.

Section 10. So remarkable are your proceedings herein, that I feare it was not a jeſt of him that ſaid at *Geneva*, *Servetus occidendus eſt, ne apud exteros Eccleſiæ noſtræ malè audiant*; *That* Servetus *was to be burnt that their Churches might not heare ill abroad, i. e.* that the *Papiſts* might not be ſcandalized; which if it were the conſideration that mov'd in that matter, then have you more bloud lying at your doore, then what you have ſpilt, even that which

which in care and caution, thoſe whom you recriminate, ſhed by your *example*, and that you might not be ſcandalized at their mercy and lenity.

This were I confeſſe an ill excuſe to them that were ſo careſull to tranſcribe that bloudy leſſon, (and which is worſe, if you will have mine opinion, they have no better) but yet will be an argument that you are not overfit to accuſe them for it. *Eraſmus* among you, and *Caſtellio* among us were about the beginning of the *reformation* very bitter againſt ſuch dealing: the former, you may ſee his notes upon *Saint Jer. Ep. ad Lat. t.* 1. *p.* 39. where he can hardly allow them the name of *Chriſtians* that fight for religion (kill for religion) though againſt the *Turke*, as if warre were wont to make *Chriſtians*, *cum ipſi Turcam in pectore geramus*, *when the very uſing of this violence is a prime piece of Turciſme*. The latter wrote a booke on purpoſe againſt that practice; I wiſh the whole *Chriſtian* world of both parties would ſuffer themſelves to be repreſented by a couple of ſuch meeke and honeſt *proxies*; be you pleaſed to convert as many as you can to the doctrine of neither kiling nor damning, and I will promiſe you to doe the like, and that will be better imployment for us then this debate. *Section* 11.

And becauſe *examples* are the moſt popular arguments, I will helpe you to one of this nature, and leave you to apply it; *Nero* went through *Greece* a contending in the *Muſica certamina* with all that pretended to that skill, if he had the better of it he was crowned, if not, he tooke care that they that had the better of him were put to death. The iſſue of it was, that they that had skill did on purpoſe play as ill as they could; he conquered wherever he came, was crowned when he was there, and when he was gone, was counted a mad-man. *Section* 12.

I ſhall onely adde, what upon more exact enquiry upon that hint of the *Canon* law I finde, that the elder *Canons* or decrees of *Gratian* as they never mention the putting Heretiques to death; ſo in many paſſages out of Saint *Auſtin* they doe diſſwade the *Emperour* from it, and onely mention ſome other mulcts and reſtraints for them. The new *Canons* or the *Decretals* of your *Popes* are generally for delivering to the *ſecular arme*, but name not *pœnam mortis* neither; but what that ſignifies the *Chriſtian* *Section* 13.

Christian world now knowes well enough; onely one peice of hypocrisy I heard of (and by requeſt or propoſall of *Spalatenſis. L.6.c.5.Sect.171.* doe gueſſe the truth of the report) in your proceedings in this matter; your Spirituall Courts when they ſo deliver up, are wont to interpoſe [*ita tamen ut non admittant pœnam mortis* (or to that purpoſe) *but ſo that they proceed not to death*, when yet they knew well enough that that is the meaning of your delivering. Nay the *Canons* that require that the ſecular hand muſt proceed with all rigour againſt Heretiques thus delivered to them, will ſoone *excommunicate* any that doe not thus underſtand their meaning.

Section 14. Beſides theſe arguments *ab authoritate*, you have another drawne, as you ſay, from *Reaſon*, and the common rules of *equity* and *juſtice*, (but adde not one word to prove what you ſay ſo very improbably, but onely condemne all of high *preſumption and arrogance who ſhould be ſo hardy as to impugne or queſtion it*) one would thinke you an inchanted Knight that when you have never a weapon in your hand, nor ſecond neare you, (but onely the names of ſo many men, and armes to call for) it ſhould yet paſſe for arrogance, preſumption, and hardyneſſe in any to combat with you.

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Section 15. That you did not fitly produce your teſtimonies to your purpoſe, 'tis plaine enongh by what followes, the limitations and reſtraints that this doctrine, you ſay, muſt be bounded with, whereas your citations were generall without any reſtraint.

Section 16. Your reſtraint or exception is, that where a *Kingdome is in a peaceable poſſeſſion of Catholique religion, there 'tis no cruelty to inflict theſe puniſhments on the Teachers of new doctrines.* And for this you ſay there is *reaſon*, which cannot probably be contradicted, but are ſo very uncourteous and contemptuous to us, as not to thinke us worthy to partake of the leaſt ſyllable of ſuch *reaſon*, unleſſe that muſt goe for one, that wicked men aime at temporall contents, and are conſequently with-held by temporall puniſhments, which ſhall be acknowledged a reaſon, when difference in *opinion* appears to be an impiety of ſo much *deſigne*, & all whom you call *Heretiques*, are by you proved to be *wormes of the earth*, deepe worldly *deſigners* alſo.

For truly I confeſſe, to all thoſe things which are committed by

by any, who may justly be presumed to commit them against conscience, for some worldly interest, I should give my willing suffrage that some temporall bitternesse should be opportioned; that so seeing their *Error*, and finding temporall *paines* in stead of temporall *advantages* to be their portion, they may be disciplin'd to better and more honest thoughts; nay if the doctrines *tend to liberty*, I meane either as *Mahomets* did to all kinde of voluptuous living, or that other liberty (that some of your friends and some others that call themselves *reformed*, but in my opinion are very farre from it, have beene guilty of) the shaking off the yoake of civill obedience to the Magistrate set over them by God, it is then lawfull to coerce such *innovaters*, if the prudence of the State shall thinke fit. But difference in *opinion* (though it be in a Kingdome never so peaceably possest of the *Catholique* Religion) if it tend not to any of these dangers, nor be convincible of those impieties and designes, will by no reason or consequence be involved in that number.

This you seem to be content with, when you adde *that this severity must not be extended to all that any where teach or professe erroneous doctrines*; but upon better consideration of your following words, 'tis cleare that your restraint or exception lookes another way, *viz.* that against those that are *not the first invaders, but another generation succeeding them, whose errour is contracted by the vice of education, &c. the Church doth not execute the severity of the lawes.* In which words, though we of this, and all other *Protestant Kingdomes* at this day have so farre our parts, as that, if it were never so much in your power, you ought upon these grounds not to hurt us, because we are the progeny, and not the first invaders; yet seeing all the restraint is for the *execution onely of the severity of the lawes*, and those lawes are supposed by you to be *in force against Heretiques*, and so against us, whom you call by that name; we have great reason to thinke, there is little kindnesse in this present restraint of yours. *Section* 18.

For to the utmost of my understanding of your words, it remaines still free to you after this concession, to be as severe to any, as your power will enable you. And if by us at any time any claime of favour should be put into your Consistory, your answer probably would be by this *dilemma*; either you are *in-* *Section* 19.

vaders, (and seeing beginnings are alwaies weakest, all that are not able to resist or defend themselves, shall goe for *invaders*) and then you have no title to mercy by this tenure; or else you
D. are a numerous *off-spring and progeny of them* (and so possibly able to *resist*) and then you shall have *mercy*; If we stand on these tearmes with you, and your order for restraint of *severity* hold no longer then our strength to resist you, then we shall scarce acknowledge the obligation, but thinke our enemies on the other extreame as kind as you; for both of you are good at being mercifull, when you are on the weaker party, but both very tyrannicall when you begin to be strong.

Section 20. If you were so constant to your articles of restraint, as that all the prosperities of warre, advantages of place, and auxiliaries, could not tempt you to a massacre of any, save onely some one (single *corrupter* and *invader*) or two in an age, I might then have reason to thinke I might have mistaken your meaning, but certainly you have beene as cruell on the cubs, as ever you were on the old foxes, and made as little scruple to put many thousands to death in one night (whom you could not thinke to be all *leaders* in factions, or *invaders*) (as the stories of *France* will testifie, and the very words of the *bull* of *Urban the eighth*, to encourage the *King* of *France*, to root out the *quadrupedes in Gallia stabulantes*, *&c.* as any one *John Husse* alone by himselfe at another time. And that you will have this latitude to let loose your restraint again, when time serves, it may seeme probable by what you adde of *Austria*, *Stiria*, and *Carinthia*, whose priviledges it seemes lasted no longer then you thought fit; For assoone as you thought it seasonable, they were presently pronounced *seditious* and *conspiratours*, and so put to the sword; and for *France* and *Poland*, I wish the names of *Massacres* had
E never beene heard in either of them, or at least that the *Pictures* of them with words of papall approbation, were not to be seen at *Rome* to testifie what is the cause of your present kindnesse, (*viz.* the *difficulty* of the worke) that the *Protestants* there at this time are not molested.

Section 21. As for your recrimination against *Protestants*, seeing it is very *universall* (*suffer Catholiques in no place*) and very sharpe, (*that they persecute Catholiques whereſoever they are ſtronger*, *after*

after a very violent, mercyleſſe, deſperate manner, ſlay, impriſon, robbe, baniſh, defame, &c.) I muſt beſeech you either to prove it againſt this your Country, or elſe to make it reparations, and remember when time ſerves, that when *Proteſtants* are thought to perſecute you, then preſently 'tis a *proceeding much worſe and more unreaſonable then the Turkiſh.*

As for the truth of your ſuggeſtion, certainly the number and ſtrength of *Proteſtants* hath for many yeares ſurmounted that of *Papiſts* in this Kingdome; and yet I ſhall be confident you will be poſed to produce the *example* of any one ſince *Queene Maries* daies that in this Kingdome was put to death meerly for *religion*, without being guilty of ſomething elſe, which by the knowne lawes of the *Realme* is lyable to the puniſhment of *treaſon*. And for the other *penall* lawes in this Kingdome, which are not *Capitall*, but *pecuniary* mulcts, &c. I ſhall ſay that 'tis ſomewhat hard, that we muſt be thought worthy of all thoſe bitter invectives, which you yet farther adde, becauſe I conceive there was never any Kingdome, that own'd any *religion*, but there was ſome difference made betwixt that, and all other, in reſpect of temporall *priviledges*, and *favours*, and *immunities*, and any ſuch difference reaches neare as high, and goes as deepe as pecuniary mulcts. And beſide it is not irrationall to ſay, that the inflicting ſuch mulcts may very probably tend to the quiet, and ſo to the advantage rather, then to the oppreſſion of ſuch ſufferers; it being not without example that the ſuſpicions of the people, and jealouſies that the eſtabliſhed religion ſhall be diſcountenanced, (having no deeper ground then an imagination that the *Prince* may have inclined to give *toleration* to the other party, or but *immunity* from theſe puniſhments) hath brought ſuch *odium* upon the preſent government, and ſharpeneſſe on thoſe thus thought to be favour'd, that in compariſon with theſe ill *accidents*, a few *pecuniary mulcts* might paſſe for a *priviledge*, as the letting of bloud is to be eſteem'd by thoſe who are entring into a *pluriſie* for want of it. *Section* 22.

If upon theſe conſiderations ſuch mulcts as theſe may not be conceived ſupportable, I muſt confeſſe 'tis an hard lot to be placed in a throne betwixt two contrary pretenders, and as unhappy for any ingenuous man, to make any confeſſion to you, who *Section* 23.

from his *Lordship's* acknowledgment, that the *Church of* England *is a little too blame in this point*, conclude, that *in confessing this he insinuates all*. This is to deale with men who cannot imagine it possible, that a man's words and thoughts should be of the same latitude. Should I by the same Logicke conclude, that you, by confessing that all *invaders for Religion* must be *put to death*, doe intimate, that all kinde of *Protestants* must be executed, I hope you would say you had wrong done you. And yet to tell you truth, the subtlety of your next distinction would give any man that observed it, great temptation so to conclude of you. For after your citation of S. *Th. of Aquine*, and the *Schoolemen*, you are pleased to communicate to us a notable *Mystery*, [*that you doe use reasons to perswade, and plant your faith*, (and truly the telling us you cannot *erre*, and upon that bottome building all your most irrationall conclusions, is no speciall exercise of the *reasonable* faculty) *and onely fence it exteriourly, and aforre off, with statutes of temporall severity against invaders, which*, say you, *is another thing from defending it interiourly by that meanes*, i. e. *from justifying the right and truth of religion by them*.

Section 24. G. I should never have beene so uncivill as to have affixt such a fence to your distinction, had you not beene your owne interpreter. It is, as if you had said, you are not to be accused for planting religion by *armes*, because your *swords* doe onely force men to be of your minds, doe not give them any reasons why they should. And truly I have not heard any man say, that your armes did *fence religion interiourly*, (being the unapteſt thing in the world, to *justifie the right*, and *truth of religion*; and therefore you need not disavow that so providently) the great *Turke* could send a letter to your *Pope*, and answer and confute his *bull* of inciting the *Princes* of *Christendome* to take up armes against him, for crucifying their *god*, and tell him, that as 'twas a great falsity to charge on him what was proper to the *Jewes*, the crucifying of *Christ*, (the *Turke* being descended from the *Trojans*, and therefore desiring the *Popes* aide against the *Grecians*, to avenge their murther of the *Trojan Hector*, a kinde of *god* of theirs) so if the *Pope* were truly a worshipper of *Christ*, he would never *invade* any nation upon quarrell of *religion*; so farre

farre is this kinde of fighting (in the knowledge of all, even of *Turkes* themselves) from justifying of the truth, that it is a very great argument of the falsenesse of any sect of *Christian* religion; a plaine demonstration that they doe not obey the Christ whom they worship.

The using *the sword as an exteriour meanes of propagating your religion*, is all that is laid to your charge, and that it seemes you are content to yeild us. Though, within a page or two more, you have forgotten your selfe againe, and say, that *for publique conviction or violence you doe not owne it.* I wish you did not. *Section 25.*

And that you may for the time to come deale clearely, and never have minde to sucke in your words, and owne it againe, I shall in passing mention to you a narration concerning an honest Philosopher in *Valens* his time; It was *Themistius*, who before his death turn'd from *Aristotelian* to *Christian*, but I conceive was not yet converted, when this story is related of him. *Valens in Antioch*, saith the (a) Historian, *had vehemently persecuted the Christians that were not of his opinion, had not a booke of* Themistius *the Philosopher recall'd him, in which he perswaded him, that he ought not to be cruell to any* (b) *for a difference of Ecclesiasticall opinions, seeing among the Pagans themselves there were more than 300 sects differing all from one another; And perhaps this might be more* (c) *acceptable* (at least more pardonable) *before God, because God is not easily knowne, and is glorified in different manners, on purpose that every man may* (d) *feare the more, the more he wants of the integrity and perfection of that knowledge of him, either how he is, or how qualified, or how great he is. By the reasons of* Themistius, saith he, *nitior factus est Imperator, the Emperour became more mild.* It may not be unfit for your friends to consider the example, and doe so too. *Section 26.*

(a) *Hist. Trip. l. 8. ex Zozomen.*
(b) *Propter dissordiam Ecclesiasticorum dogmatum.*
(c) *Forte hoc deo gratum magis effet.*
(d) *Magis timeat, i.e.* be more humble, as feare by Saint *Paul* is opposed to high-mindednesse, and feare and trembling is by the Greek fathers rendred humility.

As for your challenge to us, that if we will restore all we have taken from *Papists* in *Europe*, you will restore what you have taken from us, it is a good safe *boast*; you know that it is not in any replyers power to strike the bargaine. Yet, if all the *pecuniary* mulcts under the reigne of the three last *Princes* in this Kingdome be price enough to ransome and fetch backe the blood shed by you in *Queene Maries* dayes, I doubt not but I shall be as forward as you to accept that challenge. *Section 27.*

Section 28. Meane while for the justification of our severest lawes in this point, you cannot but confesse that in most *Kingdomes* strong presumptions have beene thought sufficient to make lyable to punishment. In the *Canon* law the proving of *nudus cum nudâ*, that such a man and woman were *taken naked* together, is presumption enough to bring the punishment of adultery on any. And when our *Queene* had run so many dangers by *Priests*, and thereupon *Capitall* lawes were made, that no such should come into the *Kingdome*, or if they did they should be presumed *traiterously* disposed, and punished accordingly; and this *Statute* thus legally made, conveyed to the knowledge of all such, it hath been a very rationall presumption against any that should be so found; Though as 'tis possible that *nudus cum nudâ* may be no *adulterer*, so such a *Priest* may have no *traiterous* purpose. And yet if you marke it, (unlesse since these times of troubles) very few of you have suffered among us by this Statute.

Section 29. Sir, you had great leasure, when you could enlarge so to triumph over us for acknowledging our *Church fallible*, and professe to discharge his *Lordship* from being your Advocate, if he speake so ill for his *Client*. This you might have done long since, and unlesse your favour may be had upon some other tearmes then undertaking the *Infallibility* of meere creatures, we must all be content to be discarded by you.

Section 30. Yet after all your turning away, and slighting, we shall never be so provoked, as to *punish you for the result of what we prescribe you*. If your best use of reason in the interpretation of *Scripture* (and not any prejudice, or passion, or fau't of yours) have sincerely brought you to your opinions, and no light that is offer'd, hath beene neglected, and yet all prove unsufficient to convince you, I shall never severely pronounce against you; and if you will say, and make good as much to me, our affections may meet, though not our braines, and both of us have *charity* enough to *cover* in each other, *a multitude of errours*.

Section 31. Your catalogue of *Sects* in this *Kingdome*, I shall not goe about to examine, but onely tell you, that your *infallibility* hath beene lyable to such misadventures also, and had not the *charme* or skill of keeping all within its *circle*; if it had, there would then

then at this time have beene no body to diſpute againſt you.

In the cloſe of your long Chapter, I wonder you ſhould be ſo covetous or ambitious of lengthning it one page farther, by charging on his *Lordſhip*, that he *charges you, that becauſe you pretend to be infallible, you have leſſe reaſon to preſcribe to others*; whereas his *Lordſhip* charges no ſuch thing upon you, but onely ſaith, that *ſhe that confeſſes ſhe may erre, is not ſo chargeable with any fault, as they that pretend they cannot*; which is quite another matter. *Section* 32.

To conclude, when the buſineſſe is thus laid by you, that your *infallibility* is not yet proved to be onely pretended, and yet you have no other ground of ſaying ſo, but becauſe you ſay 'tis not, (though all his *Lordſhip's* arguments for ſo may Sections have driven all to that concluſion, and never an one of them is yet anſwered by you) it will be a moſt unreaſonable thing (and a ſound *petitio principii* againe) to affirme without any one word of proofe, that that *infallibility* is a *reality*, and ſo will not *keepe* you from *mending*, whereas nothing can keepe you from *mending*, if this doe not; this contemning of arguments againſt you, and affirming magiſterially without any. *Section* 33. K

To the 29 *Section, Chap.* 17.

This opinion, ſaith he, of damning ſo many, and this cuſtome of burning ſo many, this breeding up of thoſe who know nothing elſe in any point of religion, yet to be in readineſſe to cry, To the fire with him, To hell with him. *All theſe be empty words, as we have ſhewed before. As for our breeding up of men, I thinke we doe it as well as any of our neighbours doe; and by the way, muſt tell you that we doe not take children from their parents onely to breed them up in our religion; we doe not offer that hard meaſure either to Turkes or Jewes, but hold it an act flatly againſt the law of nature, an impious violation of Parents right, which ought to be held ſacred; and laſtly, a way of propagation of religions wholy violent and Un-Chriſtian, ſo farre are we from propagating our religion by force; and if all others with whom we have to doe, had beene of that mind, it had beene better with them; for God hath not bleſſed that way, foraſmuch as by ſad experience*

we

we have found, that none have proved greater scourges to their King and Country, then such as have had that sort of breeding given them, and contrary to their parents will, beene violently seduced in their youth; and this is no secret, but knowne to all the three Kingdomes to their cost. But enough of this, for it is a distastfull businesse.

C. 17. *Answ. to C.* 17.

Section 1. To his Lordship's 29 paragraph you have no returne, but that *these are empty words as you have formerly shewed* (and I feare we have shewed they are not, but should be very glad to be mistaken, and can truly say, that I wish vehemently that your judgment were right in this matter) But upon occasion of his *Lordship's* mention of [*your breeding up those that know nothing else in religion, To cry to the fire, to hell with him*] you are pleased to take occasion of some liberty, in shewing what good *breeding* you bestow upon men in your *Church*, and so divert to a complaint against those *that take children from their parents, &c.* and are somewhat passionate and *tragicall* on that subject; but this being nothing to his *Lordship's* words or argument, I desire to see that better answered by you, before I will enter any new combat about so *extrinsecall* an impertinency. And so enough of this also, for what ever 'tis, 'tis nothing to the matter of present handling.

To the 30 *Section* Chap 18.

"*If it were granted, saith the Enquirer, that because it agrees* "*not with the goodnesse of God to let me want a guide infallible,* "*and that the Church of* Rome *were that one; yet if that teach* "*any thing contrary to God's goodnesse, I am not to receive her* "*doctrine, for the same cause they would have me receive it, it* "*being as good an argument. This guide teaches things contrary* "*to God's goodnesse, therefore it is not appointed, by God; as to* "*say, it is agreeable to God's goodnesse there should be a guide, there-*"*fore there is one. So he.*

The Enquirer seekes to delude us with a fallacy, by altering his tearmes; for in the first place, he speakes of a thing contrary to God's goodnesse, not absolutely, but according to his understanding.

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In the second place he speakes of it, not as it is in his understanding, but as it is simply in it selfe, which is a thing quite different from the former; for many things may be in his understanding that are thus, or as he saith, contrary to God's goodnesse, which in themselves are not so, but rather, quite otherwise, for indeed it is no good consequence to argue on this sort. This in my understanding is contrary to God's goodnesse, therefore it is so, because your understanding is subject to errour, and therefore some things may seeme to it to be, which are not. Chillingworth *who followeth this Author's footsteps, argues after the selfe same manner, and hath beene answered elsewhere by himselfe. I grant then the consequence when as he saith, this guide teaches somewhat contrary to God's goodnesse, therefore it is not appointed for a guide. But I deny the Antecedent; and afterwards when he proves it, saying, it seemes so to my understanding, therefore it is so, I deny the consequence, and admit the Antecedent.*

At least, saith he, if it seeme so to my understanding, whether in the meane time it be so or not, I am not to receive it, because I am to be guided by my owne reason and understanding. If it seeme so to your understanding after such time as you have weighed all things as rightly as you can, I grant it; But if it seeme so onely before you have done that, then I deny it, for then it is not to be followed but forsaken, or reformed if it be found erroneous, as in this case of yours it is. For in this case your understanding is to consult other understandings wiser then your owne, if you can finde any such; and according to that is to determine of the matter, and not to rely wholly upon your owne single understanding. But if you doe so, you will finde your owne single understanding was deceived, and that the guide of which we treate, teacheth nothing that is against the goodnesse of God. For it is to be supposed her understanding is brighter and more capacious then yours, and therefore is to be thought knowes much better what doctrines be agreeable to the goodnesse of God, then yours can doe what is against it; and therefore your owne reason and understanding teaches you, that the Churches understanding is to be preferred, and that yours must submit; and againe, that this is the rationall way, and not the other: this the way of understanding, and that of errour. And so much in answer to this fallacy, wherein I perceive, both he and Master Chillingworth *confide very much.*

As for particular doctrines, it is true, as you say, you may examine whether they agree with the Principle, that is foundation, yet nevertheleſſe cannot you from thence conclude any thing againſt the doctrines or Infallibility of the Church, but rather for it, and this for the reaſon before ſpecified. Neither doe we, therefore, ſend you to a witneſſe, and bid you not believe it, but rather, to believe it as farre as in right reaſon you are to believe it, and not farther, that is to ſay, you are to truſt to your owne particular diſcourſes, as to particular diſcourſes, and no farther, but to the reſolves of the Church as to the dictamens of a higher underſtanding, by the light of which you are to judge and cenſure of the reſt, and by doing thus, you are ſure you doe wiſely and ſafely, and, in fine, ſo, as although you ſhould chance to erre, you might anſwer the buſineſſe at the latter day, by ſaying, I did in this caſe what I ought to doe, for I followed what my reaſon taught me, and more then this was not required at my hands. But if I follow my owne judgement, and in confidence of that doe adventure to condemne the Church, In that I offend againſt my reaſon and true judgement, and ſhould not be able to make a good apology for my ſelfe, or any way make it good that I followed my reaſon, which faculty is the rule that God hath ſet mee.

For a concluſion of this diſpute, I anſwer in briefe, that putting the Inquirers argument as he ought to have put it, namely, thus as followeth. This guide, to my underſtanding; or, to my ſeeming, teaches things contrary to Gods goodneſſe, therefore it is not appointed by him for a guide, putting I ſay, the argument on this manner, it is nothing ſo good, or ſo concluding an argument, as this other is, videlicet; This guide teaches ſuch and ſuch doctrines, therefore they are not againſt the goodneſſe of God, and therefore againe, my underſtanding was deceived in holding them to be ſo; and therefore laſtly notwithſtanding all this, ſhe may be an infallible guide and appointed by God for ſuch: Note, that we inferre hence ſhe may be, but not that ſhe is, as the Inquirer would impoſe upon us: for, we doe not ſay that the Church is appointed a guide therefore, becauſe it is agreeable with God's goodneſſe to make her ſo, but becauſe we for other reaſons know he hath ſo made her: becauſe we are not now to learne but that many things are agreeable to Gods goodneſſe to be done, which yet are not done, nor peradventure ever will

will be. Wherefore, when we are to judge what is, or will be, we are to consider, not what his goodnesse may admit, but what his will determines shall have a being, for of that lastly depends the existence of things, and not of the other.

C. 18. *Answ. to C.* 18.

In your report of his Lordship's argument, *Section* 30. you leave out those words [*therefore there is one*] and so make nonsence of that period, which in his Lordship's setting of it is excellent reason. But I can believe that this was but a slip, As for your answer to the parrallel cases, wherein, saith his *Lordship*, *Gods goodnesse is equally concerned*; doe you thinke you can ever satisfie any reasonable man in saying, [*that the first thing he speaks of is onely contrary to Gods goodnesse in his Lordships understanding, not absolutely; but of the second, he speaks, not as it is in his understanding, but as it is simply in it selfe*] from whence you conclude, that he *changes the tearmes*] Certainly, Sir, in despight of your *exception*, the argument is good, Thus; *Section* 1.

If it be sufficient to conclude an *infallible* guide because it agrees not with *Gods goodnesse* to let men want one, then any man that conceives that *Church* to teach any thing which he conceives against *Gods goodnesse*, by the same reason is not to receive her doctrine; The case is cleare, because nothing concludes to any man any farther, then it is conceived by him; and that is not a proofe to me, which I doe not conceive to be so; which makes his *Lordships* arguing to be farre from fallacious; For the matter of this *paragraph* is not whether it be really true, that it agrees not with *Gods goodnesse* to let men want an *infallible guide*, but (supposing it to be so) whether it will follow the *Church* is *infallible*, or whether he whose understanding is convinced and perswaded of that truth, [*that it is not agreeable to Gods goodnesse to let us want such a guide*] be enforced to confesse it *infallible*. *Section* 2. *A*

This also his *Lordship* disputes not against (but will willingly acknowledge the consequence, supposing that the Antecedent were true) onely by the same argument proves another thing, that he that conceives the *Church* to teach any doctrine contrary to *Gods goodnesse*, or that, which is such to his understanding, *Section* 3.

or he that ſuppoſes the Church to teach ſo, muſt not believe that Churches doctrine. So that if you marke, the ſuppoſition is equall on both ſides, not taken for true one ſide, and onely pretended on tother, but one taken to be true by you, (that, *not to provide an Infallible guide is contrary to Gods goodneſſe*) and tother taken to be true by his Lordſhip (*that Gods damning thoſe that erre without either negligence or prejudication, is contrary to his goodneſſe alſo*) and if the Argument be of force on one ſide, it muſt be ſo alſo on
B tother, and for you to ſay that what you ſuppoſe, is true, but what his Lordſhip ſuppoſes, is not ſo, is a terrible *petitio principii* againe, and no ground of a confutation againſt his Lordſhip; The ridiculous arguments that you put in his Lordſhips paper, without his privity, will be matter of reproach to you, (who if you underſtood (as I ſuppoſe you did) were willing to deprave his diſcourſes) and not unto his Lordſhip.

Section 4. As for your way of ſatisfying his Lordſhips underſtanding, that what the Church teaches is not contrary to the goodneſſe of God, [*becauſe the Church knowes what is ſo, better than he*] 'twill ſure prevaile little with any, that is a diſputing whether the Church is *infallible* or no, (as you ſee his Lordſhip now is) for if ſhe be *fallible*, ſhe may miſtake in that judgment, and that
C ſhe doth not miſtake, there will be no aſſurance from her ſaying it, as long as the controverſy depends about her *Infallibility*, which to affirme not to depend, or to be no controverſy, is *petitio principii* againe.

Section 5. As for your Concluſion of this diſpute, wherein you ſet the compariſon betwixt two Arguments, and ſay yours is much the better; I ſhall not need debate that with you, becauſe they are not the two Arguments betwixt which his Lordſhip makes the compariſon. The firſt I confeſſe you have rightly ſet downe, [*This Guide to my underſtanding teaches things contrary to Gods goodneſſe, therefore it is not the Guide*] and this will be as good an argument, as this other, [*'Tis to my underſtanding contrary to the goodneſſe of God, that the Roman Church ſhould not be an infallible Guide, or that there ſhould be no infallible Guide; where there is none but the Roman Church, therefore the Roman Church is ſo*]: In this compariſon the conſequences are equally true, and built upon the ſame ground, that that which is againſt Gods

goodneſſe

goodneſſe cannot be; and the *Antecedent* equally affirmed according to ſeverall underſtandings, and then whether the other Argument which you bring, be comparable to either, it matters not.

But when at laſt you give us a note, that the argument from *God's goodneſſe* doth not conclude that your *Church* is *infallible*, but onely that it may be ſo; I confeſſe you make me repent of all this unprofitable attendance I have paid you, in following your argument thus farre, when your ſelfe have given me directions to a ſhorter cut of anſwering, *viz:* by granting that it may be *infallible*, that is, that nothing in nature reſiſts, but that, if God's pleaſure were ſo, it might be *infallible*, but ſay we, we have no evidence from God that it is his pleaſure it ſhould, and therefore we conclude it may be deceived, or may be *fallible*; betwixt which two, though there may be ſome difference, (as there is betwixt *falli* and *fallibilem eſſe*) yet unleſſe ſome evidence can be brought againſt one, which cannot againſt the other, they will be both equally true, as farre as reſpects our knowledge or debate of them. *Section 6.* D

And when you adde, that 'tis from other reaſons that you conclude ſhe is *infallible*, and not from this of *Gods goodneſſe*, I anſwer, that 'tis cleare that his *Lordſhip* was now diſputing onely againſt that reaſon taken from *Gods goodneſſe*, which it ſeemes you confeſſe was no *reaſon*; and for your other reaſons, they are either confuted in other paragraphs of his *Lordſhips* Treatiſe, or when you produce them, ſhall be. *Section 7.* E

To the 31. Sect. Chap. 19.

This Section *is ſpent in the enquiring whether a man ſhall be damned for making a diligent and impartiall enquiry after the true religion, of which he finds the infallibility of the Church to be a part, ſuppoſing that his reaſon, when all is done, will not aſſent. This is his Quære, and the ſame may be made concerning any other verity, or point of doctrine; as namely, of the holy Scripture, whether or no it be the word of God; and what ſhall become of that man whoſe reaſon, after an impartiall ſearch made, will not aſſent; or againe, about the truth of Chriſtian Religion, unto which, after ſuch a ſearch made, his reaſon will not condeſcend.*

I answer first, that it is a mockery to aske whether or no any Man shall be damned for making a good enquiry without successe; and in effect it is the same as to enquire whether a Man shall be damned for doing a deed that's commendable and good. For this Question supposes that either the Enquirer, or we were very simple Creatures, and did not understand our selves, or else that the Gentleman-demander was not in earnest, but propounded it only for his recreation, though at a time ill chosen and unseasonable, and also in a matter about which there ought to be no jesting.

I answer secondly, that in a place where instruction and information may be had, the case he puts is morally impossible to happen out; for we deny that where the search is diligent, impartiall, and without prejudice, and where againe information sufficient is to be had, that there the reason shall not be able to assent, and that whereseoever it cannot, that same happens, either through weaknesse, or inhability of judgment and capacity, or else by reason of some disordinate passion of the will, by which the understanding is misled and darkened, as in those, who are refractary, it for the most part falls out. Which passion and prejudices arise, sometimes from custome and education, sometimes from vitious inclinations, sometimes from a crookednesse and perversity of nature, which doth refuse instruction. Wherefore as it is no sufficient excuse for an Infidel to say, I have searched diligently whether or no Christ be the true Messias, or whether the Scripture be the Word of God or no, and after all endeavours used, my reason will not assent; so in like manner it is as little sufficient to alleage, that after enquiry made about the true Church and her Infallibility, your reason would not assent, for in these cases, we cannot grant any ignorance invincible; or free that errour which possesses them from guilt. Now what shall become of others who want instruction sufficient, and have no crookednesse or backwardnesse in their will, and die in ignorance, is another point, and different from this of ours, and is to be resolved in the Question about the efficacy of Implicite faith, to which I referre my Reader.

Chap. 19. Answ. to Ch. 19.

Section 1. In this Paragraph his Lordship askes a Question, Whether, supposing [*that he that never heard of the Church of* Rome, *shall not be damned for not believing it infallible*] it can be thought, that he

he that hath made diligent ſearch, and uſed honeſtly all meanes afforded him, and yet doth not believe the *Church infallible*, ſhall be *damned* for that not-believing (this is the Queſtion, and to weigh it downe on one ſide [*that that latter ſhall not be damning when tother is not*] this reaſon is put in that in this matter all that that Man hath done in the ſecond caſe more than in the former, is onely the having *diligently enquired*, which is preſumed to be no *damning ſinne*.

In ſtead of the Queſtion thus put, you ſet another ſomewhat diſtant, but I will ſuppoſe tending to the ſame effect, whether a Man ſhall be damned for making a good enquiry without ſucceſſe; which you ſay is a mockery, and ſo, as I conceive, ridiculous to affirme it; and ſo, Sir, after all your deſcanting on his Lordſhip for asking this queſtion, it is apparent by our explication of it, that upon the denying of that which you ſay, 'tis ridiculous not to deny, it inevitably followes, that that Man ſhal not be damned for denying the *infallibility* of your Church. *Section* 2.

And though you take paines to perſwade that this caſe is morally *impoſſible*, yet you muſt give us leave from your ſtating of the caſe, wherein you ſay it is ſo, *(viz: when information ſufficient is to be had)* to conclude your proofe a *petitio principii* againe; for when wee deny your Church to be *infallible*, and moreover affirme, that if it be, it cannot be *infallibly* knowne to be ſo, how can you thinke that we ſhall ever yeild (without any offer of proofe) that there is *ſufficient inſtruction* to be had for any man in this point? beſides, for you to ſay that every Mans not acknowledging this, proceeds either from Weakneſſe or Paſſion, what is that but uncharitableneſſe firſt, and then ſhortneſſe of diſcourſe, (when the caſe was on ſuppoſition that there was no fault of which his ſearch was guilty) and *Petitio principii* againe? *Section* 3. A B

To the 32. *Section, Chap.* 20.

Whoſoever admits of truth upon no better grounds than others doe admit of falſhood, doth not receive it rightly, ſolidly, and as he ought, but after a way defective and infirme. Againe, whoſoever ſearches and is loath to finde, and would not ſee it when he might, this Man refuſeth truth as badly and weakly as the other doth

doth receive it; and as the truth will not benefit the one, so the enquiry will not advantage or excuse the other. As for such as are bred up in a true Religion, and which, without particular examination, they accept, it were rash judgement to say all these received truths upon no better grounds, then others did falshood; for first, according to this account, the greatest portion of Christian men on all sides would be in a hard condition: amongst whom the simple and illiterate, who are not able to read Evagrius either in Greeke or Latine, nor yet the Bible either in Hebrew or Greeke, or otherwise to make any strict search into antiquity, for their making discoveries which faith was the Antient and Apostolique. But though they be unable to doe this, yet doe they not therefore take up their Religion at randome and by chance, or consult passion about it, and not reason, but contrariwise, doe finde their reason satisfied each one according to their severall models, or measure of capacity, by the present view of the majesty and divine perfections of the Catholique Church and faith therein professed, together with the assurances from publique fame and creditable relations. By meanes of which the divine providence and veracity shewes them infallibly what wayes they are to take, and what doctrines to receive as revealed from above. And thus, regularly speaking amongst orthodox Believers, where Religion may appeare like it selfe, every Man of capacity, though illiterate, may see sufficient to resolve him, which satisfaction from any false Religion he could not receive; for though to a heedlesse eye, and before a diligent enquiry made, some grand falshoods may seeme more probable than truths, and that as Aristotle teacheth, multa falsa sunt probabiliora veris, many falshoods are more probable than truths; yet, not to a diligent Enquirer after the search is made, and especially, in businesses of great concernment, because God and nature have laid these kinde of truths more open to our view, and set markes upon them by which they might be knowne and discerned from falshood. Wherefore, in the law of nature, it was more credible, even to the illiterate, that there was a God, then that there was none; and now Judaisme is not so probable as Christianity is, though sometimes it hath been, nor Mahumetisme at any time so perswasible as Christian Religion, or Heresy so credible and satisfactory as orthodoxall Christianity, or the Greeke schisme as the Greeke unity; wherefore though the Parents

belieue,

beliefe, and the Religion prevalent in the Country have great influence into the minds of Men, and are great and powerfull Perſwaders, yea oftentimes Seducers alſo, and thoſe very dangerous; yet nevertheleſſe in thoſe places where truth is taught, they doe not hinder Men from the right apprehenſion of it, and from making true judgements about it, but rather like a proſperous gale of winde to Veſſels under ſayle, cauſe them to move towards the Port deſired more ſwiftly than otherwiſe they would. And thus much may ſuffice for taking off the ſlander and ſcandall which this Enquirer, and after him Chillingworth, *with great acerbity, have almoſt in the very ſame tearmes, labour'd to caſt upon right believing Chriſtians, therewith to diſparage their faith, as if forſooth, they beleived truths invalidly and upon no better reaſons then others beleive falſhood. Thus have both theſe conſpired againſt the truth, for both indeed are but one Author in effect, one the Text, and the other the Commentary; wherefore the Publiſher of this ſmall worke hath ſhewed us all the well head to which* Chillingworth *went to draw, which Well before Was unknowne to the moſt part of Men, and ſo might have ſtill remained, had it not been for this Publiſhers unſeaſonable diligence.*

Chap. 20. *Anſw. to Ch.* 20.

Your miſtake is very remarkable in this Paragraph, and your paines very prodigally miſpent in diſproving of that which is by his Lordſhip mentioned onely on ſuppoſition of ſomewhat elſe affirmed by you, and by that meanes demonſtrated to be infirme. *Section* 1. *A*

His Lordſhip's preſent reaſoning is, that ſuppoſing your *infallibility* true, yet he that denies it, and withall uſes his beſt reaſon to ſeeke if it be true, will ſure be in as ſafe a condition, as he that believes it, and ſearches not. And this he proves, becauſe the *one believes that ſuppoſed falſhood on as good grounds, as the other doth that ſuppoſed truth.* Which is ſo fully concluded from thoſe premiſes, (and ſo needs no farther proofe) that indeed theſe premiſes are able to conclude more; *viz.* that in that caſe that Man believes that ſuppoſed falſhood on better grounds (*viz.* upon impartiall ſearch) then the other believes that ſuppoſed truth; and then 'twere unreaſonable to thinke, that God that rewards mens *actions*, and not their *fates*, their *choices*, and *Section* 2.

not their *ſtarres*, ſhould condemne the one, more ingenuous and guiltleſſe, and reward the other meaner and more criminall part of the parallel.

Section 3. All this you in a manner confirme, by ſaying, that *he that thus admits of truth, admits it not ſolidly, rightly, and as he ought, but after a defective and infirme way.* Which being borrowed from you out of this Chapter, the reſt will appeare to belong very nothing to his Lordſhip's argument, and therefore I chooſe not to inſiſt on any reply to it. For of thoſe which doe finde their reaſon ſatisfied in your *infallibillity*, of which you ſpeake a while, his Lordſhip ſpeakes not; and for the truths that God and nature have laid ſo open to our view, of which you ſpeake againe, ſure this of *infallibillity* is none.

Section 4. As for your diſpleaſure expreſſed againe (without any new occaſion) againſt the unſeaſonable Publiſher (which if you and ſome others of your Friends were meere Students and Votaries, to *pray* for, and ſtudy the *peace of Hieruſalem*, and not too active Infuſers and Enterprizers in theſe troubled waters, might indeed be acknowledged leſſe ſeaſonable) it is the very thing you ſaid before, and then was ſufficiently proved to be unſeaſonable.

To the 33, & 34. Sections, Chap. 21.

That the Enquirer did not deny with obſtinacy the infallibility of the Church of Chriſt, or any other Article, we are willing to beleive, yet nevertheleſſe how ſafe he was we know not. For a man may be obſtinate and yet not thinke ſo, though he may peradventure have juſt reaſon to ſuſpect it. It is not likely that Arius *for example, or any other Arch-heretique did thinke themſelves to be obſtinate, although it is not to be doubted but they were, for in the heart of Man there be many darke corners in which obſtinacy may lurke and be unſeen; many paſſions that doe corrupt the intention, which without great diligence are not eſpied, eſpecially in Men that are Lovers of the world, or be poſſeſſed with prejudices before hand. For which the wiſe Man wiſely ſaid,* Verebar omnia opera mea, *I diſtruſted all my workes. And ſo hath every Man reaſon to doe in this univerſall corruption of nature and manners. The* 34 Sect. *hath no difficulty in it which may require an Anſwer.*

Chap.

Chap. 21. Answ. to Chap. 21.

Your Answer to the 33 Sect. is very strange; you first grant very freely, that you *beleive that his Lordship did not deny with obstinacy the infallibility of your Church*; and yet in your next words you interpose against him, that *a man may be obstinate, and yet not thinke so*; and on that, ground your Answer to that Section. But sure, Sir, whosoever else may be obstinate, or what grounds soever he may have to suspect he is, yet this cannot by you be said of him at the same time when you acknowledge he is not obstinate. *Section* 1. A

I beseech you compare your Answer with that Paragraph of his Lordships again, and tell me whether this would not be very strange dealing. Suppose a Friend should make this Syllogisme for you; an honest Catholique ought not to be denied the liberty of this Towne, but this Gentleman is an honest Catholique, *ergo*: and to the *major* I should answer by silence, (*i. e.* consent) and to the *minor*, [*that you are an honest Catholique I am willing to believe*:] Nevertheless whether you ought to have the liberty of this Towne, I know not, for you may be a dishonest Catholique, and yet not thinke so. *Section* 2.

I pray how would you like this way of discourse? would you not first tell me that I did in effect deny the conclusion, *i. e.* make scruple how you should be dealt with, after I had acknowledged both that all honest Catholiques ought to be used as you desire, and that you are an honest Catholique? And Secondly, that I did suck in my concession of your being an honest Catholique, assoone as I had made it; for if that Reply belong to me, then is it doubted, whether I am such or no. Be pleased to compare the cases, and this is directly your answer. *Section* 3

What you meane by the *no-difficulty* in the 34 Sect. (which you confesse, and which therefore requires no Answer) I doe not perfectly know, but shall suppose you meane, that there is nothing of doubt or question in it, and then I am sure I have nothing to reply, but that by the same reason the 33 Section must be granted also, for the *medium* is the same to inferre both those conclusions. *Section* 4.

To the 35, & 36, Sections, Chap. 22.

To beleive, *saith he*, implicitly what God would have believed, is also to beleive implicitly what the Church teacheth, if this doctrine be one of those which God commands, to be believed. *My Answer to this is negative, and my reason of deniall is, because one implicite faith doth not containe another, but it is an explicite assent and no other that containes within it an implicite. To the point then I answer, that if that same generall belief, which he falsly calls Implicite, be sincere and cordiall, we then grant that it may, as he saith, implicitly containe the other. But what will he deduce from thence? What? that all who pretend to believe on that manner doe it sincerely? It is improbable, for if it were sincere, it would in knowing Men, not stay within the narrow compasse of an implicite assent, but quickly dilate it selfe, and become explicite. Indeed this great profession of believing in a preparation of minde all which God would have believed, and goes no farther, seemes in most Men to be but feigned and delusory, and so no great trust can be reposed in it.*

Chap. 22. Answ. to Chap. 22.

Section 1. A The force of the argument, Sect. 35. you deny upon a shew of some *subtlety*, because, say you, *one implicite faith doth not containe another*. This you affirme, but afford us not the least offer of proof for the affirmation. I must therefore beseech you to looke over your *principle* againe. Suppose me to believe by an *implicite faith*, that you are an honest Man, may not that belief containe in it an *implicite belief* to every proposition by you asserted? Nay, what need this circumlocution? is not his Lordships argument most cleare being put into a Syllogisme?

Section 2. If God commands the Church to be believed, then he that implicitly believes all the commands of God, implicitly believes that the Church is to be believed: but God commands the Church to be believed, *ergo*. See now which Proposition you will deny, the *major* is evident, the *minor* I presume you will not deny, whosoever else doth, and then I beseech you be good to the conclusion.

Section 3. But that it seemes you will grant too, but suspect that that generall

generall beliefe is not ſincere and cordiall; But that I am ſure is not for us to diſpute of, or diſcerne, and I am as ſure 'tis nothing to the caſe where 'tis ſuppoſed to be ſincere, and if it be not, no Man ever thinkes it can be relyed on.

To the 37, 38, & 39. Sections, Chap. 23.

Admitting the formeſt of theſe Sections as probable. To the 38, I anſwer, that as ſome are made obſtinate by pride, ſo againe other-ſome lazineſſe detaines in ignorance. But what of that? I grant you that it is not pride in you or any Man never to aſſent, till you find good reaſon for it, but rather wiſdome. Neverthelesſe it may be pride which blinds a Man and hinders him from the ſeeing a juſt reaſon of aſſenting, yea even then when it is not onely perceptible, but alſo eaſie to be perceived; for the eye of the proud ſees not the truth, but over-looks it. The 39 Paragraph containeth in it no buſineſſe conſiderable in the matter of controverſie between us.

Chap. 23. Anſw. to Chap. 23.

The 38 Sect. you admit as probable, and now methinks I underſtand your Dialect ſomewhat better then before I did; Doth not [*admitting as probable*] ſignifie [*not underſtanding?*] Truly it had been more ingenuouſly done to have uſed that other phraſe; for the truth is, it might have been done at this time without any diſparagement to your underſtanding; for in the beginning of this Section there was at the firſt Edition clearly an errour in the print. It ſhould be thus as 'tis now mended; To the *Greeke* that concludes the former Section ſhould be adjoyned in the ſame period, *If I could, &c.* and no new Section be there made; and as the ſence, by that miſtake of the Printer, lyes broken in the firſt Impreſſion, it is *non-ſence.* *Section 1.*

Now this being ſaid, It is a little odde that there ſhould be but one piece of non-ſence in the Booke, and that ſhould have the lucke to be in your favour, and by you be confeſſly admitted as *probable.* But this was but a misfortune. Your Anſwer to the 38 is not ſo excuſable, being not one ſyllable to the matter in hand, [that *ſluggiſhneſſe may as probably bring a Papiſt to grant your infallibility, as pride a Proteſtant to deny it*] In ſtead of denying or anſwering of which, you onely reply, that *pride may* *Section 2.*

possibly blind a man. Sure this paragraph you might have admitted also, (as well as the other two that encompasse it) much better then to have said nothing to the purpose.

Section 3. The 39. I would not discourage you from granting (it had beene much for my ease if you had granted the whole treatise) otherwise I could shew you, that it conteines an argument perfectly concludent against your cause, in satisfying one maine objection of yours against us.

To the 40 *Section* Chap. 24.

We Catholiques doe not disagree in points of faith, neither where there is fire to keepe us in awe, nor where there is none, and therefore this exception against our unity is frivolous. It is the clearenesse and perfection of our rule that drawes us all to unity, and not any of the foure Elements. If we follow this rule we are at peace, and We doe well know how to follow it: contrarywise, follow your rule as well as you can, and yet you are at variance; wherefore you assigne a rule, which though it in it selfe be not uncertaine, yet which is as bad, you are uncertaine of it. Now as in Logicke a maxime, or axiome, if unknowne, or uncertaine, is no good principle of argumentation; so in matter of beliefe, a rule not certainly discernible and understood, is no good rule of faith, though never so perfect in it selfe: and this is just your case.

The differences amongst those of our Church are not differences in matters of faith or religion, as it is evident; but on the other side it is manifest and confessed, that yours are. Our differences are in Philosophy onely, or in some Scholastique and undefined point, and such in particular is, that now some yeares agitated betweene the Dominicans, and sundry of their party on the one side, and the Jesuits, and Sorbon Doctours, and many more, on the other. For these contend not as we doe, with the Calvinists, namely, whether We have free will or no: all of them agreeing in that verity of faith, but they contend about a question onely Philosophicall, which hath some relation to it, namely whether with this freedome of will acknowledged by both sides, Physicall predeterminations or præmotions can consist: which question is no question of faith. Now admitting as many thinke, that these predeterminations could not stand with the doctrine of free Will, yet the said doctrine of faith

is

is not hurt thereby: for the oppoſition betweene them and free will, is either diſcovered by the Dominicans, or not. If not, then is it dormant, and ſo, though never ſo ill, it cannot doe hurt to faith, or worke it any prejudice. If it be diſcovered, then it can worke nothing, foraſmuch as thereupon it will be relinquiſht and abandon'd preſently: becauſe the doctrine of free will is received by an aſſent of faith, and the other but by a philoſophicall or opinative; the former being the ſtronger, muſt needs command and expell the latter, aſſoone as they begin to fall at variance. Wherefore it would in that caſe be a good conſequence with them, viz. Man hath free will, therefore there is no predetermination and not contrarywiſe, (as it is with the Calviniſts) there is predetermination, therefore no free will. Therefore in the holding of predeterminations there is a vaſt difference betweene a Calviniſt and a Dominican, even as much as betweene an obedient Catholique, and a perverſe and obſtinate Heretique, and that is difference enough. And ſince you would needs know, this is the reaſon why theſe arguments make you Heretiques, and not the Dominicans. That the Church ought to have reſolved the point in difference, betweene theſe two orders, is more then the inquirer can prove, for neither of their doctrines doe hinder conformity with the ancients in any one thing, wherein conformity was requiſite; for men are not bound to conforme with the ancients in the reaſons of their beliefe, but in their belief onely. The 42. *Section we grant as making nothing againſt our doctrine. And thus* Chillingworth *is alſo anſwered who inſiſts upon this ſame point, and alſo in the ſame faſhion with this Inquirer, ſo that all things conſidered, both theſe make but one Author and require but one anſwer to what they have objected. And by this the* 41, *and* 42. *Sections be alſo anſwered.*

C. 24. *Anſwer to C.* 24.

His Lordſhip ſaith that the conſent is little thank-worthy, *Section* 1.
becauſe that may be an effect of *feare, when there is fire for them that diſagree.* To this you anſwer, that you diſagree not in A
matters of faith, *neither where there is fire to awe, nor where there is none.*

Sir, is not that a ſtrange anſwer in you, that know there is *fire* *Section* 2.
to awe diſagrees in all matters of *faith*, and conſequently no matter

matter of *faith*, where there is no *fire to awe*? By this it appeares that that exception of his Lordſhips againſt your unity in matters of faith is farre from frivolous, and to get quit of it, you are faine to make a diſtribution, of which onely one *ſpecies* belongs to the *Genus*, which being put into forme betraies it ſelfe preſently: It muſt be thus, of matters of *faith*, ſome are required
B of us *ſub pœnâ ignis*, ſome are not. Can you ſtand to it, that this ſhall hold? are there any things *de fide*, which a Man may ſafely disbelieve? if not, all the reſt you ſay in that Section is nothing to the purpoſe. But then you adde, that all the differences are
C in matters not of *faith*, to which the anſwer will be very obvious (if I troubled you with no other) that ours are ſo too, and then you have little matter of triumph over us in that excellence.

Section 3. But if you pleaſe, I ſhall be a little more large with you in this
D point, and firſt I beſeech you to conſider, that it is you that bring this Argument againſt us, taken from Diſſentions amongſt us, and not we againſt you (though we might with as good reaſon) and therefore that it lies on you to prove it a concluding Argument, and to us 'tis abundantly ſufficient, if we be but able to retort it, for then 'twill be an Argument *ad homines*, though in it ſelfe it be no Argument.

Section 4. This being premiſed, I pray obſerve, in the ſecond place, the no force of this Argument againſt us, unleſſe it may alſo appeare that our departing from you, is the cauſe of theſe Diſſentions. For if they be but onely conſequent to it accidentally, this ought not in all reaſon to be laid to our charge, any farther then thus, that this accidentall conſequent, is a probable argument of one of theſe two things, either that you have better rules for the reſtraining of ſuch Diſſentions than we, or elſe that you are more carefull in executing the rules you have; and if either of theſe be ſaid by you, I ſhall then tell you: 1. That it ſeemes this Argument concludes but probably, though the propoſition were granted, and I believe I could urge as probably on the other ſide, and conclude the excellency of our Reformation from that old ſaying of *Clemens* (by way of Anſwer to your Objection, both of *Jewes* and *Heathens* againſt *Chriſtianity*, taken from the Diſſentions of *Chriſtians* in the *Primitive Church*) τοῦτο ἡ αἰτία, ὅτι παν-

τὶ

τὶ τῶ καλῶ μᾶλλον ἔπεται, *The cause of them is, because all things, that are excellent, are subject to the envy of Men, and Devils,* and from thence to the sowing of seeds of Dissentions amongst them; agreeably to that of our Saviour, that as soon *as the wheat was in the ground, the envious sowed his tares.*

But then secondly, for the preventing of such Dissentions, I shall adde, that though we have not pretence of *infallibility*, and threats of *fire* to restraine Men from them, yet we have other rules more agreeable to antient Church *practice*, than either of these; and though the *Weapons of our warfare are not carnall* in your sence of εἰς ὄλεθρον σαρκὸς, *to the taking away of life*, yet are they if they were executed, *mighty to bring downe* or shut out *Heresies*. For, if you know it not, I can tell you, that *Excommunication* (that soveraigne receipt of *Christ* and his *Apostles*, the most perfect designe of charity, to save and recover that which is lost, to shame Men to reformation) and upon contempt of that, that secular rougher hand interposing, the Writ *de Excommunicato capiendo*, and the Statute *of Abjuration* are very strong restraints; and if they have not been so diligently executed as they ought to be, though I hope you will pardon this fault, yet he that will not, must charge it onely on the Persons of our *Magistrates*, and not on our *Religion*, or the state of our Reformation. And then let me adde that even these lawes, and this execution of them, or the like, whether among you or us can extend no farther then to outward restraints, and that onely of those that will be so terrified, or to *punishment* of them that will not; but not to *preventing of Heresies* in the inward rise or growth, or sometimes in the breaking out, whensoever ambition of being Leader of a Sect, &c. are more prevailing than feare of punishments, which cases must be looke for in every Church. *Section 5.*

To which purpose you may please to reflect upon your selves, and tell me, whether there were not good store of Hereticks before the times of the Reformation, If not, I am sure *Irenæus*, & *Epiphanius*, and Saint *Augustine*, and *Philastrius* have abused us in their *Catalogues*; and I beseech you, but to remember the ridiculous Heresies of *Galatia* (which Saint *Jerome* mentions on occasion of *Gal.* 3. 1. in respect of which he conceives the *Apostle* calls them *such fooles*, and thinks they were *bewitcht*) particularly *Section 6.* B

those of the ἀφλοῦνται, that would have *Cheese* mixt with the *Bread* in the *Sacrament*, which with two others of the like stamp, there mentioned, came from *Ancyra* the Metropolis of *Galatia*. And yet I believe you would not thinke the Argument of much force, if it should (from your example against us) be made use of by us either against those Apostolicall Churches, or against the Roman Church ever since, that so many Heresies are gone out of it; and yet that would be as reasonable in us, as in you it is to charge all the Heresies which have been in the World since *Luther*, upon the Reformation.

Section 7. For, let me aske you, is the fault that you object to us in this matter, that Hereticks are gone out from us? That which wee have said will satisfie you that that is no argument, that we are not a true Church, for if it be, it will be of force against the Catholique Orthodox Church in all Ages. Or is it, that they that thus dissent from us are suffered to continue among us? if that be it, then first there are also Dissenters among you, continuing with you. Secondly, our Lawes and Canons are for the casting them out, if their dissentings be Heretical, and that is all that you can pretend of these, and if we have been more indulgent than you would have us, that is but an errour of tendernesse first, and then that onely the fault of Persons.

Section 8. Having said thus much (which I conceive full ground of satisfaction to what you have or can say in this matter) I might now adde, that if you looke no farther then the Church of *England* even in these (which I suppose you will count the) worst times of it, you cannot finde any greater or more dangerous Heresies avowed by any considerable Party, than are owned by some of the Jesuits among you.

Section 9. I shall first mention that popular doctrine (you know what I meane) of *Bellarmine*, resumed and confirmed not long before his death, with his most advised care in his *Recognitions*. Secondly, the doctrine and practice of *resisting* and *deposing lawfull Magistrates* under colour of *religion* (that I set it no higher, even to *killing* of *Kings*.) Thirdly, the opposing the Order of *Bishops*, as expressly contrary to the sole-power enstated by *Christ* on S. *Peter*. And also Fourthly, the affirming it lawfull that *evill* may be done, so it be in order to a *publique good*; and that I trouble you with

with no more (and yet give you reaſon to thinke that it *is* in my power) I beſeech you to believe that I have read *Watſon's Quodlibets*, (and I could without much difficulty make a paralel betwixt theſe whom you ſo much charge, and thoſe whom you defend, your hateſt Enemies, and your deareſt Friends, that Booke being ſo richly able to furniſh me with hints) & that I have ſurveyed the Writings betwixt the *Seculars* and the *Regulars* (with the late controverſie among you about the *Biſhop of Calcedons* being appointed *Ordinary* in this *Kingdome*, produced) and in them the difference about the neceſſity of *Confirmation*, and the [*non*] (even now mentioned) in the *Canon* of the *Councell*, as alſo the *Symbolum Jeſuiticum*, *&c.* and if we have any greater diviſions among us yet, than theſe, I beſeech you to let me know it from you (for I believe 'twill be no eaſie diſcovery) and I ſhall promiſe to doe and pray my utmoſt, that they may be avoided.

This being thus ſet betwixt us, I ſhall not need to deſcend to a particular ſurvey of the truth of what you ſay, that theſe differences among you are in matters not *de fide*; though in that there would be a large field to amplifie in alſo. *Section* 10.

To his Lordſhips argument, [That *the Church ought to have reſolved theſe queſtions if they deſired conformity with the antient Church*] you anſwer, that *neither of theſe Doctrines hinder Conformity with the Antients in any thing wherein Conformity is required*; and confirme that by an implicite Aſſertion, which you will never be able to prove, *viz:* that the *Fathers* did not deliver doctrines (as well as reaſons) directly contrary to the *Dominicans*; Whereas 'tis cleare they did, *viz:* to that, that *phyſicall predeterminations* can conſiſt with freedome of will. Which even now you thought good (not to deny but) to excuſe by a *dilemma*, that if this oppoſition were not diſcovered to the *Dominicans*, it would doe no hurt, if it were, it would be relinquiſht. It ſeemes by this, that if they are diſcovered, and not relinquiſht, the danger would then be great, and ſo that if they knew this *conformity*, this *conformity* would be requiſite alſo, and ſo is requiſite in it ſelfe, though by the excuſe of blameleſſe *ignorance* it be capable of mercy. *Section* 11.

To the 42 Sect. you anſwer by granting againe, and thus you ſay *Section* 12.

ſay alſo Maſter *Ch.* is anſwered, and truly ſo any Man will be content to be anſwered; I would all his Lordſhips Treatiſe had been ſo anſwered, it had been more eaſe to your ſelfe, and advantage to ſomebody elſe.

To the 43 Sect. Chap. 25.

We doe not formally inferre, that becauſe our rule breeds unity, therefore all diſſenting Parties ought to yeild to that; but that diſſenting Parties have no rule on which it is fit, or ſafe to rely; and againe, that in place of it, we ought to ſeeke out one which cauſes unity, becauſe no rule can be good without that quality. Nevertheleſſe it followes alſo, ours is the true rule, becauſe, de facto, *none but ours either doth it, or is apt to doe it, and one ſuch rule there muſt be, we are ſure. Ours then is not therefore to be accepted, becauſe it breeds unity, but becauſe it alone doth breed it. As for* Nilus, *he is a pratling Greeke, and beſides that in his ſeverall ſayings he overthrowes himſelfe, and confirmes our Doctrines; in this point no heed is to be taken to what he ſaith.*

Chap. 25. Anſw. to Chap. 25.

Section 1. In this Chapter you diſclaime an Aſſertion by affirming it; diſclaime it in theſe words, [That *you doe not inferre, becauſe your rule breeds Unity, therefore all diſſenting Parties ought to yeild to it*] and affirme it in theſe [That *diſſenting Parties have no rule, that they ought to ſeeke out one that cauſes unity, that yours is the true rule, and none but yours:*] your meaning is, it ſeemes, that you doe inferre it, but you doe it not *formally*; and ſure it matters little for *formality*, when the thing is ſo granted by you.

Section 2. For that you put in the word [*onely*] it matters little; becauſe any other company that ſhould deny that *infallibility*, and uſurp it themſelves, would ſoone get the *monopoly* of it alſo, eſpecially from any that differed from them in any particular. As for *Nilus*, 'tis farre cheaper and eaſier to call him *pratling Greeke*, than to confute his ſaying, which yet, if you pleaſe to marke his words in this place, is no more than you ſay in the very undertaking to anſwer this Treatiſe, that your Church muſt by all be lookt on as *infallible*.

To

To the 44,45,46,47, Sections, Chap. 26.

In these foure Sections *the Enquirer busily endeavours to perswade that errours might secretly creep into the Church by degrees, as a Child waxes bigger, and as the index of a Clock moves about. Be it so as the Enquirer saith, yet nevertheless, might all such creeping errours, if there were any, be espied, at least, when they had once got in, if not while they were stealing thither. Thus the growth of a Child is seene plainly, though not the growing, and the hand, or shadow of a Diall is seene at what houre it is, though the slow pace thither was not perceptible; and Men may give a judgement whether it goe false or true. Why then could not errours be espied as easily after they were once stolne in, though by never so small degrees, they made their approaches thither? Thus were the errours of* Arius, Pelagius, Wicliffe, Socinus, *and others, presently discovered, notwithstanding all their Authours counterfeiting and slie manner of divulging them; even as tares, which were sown while Men slept: as soon as grown up were seen and noted. What then should hinder all other pretended errours of the Church from being seen and registred, although crept in never so insensibly?*

What matter is it that sundry Bookes are lost? Are they more lost for those errours, then for others? or were these more invisible then all the rest? It is strange with what improbable conjectures this Enquirer deludes himselfe.

He tells us afterwards of another slie way of breaking in, that is to say, under old names and titles, altering the signification, but not the words. But I would know how the errours of the Church could by this art be concealed, more than the errours of Calvin, *who sought with old appellations to palliate his new Doctrines.*

But, in conclusion, his principall devise is, that if no precedent opposition were a note of the being taught from the beginning, that then the doctrine of the Chiliasts would passe for right and Apostolicall, because, as he affirmeth, it was not contradicted till two hundred yeares after the coming in. But my answer is, it is more than any Man can prove, that it was contradicted no sooner: nay, it is more than probable, that it was contradicted in the time of S. Justin, *as we have shewed before, and also highly probable, that it was opposed and rejected in the time of* Dionysius *the Artopagite, as also hath been noted before.*

Beſides, it is no way neceſſary that every caſuall or innocent opinion ſhould be forthwith contradicted, or noted as an errour againſt faith; and of this ſort was the errour of the Chiliaſts during the time it was held but as an opinion, without cenſuring or condemning others, to which height, aſſoone as it arrived, it was cryed downe preſently and rejected.

The 48 Sect. containes but a recapitulation of what was before propounded, and therefore requires no new anſwer to it.

The laſt Sect. containes nothing that deſerves not commendation, or is unworthy of the Author, but is rather to be extolled and imitated by all that make Enquiries after truth, and his reſolves there be ſuch, that if they be truly and ſincerely put in execution by any, no man can have reaſon to be offended with him in this world, nor is it likely that God will be diſpleaſed with him in the next. But whether the Enquirer was not very unhappy in his ſearches after truth, or no, I leave it by the ſearcher of all hearts to be determined.

C. 26. Anſw. to C. 26.

Section 1. To your anſwer to the *undiſcernableneſſe of errours*, *that though they are not ſeene at the time, they may be ſeene after.* I reply, that I confeſſe it poſſible they may be ſeene after, and that ſome are ſo, very ſoone after, but yet ſure not all *preſently after*, at leaſt not *publiquely* and *vulgarly* ſeene; As they are ſeene, ſo they may be made knowne to the world, ſome a long time after others; and this is ſufficient to ſhew, that the *Authours* of the *errours* may poſſibly not be ſeene & diſcovered at all, though the errour in proceſſe of time chance to be ſo, which will be moſt evidently true, if it be farther conſidered (what his *Lordſhip* affirmed) that *errours came in by degrees*, and not at once.

A

Section 2. To your queſtion what it *matters that ſundry bookes are loſt?* I anſwer, that thus much it matters, that from thence it followes *infallibly*, that 'tis poſſible there might be oppoſition againſt any doctrine, though in the writings we have, there be none mentioned, and as you diſprove not that, ſo his *Lordſhip* deſires not to have more acknowledged.

B

Section 3. Your next anſwer by retortion againſt *Calvin* will be of no force, unleſſe *Calvin* undertooke to be *infallible*.

Section 4. For the matter about the *Chiliaſts* as you referre to your anſwer

ſwer before, ſo doe I to my reply, onely from your *favour* or indulgence to that *opinion*, during the time that it was held but as an opinion, *without cenſuring or condemning others*; but then withdrawing that *favour* when it arrived to that height; I am very glad and joyfull to joine iſſue with you, and charitably to ſuppoſe (though I affirme it not) that till you tooke upon you to condemne and cenſure others, any opinion you held, meerely as an opinion, might doe you no irreparable hurt; but now that you proceed to that inſolent unmercifull height, what mercy can you expect from your owne principles, by which yet we that *cenſure* not, *condemne* not, are confident to hope for ſome *kindneſſe* from *you*, though not from other men. C

To the 48 *Sect.* I ſhall take your example likewiſe, and to the laſt commend your ingennity for commending that, that deſerved it ſo much; and onely demand with what conſcience you could thinke him very unhappy in thoſe ſearches, which you confeſſe to be ſo happy in propoſing; for ſure if unhappineſſe ſignifie the ill ſucceſſe of his ſearches, there can be (according to your *Principles*) no feare that they ſhould by God be permitted to be unhappy; or if it ſignifie any fault in them, you cannot without *uncharitableneſſe*, and judging of hearts pronounce him guilty of it. *Section* 5. D

The Concluſion.

The generall reſult of all that which hath beene debated hithers to betwixt the Enquirer and me, is, in effect, no other but that, Firſt, the Catholique Churches infallibility is a ſoveraigne preſervative againſt errour; and againſt all diſſention or diſ-union in believing, unto all thoſe who doe acknowledge it, and yeild ſubmiſſion thereunto. Secondly, that each new verity defin'd by that Church is to them a new path to heaven, though on the other ſide, to all ſuch other as refuſe to be directed by her, it may prove juſt as the Enquirer is pleaſed to expreſſe himſelfe, a new path to walke in towards the Devill, or one ſteppe more unto damnation. And in this he was in the right, and ſpoke truer then he was aware. Now it is well knowne that all we Catholiques are guided by that ſame infallibility; and againe, that on the contrary all Anti-Catholiques

tholiques doe reſiſt it, and what will follow out of this, is no hard matter to collect. Moreover, this ſame infallibility, a quality ſo unpleaſing to the Enquirer, cannot, as he ſurmiſes, make us ſure, if we be in errour, never to mend, for we all doe offer freely that if either he, or any of his ſide be ſure to diſprove ſoundly and clearly the infallibility, we will be as ſure to mend and forthwith to relinquiſh it; by which expected act of theirs we ſhall be reduced unto ſuch good tearmes, in which all Anti-Catholiques continually are, that is to ſay, to believe at randome, reele wildly up and downe unconſtantly, and fall at variance amongſt our ſelves, as they doe; and then I hope the Enquirer will be contented with us.

But the want on their behalfe of ſuch an efficacious proofe as this, hath beene the true reaſon why we have not hitherto thought of any alteration, or comming towards them. Certainly it is much better to be perſwaded though falſly, of an infallibility, then to be ſure to have none, as you now are, but to be wrangling perpetually, falling out and fighting amongſt your ſelves; whereas, before you were, when as our Religion prevailed, this inconvenience happened not. So that, in fine, all the goodly fruits you have reaped from your impugning Church and Councels, and in bringing in inſtead thereof a new invention of your owne, is but the making of your ſelves and your Country miſerable, which daily, by deare experience we finde. And ſo much for the Enquirer's unadviſed impugnation of the infallibility of the Catholique Church.

Chap. 27. Anſw. to the Concluſion.

Section 1. In your Concluſion which recapitulates the ſumme of theſe debates betwixt his Lordſhip and you, your firſt reſult is acknowledged perfectly, upon ſuppoſition that your Church were *infallible*; but then whether it be or no, that is the queſtion ſtill, and its being taken by you for a Principle, when 'tis ſo farre from being ſuppoſed one, is the cleare ground of the Irreconcileableneſſe betwixt You and Us. For, upon ſuppoſition that we were your Proſelites in all manner of doubts beſides, yet your requiring us to believe you not onely in the right, but *infallible*, equally

A

equally obligeth us to believe all that your Church can possibly ever affirme, as what you doe already, and then we must have a strong faith indeed to be able to beare such a burthen. Whereas if you could but be brought to thinke it possible, you might be deceived, we could then finde place in you for *Scripture* and *reason* to make impression: but till then, you have that terrible prejudice against them, whensoever they are produced against you (and whensoever they are urged for you, they are to little purpose, onely to confirme you in the beliefe of that which you are already infallibly perswaded to be infallible) that they are but temptations and shafts of Satan, which, the stronger they come, and the more irresistibly, the more is your faith obliged to resist them all; and to that this one fortification is sufficient, that you know that whosoever doubts of your infallibility, is not fit to be heeded in any thing else; Reason must cease to be Reason, Scripture to be Scripture, when it appeares on that Argument. B C

And that sure is the reason that this Treatise of his Lordships, which consists not of more Paragraphs, than convincing Reasons, against your Infallibility, is so easily rejected, or forgotten by you, that now you cannot acknowledge ever to have heard any such on that Theme. And then I shall not attempt to hope to have so much, either Logicke or Rhetorick, as to make that impression on you. *Section 2.*

Onely let me desire you to consider the ground of your last period but one, that certainly it is better to be perswaded, though falsely, of an Infallibility, then to be sure to have none. *Section 3.*

Where first you must, if you speake intelligibly, intimate that your errour is better (not onely than another errour, but) than truth, for the Infallibility you suppose to be an errour, when you so speake, but the no-infallibility you doe not suppose to be no-truth. *Section 4.*

But then Secondly, I am so farre from this opinion of yours, that I conceive it hard to imagine any errour, that could doe so much harme, as this of the pretended Infallibility, supposing it, as now you doe, to be an errour; for that which brings a certaine *Section 5.*

possibility (if no more) of all errours after it, and leaves no one falsity out of the Creed; that 'tis possible for all temptations to perswade your Church, is certainly a complicated errour, and may well be called Legion, for nothing else can be so numerous as this; I'me sure not the believing you fallible, though you were not so; For, that would be but one errour, and no other necessarily consequent to it, it being very possible for him that hath that opinion of you, to thinke every thing else that you thinke, to thinke you actually in the truth, although it be possible you may be in the wrong. Not to mention the great injury that that Infallibility, if it did belong to you, would in one respect be apt to doe you, I meane to deprive your Church of all reward for any truths you preach, there being no matter of reward where there is no possibility of doing otherwise, nor capacity of a crown, where, for want of a possibility of being overcome, there is also an impossibility of obtaining victory.

D

Section 6. Thus have I given you an impartiall account how much, or rather how little, your Papers have wrought upon my understanding; and truly as the end of my writing any thing was, that I might satisfie your judgment, so the maine end of my enlarging to so many particulars, and, (as you may see by the expressions of my then-present-intentions at the end of the first Chapter) to a length which I had resolved against, by examining almost every period in your seven sheets, was to satisfie your desire, signified *in putting your Papers into so many hands*, that, to tell you true, after I had read them over, and declined the having any thing to doe with them once, then within few daies after found another way to come to my hands againe; so that it had not beene civility toward you to have put you to any more trouble, or farther to have tempted you to thinke your selfe victorious. To fortifie you the better against that temptation, I have beene perhaps more plaine and punctuall sometimes then would otherwise have beene necessary; and if when you have read it over, you finde any such plainnesse to have beene without cause, upon your signification of your sence of any such my offence, I will promise to aske your pardon; meane while I shall not trouble you with any farther thoughts of continuing

tinuing this Controverſie, (*peace* and *unity* and *amity* of pennes and hearts being much a more *lovely* thing) but deſire that if any thing in your Paper (as farre as it preſſes his Lordſhip) be in your opinion unſatisfied, it may in few words, without ſuch a large trouble as this, be mentioned by you, and then friendly debated betwixt us at any time of meeting; of which whenſoever by the meanes that this came to my hands, you ſhall ſignifie to me your pleaſure, I ſhall not faile to ſerve you, being indeed reſolved never to be thus injurious to my Reader againe in civility to any man.

From my Study
Sept. 23.
1645.

An *Appendix*, or *Answer* to what was returned by the *Apologist*.

TO this *Reply* of mine what was by the *Apologist* returned in the Margent of my Paper, shall be now distinctly set downe as the *Preface* promised, with a direction (by some Letter of the Alphabet) to that part of any Chapter of the discourse, to which each of his *Annotations* were applied, and affixed. And for *Answer* to them I shall not need enlarging.

In the *Introduction*, at the letter [*A*] this Annotation was set in the Margent. [*I know of neither Scoffes nor Triumphs.*]

Answ. That there are such, the Reader will give credit to his owne eyes, if he review the latter part of your first Chapter, as also the close of the 8 and of the 15 Chapter; And that you ought to *know* them, *i.e.* acknowledge and reform them, as being contrary, the former to that *Charity*, the latter to that *Meekenesse*, which our *Saviour* left in charge with those that would be called by his *name*, I hope you will discerne, and confesse with me.

C. 2. *B.* the Annotation is [*I doe not treat here what is done by some, but what in propriety of speech ought to have beene done.*]

To this I anſwer, firſt, That it being true (as this Reply confeſſes) that ſome Romaniſts uſed that ſtile of *Catholique Roman Church*, (though this Apologiſt did not) This is fully ſufficient to juſtifie his Lordſhips title, becauſe he was not bound to foreſee that this Apologiſt would reforme the ſtile of others; And ſecondly, though it be not propriety of ſpeech, yet was that no argument neither, becauſe his Lordſhip that holds that *Church fallible* in greater matters, might conceive it poſſible for them to be ſo in matter of *propriety of ſpeech*, nay was confident that ſo they were, being not able to disbelieve his eyes and eares, that of this they were guilty, as *improper* as it is. But then thirdly, the matter is yet more cleare againſt the Apologiſt; for though his Lordſhips title did not *preſage*, yet I which had read that Anſwer, could ſee that he himſelfe ſaid that the *Church Catholique* was the *Roman*, and the *Roman* the *Catholique*, and that is the thing which I affirm'd from his owne words in that place to which that Annotation is prefixt. And therefore for him to ſay, that in *propriety of ſpeech this ought not to be done*] as it is an accuſation of himſelfe, who was guilty of that *impropriety*, ſo is it not a confutation of me, who onely ſaid he was ſo.

Ib. C. [*We ſpeak here according to the rules of formall predication, not for reprehenſion of the Enquirer, but for rectifying the manner of ſpeaking, and ſtating the Queſtion rightly.*]

Anſw. 'Tis not imaginable how this note could advantage the Writers cauſe. In the very place to which this note is affixt, I am a proving by rules of *formall predication*, that, by what is ſaid by the Romaniſts, and particularly by your ſelf, it is apparent, that you affirme the *Roman Church to be Infallible*, though not *quatenus Roman*. this concluſion you deny not to follow from thoſe *rules*, but ſay [*you ſpeak according to thoſe rules.*] And truly I have as yet no neceſſity to deny that you doe ſo, nor ſhall I, untill having affirm'd the *Roman Church* to be the *Catholique*, you proceed to deny the *Roman* to be *Infallible*, though the *Catholique* be. This you doe not yet diſtinctly deny, (though the whole controverſie about the title of his Lordſhips booke ſhews that you are not very willing to ſtand to the affirmative.)

When

When you doe ſo, I ſhall make bold to put you in mind of thoſe rules, and in the meane onely to take notice of your owne confeſſion, that what you ſaid was *not for reprehenſion of the Enquirer:* which I muſt affirm to be a retractation of your former writing, which pretended to prove that in truth it *was not ſo, as in the Enquirer's title it is called.* This was then ſurely a *reprehenſion* of the *Enquirer*, and if now you ſay you meant not to reprehend him, this is to ſay you did not meane to doe what you did, which being a ſtile of humility I ſhall never reproach or find fault with in you; but yet tell you, that what you call in the next words of your Annotation, your [*rectifying the manner of ſpeaking, and ſtating the Queſtion aright*] is in my Anſwer proved to be contrary to your owne *manner of ſpeaking*; and a cleare *miſ ſtating*. To which proofes as here you reply nothing, (nor is it imaginable how you ſhould, the matter being ſo evident, *viz.* that they that affirme the *Roman Church*, to be the *Catholique*, and the *Catholique* to be *infallible*, muſt needs affirme the *Roman* to be *infallible*) ſo doe you in effect confeſſe that you had nothing to reply to the remainder of that whole Chapter, which as it is the longeſt in the Book, ſo by vindicating the fitneſſe of his Lordſhips title, and ſtating of the Queſtion againſt your exceptions, doth lay very uſefull grounds for the voyding your pretenſions to *infallibility*: For if it be cleared by my firſt Chapter (as I conceive it is, and your Annotations do not deny it to be) that the Queſtion is of the *infallibility of the Roman Church*, then we that deny the *Roman* to be the *Catholique* muſt never be charged of denying the *Catholique* to be *infallible*, nor be liable to the arguments that are brought againſt us upon that head, (which without queſtion are the beſt you have) though we deny it never ſo confidently of the *Roman*.

Id. D. *Surely the meaning is very obvious.*]

Anſw. If it be, I am ſure the words doe not clearly expreſſe it, for how ſhould the editor of his Lordſhips tract (to whom the former part of that period belongs, in theſe words [*though no notice hath been taken of any anſwer given already*]) *take notice* of *giving licence for any other anſwer? Give* notice he might, but that in my judgment is not to *take*; and *take* notice

tice *you* might, but that I conceive would not cohere with the antecedents, and any third way of rendring, I confesse I imagin not; and therefore ſtill if the meaning be obvious, it muſt be met with ſomewhere elſe, then in the ſound, and contexture of the words, but this ~~ſpeech~~ ſhall not be imputed to you, it was onely an officiouſneſſe in me then, to ſhew you it was ſuch.

Id. E. *Theſe are bitter ſcoffes, and no way grounded upon my words.*

Anſw. That the phraſe [*ſad newes*] was grounded on your words there recited by me, I muſt ſtill affirme, for they are moſt evidently a forme of complaining, and that is all I meant by [*ſad newes:*] yet if to you it ſeeme to be a *ſcoffe*, or *bitter*, and both thoſe in the plurall, (more *ſcoffes* than one in that ſingle expreſſion) though my conſcience doth not accuſe me of any ſuch intention, yet I will fall at your judgement, and beſeech you to pardon me for it, and to make you reparations, promiſe to endeavour to offend no more againſt you, or any other Adverſary by any kind of *bitterneſſe*; and for once be you pleaſed to imitate my reſolution, and remember, that when another man ſpake it [*ſad newes*] was a *bitter ſcoffe*, and then perhaps your *reprehenſion* of me may worke a double *cure*, and heale you alſo of ſome *exceſſes*.

Chap. 2. *Anſw. to Ch.* 2. A. *I doe not beg the Queſtion, but deny what the Enquirer aſſumed as true and granted, namely that our proofes of the Church are no other nor better than thoſe by which you impugne it: which aſſumpt of his we deny, and whether juſtly or no, muſt depend upon the triall and the examination of his proofes to follow after; and therefore this deniall of mine is no* petitio principii, *but a right and Logicall deniall, which either the Enquirer or you were bound to diſprove, and not to tell us as you doe that we are bound to prove againſt the Enquirer, who here chargeth us, and ſuſteineth the Perſon of the Opponent, or one that argues againſt our Infallibility.*

I am the Defendent, and no Defendent can begge the Queſti-

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on, my diſcourſe is Apologeticall as the Title tells you.

Anſw. I did not venture to tell you that you were guilty of a *petitio principii*, untill I had, as I conceived, made an *ocular demonſtration* to you that it was ſuch, which you may pleaſe to review in the place; or to ſave you that trouble, I ſhall tell you the ſumme of it; you deny a propoſition, which in that place 'tis cleare that his Lordſhip proves, and having not anſwered one word to his proofes (which is in effect to deny the *concluſion*) you then give a proofe or reaſon of your deniall [*for we affirme that our Churches infallibility is proved by reaſons which are reall and true, &c.*] this reaſon of yours being as much denied by his Lordſhip, as your maine concluſion againſt which he diſputes, ought in any reaſon to have beene backt with ſome firme proofe, and of that kind you give none but your owne affirmation; and becauſe you doe not, this I there call a *petitio principii*, agreeably both to *Ariſtotles* notion of that *Sophiſme*, and to the notation of the phraſe. For *principium*, or τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ being acknowledged to ſignifie the queſtion, for that or any part of it to be brought in to prove any thing that in that diſputation is denied, is either αἰτεῖσθαι or λαμβάνειν, *to begge the queſtion, or take it for granted*, and in effect, to prove a thing by it ſelfe, (which is the moſt irrationall proceeding that can be.) If you are not yet convinced of this, I ſhall yet farther give you a proofe of it from thoſe antient Authours, which can beſt judge of this matter, the *Interpreters of Ariſtotle*; Take one for all, †*Magentius*, in his definition of this *Sophiſme*. Ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ δεικνύειν δι' ἑαυτοῦ, περυκὸς δι' ἄλλου δείκνυσθαι, *A begging of the queſtion is, when any thing is proved by it ſelfe, which ought to be proved by ſomething elſe.* Or againe, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ προκείμενον εἰς ἀπόδειξιν, πάλιν λαμβάνομεν ὡς πρότασιν εἰς κατασκευὴν ἑαυτοῦ, *When that which is propoſed to be proved, is uſed as a medium, to prove it ſelfe.* Or again, ὅταν πάλιν λαμβάνωμεν πρότασιν, δοκοῦσαν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ προκειμένου, ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ᾖ, *when we uſe a medium which ſeemes to differ from the queſtion* (or the thing to be proved) *but is all one with it. As if to prove that pleaſure is good, I ſhould aſſume, that pleaſure is to be choſen, whereas,* ſaith he, τὸ αἱρετὸν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὰ ἐστι, *that which is good, and that which is to be choſen are all one:* and therefore unleſſe

† Ἐξήγησις εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν βιβλία. fol. 28.

that be farther proved, that pleasure is to be *chosen*, there is nothing done toward the proving it to be *good*. That this is your very manner of proceeding, I need not farther prove, having done it so newly by laying your whole processe before you; I shall onely adde the note of that *Scholiast*, that τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι, *The not demonstrating of what wee undertake, is the genus of this begging the Question*; or *Begging the Question is a speciall species of not demonstrating*; and unlesse you will discerne first, and then labour to repaire this infirmity in your discourses, all your mentions of the *Philosopher in his Analytickes*, will not perswade us that you are likely to *demonstrate*.

Thus much I had briefly said to you before, but now have been forced to lay downe more largely; and let me tell you, that when I had not onely *affirmed*, but *proved* you guilty of this *Sophisme*, you ought either by denying my premises, or by some other way to have answered my proof.

And instead of so doing, To say onely [*you are not guilty*] is a *denying my conclusion*, and *petitio principii* againe. And from this you cannot be cleared by what you adde [that *you deny what the Enquirer assumed as true and granted*;] For First, I say you were to have *answered* or *denied* my *premises*, and you onely assay to prove your owne *conclusion*; Secondly, your way or *medium* of proving that, is not concluding neither; For the thing assumed (by his Lordship) being this, [That *the meanes brought to prove your Infallibility were fallible meanes, and so granted by you*] his Lordship did not assume this as granted or true in it selfe immediately or without proofe, but proceeded to prove it to be true and granted by you, and that by this *medium*, because with you nothing was conceived *infallible*, but the *Church*: That conclusion then (being not set downe as a premise or principle of probation, but as a *conclusion* proved by that *medium*) you againe professe to deny, (remember I say you deny the *conclusion*) and then sure we want no *tryall* to discover the justnesse of so doing; and whereas you say his *proofes follow after*, I answer, that some other proofes follow after, but one sufficient proofe is brought in that place; and the denying the conclusion without answering of that one proofe, is it which brought

brought all this charge and inconvenience upon you, and therefore you now see I doe not require of you (as you say I doe) to *prove against the Enquirer*, but onely to answer his proofs; But if in stead of doing so, you will take upon you to prove the conclusion which the *Enquirer* hath disproved, and doe that onely by a bare saying somewhat which you know he denies, this is a *petitio principii* still. And your second Argument that it is not, taken from your being *Defender*, or *Answerer*, or *Apologist*, will no more quit you from that charge; for though an Answerer as long as he doth no more but either deny the *major* or *minor*, or answer to either of them by *distinguishing*, *limiting*, *&c.* cannot be guilty of that fault, yet if he deny none but the *conclusion*, he doth in effect, and *interpretativè begge* the *Question*, and if instead of denying of, or answering to the premises, he go about to prove the Question in hand, or any part of it, he doth by so doing, take the place of an Opponent upon him. Now because 'tis possible for an *Answerer* to doe one of these, though he ought to doe neither, it followes, that by either of those waies the *Answerer* may *begge the Question*, and both those are your case at this time, as hath, I conceive, already been manifested, and therefore I must be excused, if I still conceive my conclusion is regular, the *Apologist* is *guilty of that Sophisme*.

C. 5. *Answ. to* C. 5. A. *An Answerer is not bound to prove but to defend; This Arguer and the Replyer, which is your selfe, are bound to prove.*

Answ. He that keeps himselfe strictly to the *Respondents* taske, *i. e.* either to *deny*, or *limit*, or *distinguish* of either of the premises in the Objection, is not, I confesse, bound to *prove*, because he is not supposed to affirme any thing, his *repelling* the Enemies weapons, or *avoiding* of them, is enough to defend himselfe. And if this were your case, I should be unjust to require any proofes from you. But you must be a very great Despiser of my Papers, if you did not take notice in that place, that I was forced to be plaine with you, and tell you that you had not answered (neither by *denying* or *distinguishing*, *&c.*) any one word to his Lordship in your whole fifth Chapter, but fell into other discourses of your owne, which course as it is not the part of

an Answerer strictly taken, so if it be permitted him at all, it must oblige him to give proof for all such assertions as he shall bring in thus casually, or else never to expect, or require to be heeded by his Adversary.

And of such assertions as these, (which were easuall and extrinsecall to your discourse, and by me conceived false) it was, that I required proofe from you, and you are still my Debtour for it.

Chap. 6. Answ. to the 6. Chap. A. *If we affirme our principles be certaine, contrary to the Enquirers surmise, you, if you can, are to preve they are not, or else leave off contending.*

Answ. Certainly this is very strange usage, when that which you call the *Enquirers surmise*, is a conclusion induced by the *Enquirer* by many strong proofes. This you know is there evidenced by me, and if I had been mistaken, you should have said so.

This being supposed, I must tell you, that it is farre from being sufficient for you, to *affirme your principles to be certaine*; for when the Enquirer hath proposed many Arguments to prove they are not *certaine*, and among the rest this convincing one, [That *your Church* (which is your *infallible*) *is offered to be proved by such markes as the ignorant cannot seeke it by*, and the *learned, though* never so honest, *may chance not to finde it by*] for you still to affirme they are *certaine*, and to adde no more, is but to *deny the conclusion*; and against such an one 'tis to little purpose for me to bring farther proofes, when those that are already brought are so dealt with; and truely unlesse you please to give over this course of *denying conclusions*, and *not considering premises*, I will soone obey your advise, and resolve to *leave off contending*.

Ibid. B. *Our Authours have proved all that we in defending doe affirme, and if the Enquirer had impugned their proofes, we then would have tryed to defend; wherefore that which we affirme and declare, doth not rest upon a bare affirmation, although*

though I prove them not in this place, as being here a meere Defendant, and not an Arguer.

Answ. This annotation being upon the same occasion, and in substance the same with the former, is already answered. Onely I shall adde, that if you affirme ought which your Authours in other Bookes bring proofe for, this will not excuse you from a necessity of answering his Lordships arguments against that *conclusion* of your Authors; or if it doe, you must not passe for a Defendant. His part it is to ward the Adversaries blowes, and if he make a thrust himselfe, he then turnes Offendent or Arguer, and when he doth so, he must take care his weapon have some edge (I meane, his affirmations some *proofes* annext) or else they will wound no body. As for the *Enquirer*, *i.e.* his Lordship, it was not his present taske to descend to an enumeration and impugning of all your Authours *arguments* (though yet those which he could thinke of as your chiefe, he hath insisted on; and were he alive, he would from your dealing here have little encouragement to seek out for others) his intention was to frame *arguments* against your *conclusion*, and if you had denied or answered them, you needed not to have troubled your self to affirme any thing; or if out of designe, or *ex abundanti*, you will, you must be content to be call'd upon to prove it; For call your selfe what you please, you must be an Arguer when you so affirme.

Ibid. C. *Yes sure by consequence it is.*

Answ. I am forced to aske your pardon, if I know not certainly to what part of my discourse this Annotation belongs, whether to the end of one period, or the beginning of the other. Yet it falls out luckily, that which soever it is, it is againe the *denying the conclusion* (which you are very subject to) for the end of the former period is the mention of a *conclusion* deduced from *grounds* immediately before specified. And the beginning of the second period is a *negation* of mine, with proofe immediately following it, and before I come to the proofe, [*For though, &c.*] you presently interpose your [*Yes sure by consequence it is*] but will not consider me so much, as after my

example to give the least proofe for what you say, or take notice of that proof of mine.

C. 7. *Answ. to C.* 7. A. *I make no distinction here, but suppose it made and also manifest.*

Answ. I only said you had *given a distinction* (not *made* it) and that supposed it *made* also; and I then conteined my selfe from taking any exceptions to it; onely I told you the applying of it to that place would have *afforded some game if I had been so sportingly disposed.* And to that I pray consider how pertinent your Annotation hath proved. I will not be provoked to adde more.

Ibid. B. *Your part was to have confuted what I say, and not so often, and to no purpose repeat this* Petitio Principii.

Answ. If it be a sufficient confutation of any *Sophister* to finde out, and tell him of his *sophisme* (which *ipso facto* is worth nothing when 'tis discovered, as the title of *Aristotles* Booke of *Elenchs* supposes, ἔλεγξις being defined by *Varinus*, φανέρωσις τοῦ κεκρυμμένου, *a discovery of that which was hid*; and 'tis manifest by comparing 1 *Cor.* 14. 24. with *v.* 25. & *Eph.* 5. 13.) then have I obeyed you in confuting what you say, though I take not your advice for the way of it. And indeed if it should be in any Duellers power to prescribe to his Adversary (when he is in his danger) that he shall not wound him this *way*, but some other, or if it were regular for you to forbid me to tell you of a *Petitio principii*, (when you are clearly guilty of it, and when to evidence that against you, is not onely the shortest, but most *logicall*, most expedite and most clear way of redargution) your Adversary might be weary of playing out the prize, though he were sure to conquer in it. I shewed you that an *Answerer* might so carry the matter; as to be guilty of *Petitio principii*, and 'twas but *passion* in you to check or tell me, *'twas to no purpose*, that I said you were so.

C. 8. *Answ. to C.* 8. A. *We have done it, and doe it continually when occasion requires.*

Answ.

Anſw. I beſeech you read over thoſe lines of mine to which your Annotation is affixt, and ſpeak your conſcience, whether you think 'twas fitly noted, If you can be ſo partiall to your own creature, I will not contend with you, but onely tell you, that as I conceive it impertinent, ſo I ſee apparently, that 'tis contrary to that other ſpeech of yours, which within three lines I there recited from you. For if you doe it continually (*i. e.* prove the *Roman Church to be the true by its agreement with Scripture, &c.*) as here your Annotation ſaith you doe, how could you ſay his *Lordſhip* was miſtaken in ſuppoſing you did ſo? I wiſh you had firſt read out to the end of the period, and then I ſuppoſe you would have fitted your Annotation to it the better.

Ibid. B. *I doe not diſclaime Scripture, though I doe not hold it to be the firſt or formoſt proof either of the Church or of Chriſtian Religion, and would know how you your ſelfe would convert an Infidell or Atheiſt by Scripture, beginning with that proof.*

Anſw. You muſt againe remember (what my laſt Anſwer mentions) that in that place when his Lordſhip had ſuppoſed you to prove the *Roman Church to be the true Church by its agreement with Scriptures and antiquity*, which is in effect by *holding the truth*, you plainly tell him he is *miſtaken* in you. On this ground I muſt conclude (and thinke it proved by that confeſſion) that you doe diſclaime Scripture, as farre as I ſaid you did, *i. e.* not to all purpoſes, but to that of which the diſcourſe was, *viz: to prove your Church to be the true Church.* And 'tis not enough to ſay that you doe *not hold it to be the firſt or formoſt proofe, &c.* For if it be uſed by you as any proofe at all, that will alſo be a very probable meanes, (beſides that it makes it evident, that his Lordſhip was not miſtaken in ſuppoſing it ſo) to bring you into the circle which you were ſo carefull to avoid. You ſee I am cleare from your Animadverſion, and ſo have no occaſion to enter into that new controverſie, whether the *Scripture be the formoſt proof either of the Church, or of the Chriſtian Religion*, (though ſure it may be one without being the other, it may be the *formoſt proofe* of evidencing which is the *true Church* to them that are ſuppoſed Believers (and none elſe will be

be fit for that enquiry) yet not be the *first meanes* to prove *Christian Religion* to Unbelievers:) And yet I shall not be over-coy, nor make much scruple to tell you my opinion of this also, that I would not begin with an Infidel, with that proofe to either purpose, as supposing he did believe it, or that it would of its owne accord attract his beliefe *infallibly*; but for Christianity it selfe, I should first labour to win somewhat upon his affections by converse, and by shewing him the excellency of the *Christian* precepts, (and the power of them in my life) bring him to thinke my discourse worth heeding, then when I had gotten that advantage, I would relate the *rem gestam* of Christianity, where all the acts, and miracles, and passages of *Christs* life would come in; then, if he doubted of the truth of it, tell him the authority, by which it comes downe to us in a continued, undistributed, undenied *tradition*; from those that were αὐτόπται τῦ λόγυ, *oculate Witnesses of Christ, and the whole matter*; and to as good an advantage as I could, compound the severall *motives* of *Faith* together, which if you please you may view at leisure in *Grotius de verit. Chr. Rel.* and when by these meanes I had converted him, I should then by Scripture and antiquity, (which would now be of some authority with him) and not by *miracles*, attempt to manifest to him which were the *true Church*. To which end it may be worth your remembring, that your *Apostle of the Indies Xaverius* thought fit for their use to compile a double *Gospel*, one of *Christ*, another of S. *Peter*, by the authority of one of them to teach them *Christianity*, of the other, the *supremacy* and *infallibility* of S. *Peters chaire*. But I shall not give my self liberty to enlarge on this.

Ib. C. *I deliver the method, and how it may be, I also affirme or declare that it is, I was not in this place to prove, but to defend against the Enquirers arguments, and no other, and therefore those two quarrels needed not.*

Answ. The designe of most of your *Notes* is to save your selfe from the necessity of *proving* any thing that you *affirme*, whereas it might be but an act of a little *supererogating charity* if you would sometimes prove your assertions, even when by strict law you were not bound to it. But, Sir, I will not require your

your *almes*, but onely your *justice*, and though that will not oblige you to *prove*, when you onely *defend*, *i. e.* when you onely *deny* the premiſes of his *Lordſhips* arguments, &c. or when you are ſtrictly an Anſwerer; yet when inſtead of that, you confront any *affirmation* of yours to his *Lordſhips concluſion* (as here you doe, and in all places when we charge *petitio principii* upon you) I muſt then be pardoned to put you in mind of your duty (which is that of *Arguers* then, and not of *Reſpondents*) either to prove what you ſo ſay, or not to think you have convinced any man. They that cannot anſwer one argument produced againſt them, may yet think fit to make uſe of ſome argument for them, hoping that may prove as convincing on their ſides, as that againſt them: and ſo by divertiſement put off the heat of the impreſſion; and this you have been proved to be often guilty of, and 'twill ſatisfie no man to ſay, that you neither *are*, *nor* (becauſe Defendant) *can be guilty of ſo doing.*

Ibid. D. *Sure he hath not, for* Turnbull *hath vindicated himſelfe.*

Anſw. If every reply were a *Vindication*, then you may have affirmed truth, and then theſe few marginall notes of yours (ſuch as they are) would be your *Vindication* alſo; and then I ſuppoſe you will give your free conſent that they be *printed*. But the task would be too long to diſproye what you have now ſaid, (for it would require the examination of all thoſe writings betwixt the two Combatants, and when that were done, you would think perhaps, that *Turnbull* were *vindicated*, and I that he were not) I ſhall onely tell you that you had beene ſo concluded in a *circle* infallibly, if you had aſſerted that method, which his *Lordſhip* there diſproves; which is enough to vindicate his *Lordſhip* againſt thoſe that doe aſſert that method, (as ſure ſome *Romaniſts* doe) and againſt them he there argues and not againſt you, or any in that place which renounce that method.

Ibid. E. *If our Church be the true Church, it muſt be proved firſtly, as Chriſtianity is firſt proved; that is to ſay, by motives of credibility, and ſupernaturall oſtenſions, or acts not of natu-*

rall and ordinary, but ſupernaturall and extraordinary providence; and he that will not prove Chriſtianity by this way, will not prove it at all. After this done, Scriptures and Fathers doe come, but not before, and this way is not new, but the way of the Antients.

Anſw. I have here no neceſſity of re-examining of the means of proving *Chriſtianity* to an Infidell, it will ſuffice to remember that thoſe meanes which are neceſſary to that, may be unneceſſary to prove, which is the *true Church*, becauſe now to him that is converted (as he that will judge betwixt *true* and *hereticall* is ſuppoſed to be) other meanes may ſuffiently ſupply the place; ſuch are *Scripture* and *Antiquity*, which to an *Heathen* are of no authority, but to a *Chriſtian*, or *ſuppoſitâ fide*, are, and being ſo (as I conceive you will not think fit to deny) may well be made the umpire betwixt us, who are, I hope, allowed to be *Chriſtians* ſtill by the conſent of parties, or if we are not, our pretenſions to *miracles* wil hardly gain any credit with them that have that prejudice againſt us.

Mean while I muſt remember you that *motives of credibility*, as you call them, are but weake premiſes to induce a concluſion of ſuch weight, as the choice of religion is. I will tell you what I ſhould have ſaid inſtead of it. *Motives of exceſſive probability*, of the ſame, or greater force then thoſe, on which I ground and build the moſt conſiderable actions of my life, and which (as * formerly I told you) if I will diſ-believe, I have as good reaſon to miſtruſt the wholeſomeneſſe of every diſh of meat I taſte on, (which 'tis phyſically poſſible may poiſon me, but yet none but *Hypocondriackes* think it will, or phanſie it ſo ſtrongly, as to abſteine) the ſecurity of any title of eſtate I purchaſe or poſſeſſe, the truth of any matter of fact in the moſt acknowledged hiſtory or tradition among men, that I daily ta'k of.

* Anſw. to *c.* 14.

All which though they produce not (nor are *apta nata* to doe ſo) a *ſcience* or *infallible* certainty, *cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum*, yet doe they (or are very ſufficient to doe ſo) a *Faith*, or fiduciall aſſent, *cui non ſubeſt dubium*; of which I doubt no more, then of the demonſtrated probleme before me, a *certainty of adherence*,

adherence, of which the believer is as fully poſſeſt, and from it receives as ſtrong motives to doe any thing proportionable to that belief, as if the *certitude of evidence* were allowed him. And this I conceive is a degree prettily advanced above *motives of credibility*, for ſuch is every the loweſt probability, nay almoſt poſſibility, and non-repugnance, whatſoever is poſſible to be, being (in it ſelf, and in caſe the oppoſite ballance be not otherwiſe weighed down) *credible*, *i. e.* poſſible to be believed alſo. But this by the way, and *ex abundanti*.

C. 9. *Anſw. to C.* 9. A. *Why cannot the ſimple know this* (viz. that the *Greek Church doth not pretend from Saint* Peter) *as ſurely as they know the whole Chriſtian Church pretends from Chriſt, and from no other?*

Anſw. Sir, you are a little too haſty in your annotation, for if you had but read on to the next lines, you had received the anſwer to your queſtion, ſo far as my diſcourſe is concerned in it, *viz.* a ſpecifying of divers wayes, by which 'tis poſſible the *Greek Church* might (and one, whereby one part of it doth) pretend ſucceſſion to S. *Peter*. And then that which ſo manifeſtly may be, and is, will not I hope be ſo eaſie for ignorant men to know ſurely that it is not, or ſo ſurely as that the *Chriſtian Church* pretends from *Chriſt*, and from no other. Which yet if it have any difficulty in it not intelligible to ſome *ignorant* men, I take no pleaſure in frighting any with an apprehenſion that God wil ever damne thoſe *ignorants* for not being ſure of what is ſo difficult, ſo their lives be *believing* and *Chriſtian*, and agreeable to what they doe *know* of *Chriſt*.

C. 10. *Anſw. to C.* 10. A. *No ſure, not againſt the ordinary neceſſity.*

Anſw. The thing I ſay in that place is, that his *Lordſhips* argument might be (I ſhall adde, is) of force againſt the neceſſity of a guide, (meaning thereby an *infallible* one, for ſuch only is to our purpoſe) and that that will ſerve his *Lordſhips* turne, and deſtroy you, I there farther prove by a full explication of the whole matter. And therefore you muſt give me favour to leave out your epithete of [*Ordinary*] which you would

have me interpoſe, when my diſcourſe in order to its end, hath no need of it. And if you tell me you put it in in your anſwer to his *Lordſhip*, and that therefore I have not vindicated his *Lordſhip* from that anſwer, unleſſe I take it in alſo; I muſt then confeſſe to you, that I did not ſo underſtand your words, [*all this is nothing againſt the ordinary proviſion and neceſſity of a guide*] that the word [*ordinary*] was ἀπὸ κοινοῦ to be repeated to the word [*neceſſity*] but onely that it belonged to [*proviſion*] And now that I know your pleaſure, I ſhall more clearly returne my anſwer, that his *Lordſhip* ſuppoſes ſome men (and I confeſſe my ſelfe to be one of them) to believe, that to all who follow their reaſon in the interpretation of Scripture, and ſearch for tradition (*i. e.* the conſtant interpretation of the *Catholique Church* concerning any difficulty) God will either give his grace of aſſiſtance to find the truth, or his pardon if they miſſe it. To which purpoſe you may pleaſe to compare *Juſtin. Mart. queſt. 4. ad Orthod.* and, to omit many more, *Facundus Hermian. in def. 3. capit. ad Juſt. l. 11. p. 491. & p. 496. & l. 12. pag. 513.*

Now to them that ſo believe, the argument which you fetch from Gods providence to conclude an infallible guide, will not, ſaith his *Lordſhip*, be ſufficient to prove it; becauſe he ſtill will be able to ſay, that where imperfection is accepted, *meanes* of *perfection* are not *neceſſary*; if God will pardon *weakneſſes*, he need not give ſuch a meaſure of *ſtrength*, as excludes all *weakneſſes*; if *ſincerity*, though with ſome mixture of ſinne, will ſerve turne here *in viâ*, we need not expect from God that *integrity* of faculties, which either was beſtowed in paradiſe, or will be in heaven, to give us an unſinning innocence. And if you will ſtill interpoſe, that this is nothing againſt the *ordinary neceſſity, becauſe theſe are caſes extraordinary*. I anſwer, that this is a great miſtake; For under the *Goſpell* or *Evangelicall* State (under which all men have beene ſince the promiſe of *Chriſt* upon *Adams* fall) there is no *ordinary neceſſity* of never *miſſing* or *miſtaking*; our naturall ſtate being an eſtate of *weakneſſe*, is advanced by *Chriſt* into ſuch a condition, not wherein all *weakneſſe* is excluded, but wherein *ſincerity* with mixtures of ſlips and errours ſhall be accepted, and this as *infallibly* as *in-*

nocence

nocence had beene rewarded under the *first covenant* made with *Adam* in the first state. To the *first Covenant*, which is *strictî juris*, such pardon for slips might be *extraordinary*; but to this *second* (whereof ἐπιείκια or gentlenesse, is as much apart, as ἀκριβοδίκαιον, or strict justice, was before) this pardon for invincible infirmities is as ordinary, as obligation to punishment for every slip had beene before, this being a prime ingredient in that Covenant, and not *extraordinarii*, but *ordinarii juris*, that under it such slips shall not be remembred. In like manner as in this Kingdome *Chancery*, though it be opposed to *Common Law* (in one sence, as that signifies *strict law*) yet it is a part of our *common law*, as that signifies the *Municipall law*, or totall body of lawes by which this Kingdome is ruled; *Equity* (though perhaps it came in later, and to repaire defects or excesses in the *strict law*) being now as much every Subjects right, and Writs out of that Court as legally required and granted, and the whole processe in Chancery, as clearely *sec. jura & consuetudines Angliæ*, and so as much *Ordinary*, or *secundum Ordinem*, as any thing that passes in the *Common Pleas*. And so much for your nice interposition of the word [*Ordinary*] to your pretended *necessity* of a *guide*; where yet I might farther tell you, that *infallibility* is not essentiall to, or inseparable from a *guide*; and therefore though the *Guide* were granted to be *ordinarily* necessary to the finding out of truth, yet this would not come home to *infallibility*. The antecedent I could make good at large, if it were now seasonable.

Ibid. B. *They (i.e. misses and mistakings) are called extraordinary, because happening accidentally besides the provision of the law, and not because they happen seldome.*

Answ. That misses and mistakings, infirmities and ignorances, doe happen besides the provision of the second, or the *Evangelicall Covenant*, is a mistake, as was intimated then (within few lines after those, whereon your annotation was fastened) and now at large proved in my last answer to your former annotation, and I shall not need repeate it, but onely tell you there is a *law of Faith* (aswell as of *workes*) and that in that law

there is provision for *errours*, aswell as *sinnes*, and that I hope belongs to all *Christians*, *for we are not under the Law, but under grace.*

Ib. C. *And why so?*

Answ. I had before given you the reason, *viz.* because your discourse hath tended to inferre the one, and not the other.

C. 14. *Answ. to C.* 14. A. *No man can binde another under paine of Anathema to beleive as he defines, unlesse his definition be certaine.*

Answ. There was here very little occasion for this note. For the businesse of *Anathema's*, I had sufficiently restrained; First, by limiting them onely to *excommunications*, as an act of *Ecclesiasticall* discipline upon the refractary; and therefore Secondly, not for matter of simple beleiving or disbeleiving; but Thirdly, for matter of disobedience to our lawfull Superiours, and that disobedience againe not in refusing to submit our understandings, but our wils, and our consequent actions: and Fourthly, all this with stubbornenesse and perversenesse, after the using of all milder courses. And with these and the like limitations there will be no more difficulty to say an *Eccleſiaſticall Magiſtrate* may *excommunicate* a disobedient refractary perverse Gain-sayer, without undertaking to be infallible, then to say a civill Magistrate may punish a Malefactour without being *inerrable*. And therefore when you talke of *binding to believe under paine of Anathema*; there is some mistake in that, or if there were not, yet *Truth* (if it were on grounds of Scripture believed to be so) would be as sufficient a foundation of so doing, as the *infallibility* of the Judge. For not onely every *truth* is in it selfe as *certaine*, as that which is *infallible*, (every matter of *fact* that is so, is as certainly true, as any demonstration in *Euclide*, and he that speakes it, speakes as *certainly true*, as if he did *demonstrate*, yet is not in other things *infallible* for all that) but he that beleives it with a full assent, hath as little *doubt* of that truth, as if it were before his eyes; yet doth it not *fide cui non potest subesse falsum*, on any supposition of its *infallibility*; by which meanes (though he pretends not to *infallibility*, yet) having no degree of *doubt*, he hath that, on which he will confidently

fidently build any *action*, and even lay downe his life for ſuch truths, if they be of weight: which if it be not ground enough to proceed on to an *Eccleſiaſticall cenſure* againſt the *ſtubborn* and *perverſe* you are very mercifully diſpoſed, and I will not provoke you out of it, but rather give you my ſuffrage, that no man be thus *cenſured* for matter of *opinion* but upon that light which is clearely deducible from the *Scripture*, or *univerſall tradition*; and then I ſhall confeſſe my ſenſe, that to *anathematize* men for any matter of doctrine, of any lower alloy, is though not *formally*, yet *interpretativè* a kinde of pretending to *infallibility*, uſurping as much, as if men were *infallible*, which they that have the ſpirit but by *meaſure*, ſhould have ſo much *humility* in themſelves, and *charity* toward others, as not to be guiltie of.

Ibid: B. *The ſword preſerves not inward unity, nor ſatisfies the minde.*

Anſw. I had no occaſion to ſay it did. I was ſpeaking (as your anſwer called me to it) of *diſcipline*, and *unity*, or ſuch *unity* as *diſcipline* produced, which is *outward unity*, as oppoſed to diviſion and *Shiſme*; and yet let me tell you, it were not unpoſſible to extend my ſpeech to *inward unity*, and *ſatisfying of the minde*. For ſuppoſe a particular *Church* to have ſufficient meanes to worke in the hearts of her ſonnes this inward unity, *viz.* by ſetting up the authority of *Scripture*, as it is interpreted by the *Fathers*, and receiving with due reſpect, and obedience all *Apoſtolicall Traditions*; Theſe, if duely revered by all Sonnes and Subjects, would be able to keepe all of one minde in all matters of *Faith* (and for lower points ſome kinde of *liberty* being allowed, would preſerve *Charity* as well) and then while that Church were in this happie temper, you may farther ſuppoſe the *ſword of violence* to come in, and diſturbe all, wreſting out of her hands the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe meanes, and beating downe the *authoritie*, and taking away the *reputation* of them. And then in the caſe thus ſet, you will ſurely grant that the *rightfull ſword*, if it might be ſo proſperous as to vanquiſh the diſturber, and reſtore what was thus violently taken away, may prove no improbable meanes of preſerving even *inward unity* in this

this ſence; and if you marke it, we ſpake it not in any other. And yet once more, if we had, we might have beene juſtified perhaps in our ſaying. For *Hereſie* being a piece of carnality in the Apoſtles judgement, 'tis poſſible that the outward *ſmart*, that comes from the exerciſe of the *power of the ſword*, *i.e.* from temporall puniſhments, may cure that diſeaſe, and perſwade them, who inſtead of pleaſure from their *hereſie*, reap nothing but paine, and ſorrow, to make better proviſion for their owne *fleſh* and *blood*, and thinke of hearing that reaſon, to which other honeſt mens eares are open, and then that may produce inward unity alſo, and theſe mens minds may be ſufficiently ſatisfied with that truth coming thus to them *tempore congruo*, *at a fit ſeaſon of working*, which at another time had beene rejected. You ſee how little reaſon you had for that annotation.

C. 15. *Anſw. to C.* 15. A. *Chillingworth ſaith it in termes, and him alſo I deſired to anſwer.*

Anſw. Can you thinke this faire dealing? His *Lordſhip*, I made appeare from his words, ſaid it not. And you cannot ſay he did. But *Chil:* ſay you *did ſay it.* What is that to his *Lordſhip*, or to me who undertake onely to vindicate his *Lordſhip*, and had not that rich harveſt of leaſure to thinke fit to be retained any more in other mens cauſes on ſuch joyleſſe termes as theſe? in which rather then I would adventure to be engaged, I ſhould be content to be thought to have no degree of kindneſſe to him, eſpecially hearing that you had three great volumes prepared againſt Maſter *Chill:* But then I pray what is the meaning of [*him alſo I deſired to anſwer?*] Can you thinke fit to impoſe a thing on his *Lordſhip*, which was ſaid onely by Maſter *Chillingworth*, and when you were diſproved, thinke you had ſtill confuted Maſter *Chillingworth alſo*, when you had only falſified, not confuted his *Lordſhip?* Sure, Sir, this is not faire.

Ib. B. *I know very well this was objected by both of them, and this I deſired to anſwer, whether it were in their bookes or no.*

Anſw. Here is more of the ſame ſtreine. But I did conceive by your title, that you had confuted his *Lordſhips* tract that was publiſhed,

publiſhed, not any unwritten diſcourſes, which we have no way of knowing, whether they paſt or no, I am ſure were not undertaken by me to be vindicated. I never reſolved to juſtifie all that you could ſay either of them ſaid, and I might be forced to be uncivill with you, if I ſhould enter any ſuch debate with you.

Ib. C. *Neither* Arius, Neſtorius, *nor others could peep out for ſaying any thing againſt the doctrine received. How then could this* Dionyſius *have eſcaped, if he had adventured any thing againſt all the Orthodox?*

Anſw. You are very much given, inſtead of anſwering *Reaſons*, to deny *Concluſions*, and if that were backt with *Reaſon*, 'twere yet very improper for a Reſpondent, which you told us was your office at this time. But then ſecondly, in this matter you know, that neither I, nor his *Lordſhip* have ſaid that *all the Orthodox* were for the *Millennium*. And yet thirdly, if they had, yet the denying the *Milleunium* being a more tolerable opinion than thoſe other of *Arius*, and *Neſtorius*, *Dionyſius*'s oppoſition of the *Chiliaſts* might paſſe more unreſiſted, than *Arius*, or *Neſtorius* could doe.

Ib. D. Photius *tells us there were Anſwers given, though he recites them not, and* Schottus *in his Notes hath reſolved them.*

Anſw. I will not take the paines to ſee or examine whether *Photius* ſay there were Anſwers. If he recites them not, I ſhall not be much moved with ſuch blanke Papers. The truth is, this hath been the way to ſatisfie the hardeſt Arguments that ever were brought, and confuting whole Books at once, by having it given out, that they are confuted, or that Anſwers are made to them, when what thoſe anſwers are, is not ſo much as intimated; this is a very cheap way of confutations; As for *Schottus*'s Solutions, if he have any, they prevaile little with us, I am ſure they will not conclude that *Photius* foreſaw, or would have counted them of any moment to alter his opinion, which was the onely thing I there had occaſion to take notice of.

Ib. E. *Though* Philoponus *cite but one Epistle, yet elsewhere he numbers him among the famous Doctors*, Basil, Gregory, &c. *thereby insinuating he had left Workes as they had, and not one single Epistle to* Polycarpus. *This is but a conjecture, but such both We and all must use in matters of fact, and When We are to walke through darke passages of Antiquity.*

Answ. Sir, you cited three places out of *Philoponus*, to prove that *Dionysius Areopagita* wrote those workes now extant bearing his name: This testimony I told you would be nothing to your purpose, unlesse it testified (if not all those Bookes, yet) of some one wherein he wrote against the *Chiliasts*. But this I shewed you was not done, because those places mention nothing of his, but an *Epistle* of *Polycarpus*, and in that I advertized you there was nothing against the *Chiliasts*. This it seems you cannot deny, but being willing to say something, say that *elsewhere* Philoponus *numbers him amongst the famous Doctours*, &c. I have not now leasure to read over all *Philoponus*, for that [*elsewhere*] (though I have reason to thinke that you that before cited the Chapters in *Philoponus* so punctually, would have had the same charity to me again, if it had suted w^th^ your interests) considering how little can be concluded from what you now cite out of him. *Dionys.* was *numbred among the famous Doctors, Basil, Gregory*, &c. doth it follow thence, that all the workes now extant under his name were his, or particularly that wherein he opposes the *Chiliasts*? Nay, would not a man rather conclude from that pretended testimony of *Philoponus* that the Authour under the name of *Dionysius Areop.* was some Writer about S. *Basils* or S. *Gregories* time, with whom he is there conforted, and that is somewhat later then *Dionysius* in the Scripture. Nay, if *Philoponus* really meant him, would he not rather have given him the title of an *Apostolicall* Person, than of a *famous* Doctor, such as S. *Basil*, &c. As for the insinuation which you mention from this of *Philoponus*, if it did conclude as you would have it, that he left Workes as they did, and not onely one single *Epistle*, yet sure twill not so much as once insinuate that they were the Works, that we have under his name, much lesse that peculiarly, which opposes the *Chiliasts*, least

least of all, that 'twas the *Apostolicall Dionysius* that really wrote all these. But you confesse *these but a conjecture*, and therefore sure 'twill be a very weake prop to hold up *infallibility*, especially when the conjecture if it should be supposed true, would tell us that which we had not before been told from you, that the *Chiliasts* doctrine was taught, (and so capable of being confuted) so early as the *Apostles* times, for with them this *Dionysius* lived.

You *conclude that such conjectures as this, you and all must use in matters of fact*, &c. To which I answer that 'tis possible you may be forced to it, on supposition that you think your self obliged to vindicate your *Churches Infallibility*, for 'tis very possible, there may be no better, then such conjectures to sustaine it. But believe me, Sir, I will never maintaine cause, as long as *God* keeps me in my right wits, which hath no better conjectures, than these to sustaine it. And for *matters of fact* so long agoe, they are of all things in the World the unfittest to be believed upon such *conjectures*. Because nothing but an authentick expresse witnesse can be ground of *faith* for such. There is no matter of fact done yesterday, but may if we will goe by conjectures (I am sure as good and as probable as yours here) be related 10000 waies, for whatsoever may be, some bold Affirmer may conjecture was, and the more antient, and more darke the passage was, the more liberty there will be for such Conjecturers, because the lesse possibility to confute any of them.

Ib. F. Salvian *doth not refuse to condemne the Arian heresie, but some of the Gothick Arians for it, as men not guilty of the malice of it.*

Answ. If you looke againe you will find that both his *Lordship*, and I say that *Salvian* refused to condemne the *Arian Heretickes* (not *heresie*) and this it seems, you confesse with the restraint of [*Gothick Arians*] and this will serve our turnes perfectly, and so we shall not quarrell about that, but hope from your owne confession, that he that is not willing to condemne all Protestants, may escape as well as *Salvian* even in your censure.

VC. 16. *Answ.* to C. 16. A. *The Councell of Constance doth not teach this* [*viz.* that no Faith is to be kept with Heretickes]

neither our Doctors hold it, as Molanus, Becanus, Tannerus, Layman, Coeffecteau, Coquæus, *and others doe shew us.*

Answ. To *teach* is an equivocall word, and may signifie to define by way of *position* or *doctrine* in *universum*; In this sense I said it not, nor doe now meane it of that *Synod*, that they made any such *determination*, that it should be unlawfull to *keep faith with Hereticks*, or lawfull for any man in any case not to keep it. But then to *teach* may signifie also, to *teach* by *example*, & to lay grounds of doctrine for the justifying of such example. And thus the *Councell of Constance* did teach it; The *Emperour* had given safe conduct to *John Hus* &c. and the *Synod* declared that that safe conduct should be no prejudice to any Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction, and that *non obstante* any such concession, any competent Ecclesiasticall Judge might enquire, and proceed against any such Persons, and punish them as much as justice should perswade, if they would not retract their errours. And this cost those poore men their lives, whose presumption on the *Emperours* safe conduct, made them venture themselves in that snare, never suspecting, that such a distinction as that could have proved so fatal to them. That you may not hereafter say I charge you unjustly, I shall set you downe the very words in the Councell in *Binius Sess.*19.

Præsens sancta Synodus ex quovis salvo conductu per Imperatorem, Reges, & alios sæculi principes hæreticis vel de hæresi diffamatis, putantes eosdem sic à suis erroribus revocare, quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint, concesso, nullum fidei Catholicæ vel jurisdictioni Ecclesiasticæ præjudicium generari vel impedimentum præstari posse seu debere declarat, quo minus dicto salvo conductu non obstante liceat judici competenti & Ecclesiastico de ejusmodi personarum erroribus inquirere, & aliàs contra eos debitè procedere, eosdemque punire, quantum justitia suadebit, si suos errores revocare pertinaciter recusaverint, etiamsi de salvo conductu confisi ad locum venerint judicii, alias non venturi: nec sic promittentem, cum fecerit quod in ipso est, ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum. I shall not trouble you with the *English*, but onely aske what this differs from teaching that *Faith is not to be kept* (*i.e.* not necessarily, but in some case may be broken) *with Hereticks*? They that shall

after

after safe conduct given, proceed to judgment (be it *Ecclesiasticall*) against any man, and condemning him for *heresie*, deliver him up to that secular hand to punish him with death, who had given him the safe conduct, and tell him, that he, having done what in him lies, remaines not obliged by his promise, but may and must put him to death, who came to that judicature, onely on confidence of that his promise and safe conduct, have sure proceeded upon other notions of justice than those with which my education hath embued me, and I must professe to appeale from their judgements, as in my Reply to that citation of them, I was bold to doe; and whatever your friends *Molanus*, &c. have thought fit to say for the saving the reputation of that *Councell*, the matter is too grosse to be palliated, and I shall not trouble my self or you to examine their excuses.

Ibid. B. *Heresie is punished not for the accidentall grievousnesse of it, but for the essentiall.*

Answ. This is againe a *denying the conclusion*, (and not so much as endeavouring to prove the contrary) for this was the thing in this place cleerly proved by the citation of those Lawes, that all Hereticks, *viz: Arians* and *Macedonians* by name) were not to be so punisht, when onely *Eutychians* were, the former of these acknowledged by you as much Hereticks in respect of the *essentiall* grievousnes of their doctrine, as the latter. From whence it followes, that either there was great partiality, or else the difference arose from the *accidentalls*. And truly, Sir, your saying in generall that it is not so, will little perswade any, when here is such evidence in the particular, that it is.

Ib. C. *The title of defence is the Argument.*

Answ. There is not in that place any one word of this *Title of defence*, or of any other argument; And that was all I affirmed. If you please to survey the place, that will judge it betwixt us.

Ib. D. *This is a hard censure, and hardly to be proved.*

Answ. I confesse 'tis hard in some sence, *i. e.* to them that suffer under you for being *Heretiques* (as you call those that depart from your deformations) and for being *invaders* (which all may at pleasure be called that are not able to resist) As for the censure it is but that for which the grounds are gathered from your owne words. Which till you disprove, 'tis but your bare saying that 'tis an hard censure; or when it is proved, it matters little what difficulty there was in doing it.

Ibid. E. *These were not setled violences, but tumultuous, and outrages not for religion, but for other quarrels occasioned by religions.*

Answ. The passage to which this annotation was affixt, was about the *pictures of Papall approbation of Massacres*, to be seen at *Rome*. Which if they were, as you now say, *tumultuous* and *outrages*, then it seemes there is *papall approbation* for such; and then either that or you are *fallible*. But since you see it necessary to adde another limitation, that the *Massacres* so approved were not for *religion*, I would faine perswade my selfe that you disclaime *massacres for religion* (the lawfulnesse of which you were so long defending.) And if you be now in that good mood of mercy, I shall not goe about to confute or provoke you out of it, but rather pray that God confirme you and all your friends in it for a longer space, then your charitable not damning us did last in the former part of the Chapter.

Ibid. F. *Those of Queene* Maries *dayes had spoiled and stript the Catholiques of all they had, and therefore no marvaile they did seeke to punish them severely, and to suppresse them as men would doe wilde Boares broken into a parke or garden.*

Answ. He that should compare this annotation with the text would wonder how it came in, so without all temptation or occasion. I was there a challenging him to name one, that since *Queene Maries* dayes was in this kingdome put to death for *religion*. And to the mention of *Queene Mary*, the annotation is affixed. But I shall excuse the impertinence; that very hint might well put him in minde of that sea of bloud in

Queene

Queene Maries dayes. Which if it were by way of punishment for spoiling and stripping *Catholiques*, and not for *religion*; I beseech you produce one such bill of indictment brought in against the sufferers. Our *stories* have told us otherwise, If you have any authenticke records in your *Archives*, I pray make us partakers of the truth; In the meane, I feare a Protestant sonne of a *Romanist* father, may when opportunity serves, passe for such a *wild boare* and a *spoiler*.

Ib. G. My sence is that religion may not be planted by armes, but being once planted and in quiet possession it may. And this I suppose no learned man will deny.

Answ. I may believe you that this is now your sence, but that it is the sence of those words of yours, which I was then confuting, I shall be confident to deny, not only because the words bear no such sence, but because you did there your self interpret them thus, that the thing which you disclaimed the designing by *armes*, was onely the justifying the right and truth of religion by them. Which I then conceived to signifie, that your swords doe onely force men to be of your minds, doe not give them reasons why they should. Yet if after all this, you tell me in earnest, that this was not your meaning, I shall cry you mercy for the mistake, but not now enter into a dispute with you of that new question now proposed by you, [*Whether religion* (that must signifie your doctrines as they are distinguisht from, or opposed to ours, or else 'twill not be pertinent to our purpose) *being planted and in quiet possession, may*] because I cannot imagine what verbe that syllable [may] is the moode of. [Plant] it cannot be, for that which is in possession, is already planted: But what it should be, I must not divine for you. Only at an adventure I shall make a plaine state. If your doctrines were in quiet possession here, and you should know of any man that taught the contrary to them, must your sword be drawne against him, or no? I beseech you answer out of the sence of your brethren, that we may know what to expect from you. For my own part, I shall make no scruple to tell you, that though the *defender of the Faith* have the power of the *sword* given him by God to that end, to governe in *godlinesse* and *quiet*, and may there-

therefore draw it effectually againſt any that raiſe ſedition to bring in ſome other religion againſt that which is by law eſtabliſht, or that vent doctrines that are in themſelves *ſeditious*, yet ought he not, onely in caſe of any ſingle doctrine or difference in religion (where none of the civill intereſts are concerned, no violent aſſault made, or feared from the diſſenters) to unſheath his ſlaughtering ſword againſt any ſuch diſſenter, provided alwayes that that doctrine be not blaſphemous. (And they that conſenting to this truth, will yet tyrannize over mens ſoules *in ordine ad temporalia*, as you and ſome others have done over mens *bodies and eſtates in ordine ad ſpiritualia*, ſhall never be excuſed by me) and of this opinion I conceive there might be vouched as learned, and as primitive-tempered *Chriſtians* as any that are more zealouſly, and ſo more bloudily minded.

Ibid. H. *Aſperſions be eaſily caſt, but ſhould not be admitted, when there are ſtrong preſumptions to the contrary, without evident proofe; The Catholiques were knowne good Patriots under our former Kings, and under this our moſt gracious Prince we have good teſtimony, greater then which cannot be given.*

Anſw. The caſe is not here of aſperſions, but of matters of *fact*, or attempts of *Prieſts*, whereby *Queen Elizabeth* was known to have beene in danger. On which provocation the lawes forbidding all ſuch to come into the Kingdome, made it ſuch a legall *preſumption*, that if they did, they ſhould incurre that ſuſpicion, and ſentence of the law. And ſo every man knowing what meaſure to expect from the lawes, were farther to be preſumed either traiterous or madde, if on thoſe tearmes he would adventure on ſuch a forbidden journey. As for evident proofe, which you require, it belongs little to this matter, becauſe the very being in the Kingdome was a demonſtration of contemning the law, and an evidence that they were the men that were under that legall preſumption; which is farre more then *a proofleſſe aſperſion, with evidence to the contrary.* As for the fidelity of your Patriots under our formoſt Kings, when they were of their opinions, I ſhall not queſtion it; neither in like manner your

your behaviour to our present *Soveraigne*, but onely tell you, that the *Queen Elizabeth lawes* might be just for all that; (which was all we had now in hand) and for the execution of them in latter times, I before gave you an account.

Ibid. I. *We doe professe our best reason hath brought us to our religion, not our passion, and we have as much reason to be believed as any others can.*

Answ. 'Tis possible you may not; for if mens actions give in any testimony against their words, there will not be so much reason to believe such, as when there is a concordance of them; But if upon serious shrift you are able to professe this sincerity, I shall be so charitable to believe you; and allow you any hope of mercy for your *errours*, which you can wish; but yet tell you, that by making this profession in the plurall number, you doe somewhat prejudge it; no man being so privy to the hearts of his fellow professours, as to be a fit voucher for them, every man must *stand* or *fall* to his owne *Master*.

Ibid. K. *I was to answer and not to prove, and therefore might in right deny what the Enquirer falsely supposes without proofe. It is the respondents right to affirme the very point in question, or to deny it, without caring whether it be granted or no, so he himselfe be ready to defend it; and so he that can exact this as his owne, shall not need to begge any thing, and if he doe, he cannot begge more then what he hath, and what he affirmes or denies already. For example, I deny against* Copernicus *that the earth moves, or I affirme that it is quiet, and I stand to maintaine my saying. Certainly this is no begging, but yet to say that it is so, may be a begging, or if I should say it stood still, because it doth not move, were a frivolous speech, but yet for all that no begging of the question.*

Answ. This vindication of your beloved *petitio principii*, (that stands you in such stead, and returnes so frequently upon you) I have already examined, and discovered the mistakings of it; and must now tell you againe, that when the question is by the opponent proved by any *medium*, it must never be lawfull for the respondent

ſpondent to deny it againe any farther then by denying the proofe on which it was inferred; for this would be the denying the concluſion, and *petitio principii* againe. The reſpondent in this caſe cannot *exact the queſtion as his own*, nor any otherwiſe defend it, then by repelling the weapons brought againſt him. As for your great ſimile of denying the *motion of the earth*, and your ſtanding to maintaine your ſaying; if you doe this by any other meanes then by denying or anſwering the proofes produced againſt you, this is not the reſpondents part, but will, when you have done what you can, appeare to be that vulgar *Sophiſme*. It being certaine that when a thing is queſtioned betwixt two, the affirming without proofe is *begging* it, and it being not the *reſpondents* part to prove (or if he doe, he becomes *opponent*) it followes neceſſarily, that the reſpondent that in time of diſputation affirmes, muſt either ceaſe to be *reſpondent*, or elſe *begge the queſtion*.

C. 18. *Anſw. to C.* 18. A. *We are to conſider here not what is conceived but what is to be conceived. Now what is to be conceived I have ſhewed, namely that the Church underſtands better then he doth, for right reaſon will tell him this.*

Anſw. This is the very thing which is diſproved in that place, and then the bare repeating it over againe, will be but a meane kinde of vindication. Be pleaſed to looke over the place againe, and if you will ſtill thinke that there was any place for this annotation, I ſhall be ſorry I have beene thus troubleſome to you.

Ibid. B. *I have ſhewed the reaſon why.*

Anſw. When an argument is framed on a double *ſuppoſition*; without diſputing the truth of either, 'tis not to be allowed the *reſpondent* to anſwer, by denying the truth of either of the things *ſuppoſed*, for they are *ſuppoſed* in that diſpute, but not *diſputed* of. As for example, if the queſtion were, [*Whether ſuppoſing Adam were not ſalne, and Chriſt were come, the coming of Chriſt could be for the ſinne of Adam.*] doe you thinke 'twould be tolerable for the reſpondent to avoid ſome argument

ment brought against him, by saying that it was absolutely false to say that *Adam* was not false, whereas 'twas true that *Christ* was come? This would certainly be so grosse and impossible to be justified, that I should suspect any mans fidelity, that should tell me, he had rendred a satisfying reason why this should be. And this is your case at this time.

Ibid. C. *Whether she be infallible or no, she is like to be wiser than any private man. And this point cannot be in controversie with a wise man, and therefore here is no* petitio principii.

Answ. This is a rare way of replying, when a discourse hath been proved guilty of a *petitio principii*, to say 'tis impossible it should, and when a thing is denied, to say it cannot be in controversie.

But, Sir, I shall yeild you the *Church* may be wiser than any private man, yet not conceive it to follow (unlesse she be also *infallible*) that when a private man and the Church differ, she must alwaies be in the right. He that is much wiser than another, may yet in some particular be mistaken, when that other is in the right, yea and may be advised and reformed in such a particular, by one that is not so wise as he. This you may apply to the matter in hand, not so farre as to preferre the authority of any one man before the Church in generall, but onely so, as not to pronounce it *infallible*. I might tell you farther, that a member of the *Church* of *England* assenting fully to the doctrine of that *Church*, and so discharging the duty of a private man in preferring the judgement of the *Church* (whereof he is a member) before his owne judgement, may yet doubt of some things affirmed by the *Church* of *Rome*, and not make the comparison between a private mans judgement, and the judgement of the *Church*, but onely betwixt one particular *Church* and another. But after all this, I might have spared any, or all these Answers, and doe now onely desire you to looke back upon the place, and you will soone see what no ground is to be found there of your Annotation.

Ibid. D. *If you have no evidence* (*that 'tis Gods pleasure*

that your *Church* ſhould be infallible) *nor can have, you ſay true, but this latter is denied.*

Anſw. Tis eaſie to deny concluſions ſtill. But if you will either anſwer the arguments, which have proved there is none, or produce any ſuch *evidence* that it is *infallible*, you ſhall be victorious indeed.

Ib. B. *This argument which the Inquirer impugnes, is an argument of his owne making, and none of ours, yet for all that, the argument is not like a Ballad as good backward as forward, as M.* Chillingworth, *putting it a little differently from the Inquirer, would have it.*

Anſw. If you had pleaſed to diſclaime and not defend this argument at the firſt, you might have ſaved us ſome paines, and if you will yet promiſe me that no man ſhall out of M. *Knots* Book make uſe of this argument any more, I will be very well content that argument ſhall be no longer inſiſted on, yet muſt tell you my opinion from my owne expreſſe knowledge, that they which read that Book before 'twas confuted by M. *Chillingworth* did verily believe that that argument to prove an *infallible* judge, taken from the topick of *Gods goodneſſe*, was M. *Knots* maſter-piece, and the founation on which the maine weight of his ſtructure was ſupported.

C. 19. *Anſw. to C.* 19. A. *In a Reſpondent there can be no ſuch thing as* Petitio principii.

Anſw. We have ſhewed you that a Reſpondent may ſo ill behave himſelf that there may. As for example, when a man hath uſed Arguments to prove that you have been guilty of *begging the Queſtion*, For you to deſpiſe and not take notice of the arguments, and to ſay onely that there can be no ſuch thing, is the very thing called *Petitio principii.*

Ib. B. *But we againe deny it is* [Petitio principii] *and the contrary ought to be proved.*

Anſw.

Anſw. It is clearly proved in the place, and not to conſider the proofs, but to deny the *concluſion* is another guilt of that *ſophiſm*.

C. 20. *Anſw. to C.* 20. A. *If the Enquirers meaning be as you put it, it makes nothing at all againſt us, nor needs any Anſwer. But* Chillingworth *goes farther, and ſaies that many of the ſimpler ſort amongſt us believe Truth upon no better grounds, than others believe Falſhood, and yet our ſimpler ſort believe Truths, upon all the motives that yours doe, and ſomewhat more.*

Anſw. That that is his *Lordſhips* meaning is plaine, *viz: That he that denies your infallibility, and yet uſes his beſt reaſon to ſeeke if it be true, will be in as ſafe a condition, as he that believes it, and ſearches not.* And if this be nothing againſt you, I ſhall hope this quarrell is nearer an end then ever I had thought to ſee it. And then ſure many of us ſhall be capable of that *charity*, which you beſtow upon your owne, for I am confident what we doe, we doe upon *ſearch*, and *uſe of our beſt reaſon*; and yet that we deny your *infallibility*, you are ſufficiently aſſured.

C. 21. *Anſw. to C.* 21. A. *He might be ſecretly obſtinate, and yet both he and We conceive the contrary.*

Anſw. 'Tis true he might. But yet ſure you that believe he was not *obſtinate*, cannot believe that the *puniſhment of obſtinacy* ſhould belong to him, but muſt either thinke God *unjuſt*, or elſe believe him *ſafe* in the ſame degree that you think him *not obſtinate*. And this is all I required from you.

C. 22. *Anſw. to C.* 22. A. *Every implicite aſſent muſt be reſolved laſtly into an explicite, or elſe there will be an infinite regreſſion, for every implicite preſuppoſes ſomething in which it is involved or implicite.*

Anſw. I beſeech you obſerve the nature of this Annotation of yours. You ſay in your Apology, that one implicite *Faith* doth not containe another. I proved that falſe by this inſtance, that *ſuppoſing I believed by an implicite Faith, that you were an honeſt man, this might containe in it an implicite beliefe of every*

Propoſition by you aſſerted, and farther by putting his Lordſhips affirmation by you denied into a downe right *Syllogiſme*: you after your wont anſwer no proofs, but prove againſt the concluſion. And truely your proof is a ſtrange one, every *implicite aſſent muſt be reſolved laſtly into an explicite*: Ergo, *One implicite faith* doth not containe another. As if you ſhould ſay, Every *ſubordinate* cauſe muſt be reſolved laſtly into a *firſt cauſe*; *Ergò*, One *ſubordinate cauſe* doth not containe another, the *Genealogie* of *Abraham* muſt at laſt be reduced to *God*, therefore *Abraham*'s Grandfather was not Father to *Abraham*'s Father: what ſound of reaſon is there in this arguing? The antecedent is the onely thing which you goe about to prove, and the conſequence that which we deny, and therefore I ſhall need ſay no more to this Annotation.

C.24. Anſw. to C.24. A. We meane the fire of this world, and that fire we are ſure is not in all Countries appointed to burne ſuch as doe diſſent from us.

Anſw. What? not to burne ſuch as diſſent in matters of *faith*? Is there any matter of *faith* which is not required *ſub pœnâ ignis*? (I meane alſo with you, the *fire of this world*) If there be, ſpeake out. But you have by your next Annotation in effect confeſt there is not, and ſo by that confuted this, for ſo you adde.

Ib. B. I make no ſuch diſtinction.

Anſw. i. e. No ſuch diſtinction, that of matters of *faith* ſome are required *ſub periculo ignis*, ſome not; which is in effect that in reſpect of that penalty all matters of *faith* are of the ſame nature. Which is abſolutely contrary to that former, unleſſe in that your meaning were, that *fire* was not in all Countries appointed to burne Diſſenters from you, *i.e.* not in thoſe Countries, where you had not the power. And that wil be but a ſlender obligation from you, if it be acknowledged.

Ib. C. If you could make that appeare we were ſatisfied.

Anſw.

Answ. It is made appeare as much, as your like Assertion of your selves, *i. e.* by our affirming it. But if you will have patience to read on in that place, you shall see the point stated, and as much of it proved, as we have need to assert in this matter.

Ib. D. *In some places we doe* (make use of the Argument from Mutuall Dissentions) *but in this it is brought against us.*

Answ. This is clearly false, for in the 40. Sect. his *Lordship* there mentions it as an Argument of yours, and in that place becomes Respondent, gives an Answer to that Argument, and that is the ground of the present debate.

Ib. E. *Our Criterion or rule of Faith keeps off dissentions when it is followed, yours does not. Lutherans and Calvinists follow the same rule, and yet dissent and condemne one another, ours doe not so, but remit the differences to be decided to one and the same judge both exterior, and interior.*

Answ. I was a proving by the antient *Catalogues of Hereticks*, that there were good store of *Hereticks* in the world before the *Reformation*, (from which it followes that either your *infallible* Judge was not then in fashion, or else that it is not such a soveraigne meanes or antidote against *Hereticks*) you seem to distinguish that your rule keeps off *dissentions*, not alwaies, but when it is followed, and prove that farther, because you remit the differences to be decided to one and the same Judge. I might answer, that our rule, the word of God doth so too, at least in matters of *faith*, and that any such dissention, at least uncharitable censuring of Dissenters, is absolutely against that rule. But I conceive that is not the thing that commends a rule as a means to prevent dissentions, that they that follow it dissent not, (for the rule if it be but one rule, what ever it is, will doe that) but that it is able & apt to keep men obedient, and to restrain them from excesses & not following of it. Now this is an excellence that these many Catalogues of *Heresies* proved, that you had no right to pretend to, and if we have not so neither, we are but Partners in this piece of humane infelicity, to which, as long as we carry flesh about us,

it

it will be incident, for there *must be Hereſies among you.* As for your inſtance of the *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts* diſſentions, and condemning one the other, I muſt tell you that this little concernes the *Church* of *England*, which alwayes diſclaimed the being called by the names, or owning the diſſentions of *Lutheran* and *Calviniſt*, and profeſſeth only the maintaining of the *Primitive Catholike faith*, and to have no father on earth, to impute their faith to. I might adde more even for thoſe *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts*, that if they did really follow (I ſay not only profeſſe, but follow) the ſame rule, they would certainly agree alſo.

Ibid. F. *I doe not excuſe all* (the Jeſuits from the doctrine of reſiſting Magiſtrats under colour of Religion, killing Kings, oppoſing the Order of Biſhops &c.) *nor ought you to have accuſed all; For neither all the Jeſuites, nor neare all be of that mind, but of the quite contrary.* Bellarmine, Valentia, Petavius, *and other Jeſuits have written for the Order of Biſhops againſt* Salmaſius *and others, but none at all have written againſt it. Neither was the controverſie between the Seculars about that point, as it is moſt evident.*

Anſw. I have already obeyed your commands; and indeed had no neceſſity to accuſe all of that Order in all places. It was ſufficient to prove the point in hand, (*diſſentions* among your ſelves) that any conſiderable number were of thoſe opinions, which are the worſt that are to be found among our *Sectaries*. And it ſeems you cannot in your owne heart excuſe all, as kinde as you are to them. If others in a matter of ſuch moment are of a contrary mind, this is an argument not againſt, but for the truth of what is laid to you, diſſentions after all your *infallible* judgements. For the *Jeſuites* opinion of *Biſhops* I appeale no farther then the diſputations in the Councell of *Trent*, and the generall pretenſions of that Order to an Independency, and abſoluteneſſe from any but their owne ſuperiour, and the *Pope*, and this, though it allow *Biſhops* over other men, yet is ſufficiently contrary to the *Apoſtolick inſtitution*, and *practice* of having all the *Churches* and *Presbyters* in them, ſubjected to them. You adde, that the controverſie of the *Seculars* (I ſuppoſe you mean

and

and *Regulars*) was not about that point, *i.e.* of *Episcopacy*, I did not say it was, any farther then thus, as the necessity of *Confirmation* is all one with the necessity of *Episcopacy*, (which truely to me seemes to be very neare it, and I am sure the businesse was whether the *Catholicks* in *England* should have an *Ordinary* here resident or no, and that *Ordinary* was a *Bishop*; so that though it was not of *Episcopacy*, *in universum*, yet it came to a debate, whether the having *Bishops* was necessary, or no) On which soever it is, it is enough to prove *dissentions*.

C.26. Answ. to C.26. A. At least they might have been discerned, as well as other errours were, and the Authors of them also.

Answ. This note being reduced to intelligible sence, will I conceive be, that the now *Romish* errours might have been discerned, &c. To which I answer, that though they might, yet First, 'tis possible that they might not; Secondly, very possible that being favoured, if not brought in by those in authority among them, they would not be branded or recorded for errours, and then all that we their posterity can see, may be onely, that the *tares* are sowne, but not punctually at what point of the night, or who the man was that sowed them.

Ibid. B. *No more for these then for other errours.*

Answ. His *Lordship* had occasion onely to speake of these, but will say the like of all others whose *originall* is not discernible.

Ibid. C. *In all ages errours were censured and condemned.*

Answ. All kinde of errours were not thought to be of such weight, as that such heavy *censures* and *condemnations* which you lay on us, should be fastened on them. And therefore in case ours be not *errours*, or but *in materia non gravi*, in disputable parts, (as if you please to descend to particulars, we will undertake to prove them) those severe *censures* of yours, being more contrary to charity, may prove more dangerous to you, then we shall otherwise affirme your *opinions* to be.

Ibid. D. *I judge one of these two by the event, and the other by the semblance of his making a search in manner as he ought.*

Answ. This is a darke speech which I doe not clearly understand: if the meaning be, that you judge the ill *successe of his Lordships searches by the event*, and the *fault* of them by the *semblance*, *&c.* I must then tell you, that the first is a very ill grounded judgement, for no event hath proved the ilnesse of that successe, (unlesse like those in the *Gospel*, you count them the *greatest Sinners on whom the Tower of* Siloah *fell*; or like him of late, that being willing to passe his opinion on a learned mans choice of a side in the differences in the *Low Countries*, said onely this, *Illud notum est, partes quas secutus non est prævaluisse; si quis infelicitati hoc tribuat, ego prudentiam non probo minus felicem*; and *Busbequius* tels us somewhat like of the Turkes judgments of good and bad enterprizes) but rather on your owne principles I have already proved, that they must be *good* in the *successe*, which were so happy in proposing.

But then what you meane by the *semblance* of *his making a search in manner as he ought*, by which you judge the *fault* in his *searches*; I must confesse I doe not at all understand, and therefore must be faine to confesse my selfe overcome and mastered, though not by the reason, yet by the obscurity of your writing; and if that be a victory, I wish you much good of it.

To the Conclusion. A. *I here contend no more, but that our Church may be infallible, notwithstanding any thing the Enquirer hath objected. That she is so, hath in due place been proved by others.*

Answ. If you had performed the former, I meane satisfied all his *Lordships arguments*, I should not require at this time the latter from you, *i.e.* proving your *Church* to be *Infallible*. I must then onely aske you in earnest, whether you doe believe that no one of his *Lordships* arguments against your *Infallibility* (for any one will serve our turne) remaines unanswered by your *Apology*; and then whether all that I have said to vindicate his *Lordship*,

ſhip, be effectually anſwered in your marginall Notes, and whether you can juſtifie all them againſt his laſt *Reply*. If you are of this opinion in each, I am to crave your pardon for this ſo gainleſſe trouble, but referre the matter to *God* and *impartiall* men to judge between us.

Ibid. B. *If you would doe it, we then would thinke it more than poſſible.*

Anſw. The meaning of this annotation if it be ſence, muſt be this, that if we Proteſtants could or would finde place in you for Scripture and Reaſon to make *impreſſion*, you Papiſts would then thinke it more then poſſible you might be deceived. Which if it be the meaning, I muſt then onely reply by prayer, that God would ſo ſoften your hearts, that they might be capable of that *impreſſion*. But if the words be indeed no ſence, but yet miſtaken for ſome other words, which would be ſence, then the likelieſt thing that I can imagine, is, that you would have ſaid ſomewhat to this purpoſe. [*If you Proteſtants could by Scripture or Reaſon diſprove our Doctrines, we then would thinke it more than poſſible for us to be deceived*] Which though it were no huge Conceſſion, yet I ſhould be glad to have it from you, for then in effect your grounding of Faith on your *Infallibility* would be laid aſide, and then there would be no more truth in any individuall Doctrine of your *Church*, than *Scripture* or Reaſon would inferre, abſtracted from the *Authority* of your *Church*, which is all that at this time we demand from you.

And in that we are a little importunate (ſeeing we have you now in a ſeeming good humour:) Firſt, becauſe there is ſo much danger in inſiſting on that priviledge of *Infallibility*, even in any particular, wherein men are in the right, becauſe he that really doth *ſtand*, yet may (and therefore ought to *take heed leſt he*) *fall*, but moſt eminently, when a man chances to be in the wrong. He that miſtakes firſt in a piece of Divinity, and after in a perſwaſion that he cannot *miſtake*, ſealeth up that errour, obſtructs all entrance, all approach, all poſſibility of *Reformation*, is fortified impregnable againſt all aſſaults either of

reaſon, or even the ſpirit of truth; and by that one errour hath a kind of propriety in all other that can by the ſame hand be repreſented to him. Secondly, becauſe we cannot but obſerve the prudence of your *fellow-Champions*, Maſter *Knot* &c. now of late, who have choſen to vary the method from inſiſting on the ſeverall points of difference betwixt us, and them (proving themſelves to be the onely true *Church* from the particular truths profeſt by them, and by no others) to this other more commodious way of putting off all together by whole-ſale, of concluding the truth of all their aſſertions from the unerrableneſſe of the Aſſerter, manifeſting that they are in the *right*, becauſe 'tis impoſſible they ſhould be in the *wrong*, uſing all skill to perſwade this one point, and then confident on good grounds, that no other can be reſiſted. Theſe two things put together, will advertiſe you, how ſeaſonable an admonition it is to you, that you will beſtow a little paines on your Brethren, to perſwade them they are *mortall* or *fallible*; and then againe Reaſon and Scripture may finde reception, and be agreed on the umpire betwixt us and we ſhall promiſe ſincerely, that whatever that ſhall, *ſententiâ latâ*, award to you, we will moſt gladly yeild, and never breake with you, till you breake from that umpirage.

Ibid. C. *The words are applicable againſt our belief of Chriſtianity, as well as againſt our belief of our Churches doctrine.*

Anſw. The words are applied by me onely againſt your *infallibility*, and if that be as *infallible* as *Chriſtianity* it ſelf, I beſeech you either ſhew as plaine teſtimonies from the conſent of all Ages, that the *Church* of *Rome* is *infallible*, as there are for the *Canon* of the *Scripture*, or as plaine places out of the *Scripture* for it, as we can for the ſeverall parts of *Chriſtianity*, and then I will give you leave ſo to apply the words; In the meane, you may ſpare your labour of *applying* my words, or elſe prove demonſtratively that they are ſo *applicable*.

Ibid. D. *A poſſibility perhaps of more errours, but a probability of fewer, for if ſhe were fallible, yet ſhe would not be fallible, as a private man; ſo that with theſe fewer errours we ſhould have*

have quiet and unity, you with more errours ſhould have diſturbances and diſſentions.

Anſw. In this place, whereto your Annotation was affixt, the diſcourſe was upon a ſuppoſition, that your *Infallibility* were an *errour*, (which I in that caſe affirm'd, would be the moſt *dangerous*, becauſe moſt *prolificall* complicated errour imaginable) and will you ſay that upon that *ſuppoſition*, there would be a *probability of fewer errours*? Will the thinking I cannot fall make me ſtand the longer? is there no advantage to be made of *care*, and *caution*, and *feare*? or is there a diſadvantage in them? This is brave *fiduciary doctrine*, I muſt thinke *infallibly* I ſhall be ſaved, and that I cannot fall away, and the thinking that, will make it more probable that I ſhall be *ſaved*, and ſhall *not fall*. I confeſſe I had thought that *humility* were a readier way both to truth and Heaven, then either of theſe *preſumptions*. What you meane by adding (by way of proofe of that ſaying) that if your *Church* were *fallible*, ſhe would not be *fallible* as a private man, I confeſſe I cannot gueſſe. If ſhe would not, I conceive, this would be but little advantage on her ſide, for her *fallibility* would be a greater ſnare and ſcandall, and more apt to draw into errour thoſe that conceived her *infallible*, than any private mans *fallibility* would doe. For that which you adde of *quiet* and *unity*, if it were ſuppoſed to be joyn'd with fewer errours, I grant it would be an advantage, but at a time, when that *infallibility* was ſuppoſed to be one errour, and that prov'd moſt apt to produce a multitude; ſurely this ought not to have been ſuppoſed, any more, than that we ſhould have more errours ſtill, though 'twere not at the ſame time ſuppoſed that we have.

Ibid. E. *It was never put into more hands than two, but what thoſe hands might doe, I know not; and to thoſe on purpoſe to make triall what exceptions might be made againſt it, that ſo upon a review, I might know better what to alter in it, what to adde, and what to take away.*

Anſw. I conceive one man hath two hands, and therefore 'tis poſſible you may meane, it was never communicated to above

one man. If you doe, 'tis certainly falſe; But if you meane two men by two hands, you acknowledged what I ſaid, for I ſaid no more. As for your affirmation that 't was put into thoſe hands only for *triall,&c.* This cannot be ſaid of one of them, for to him it was delivered by one of your friends, as an *unanſwerable piece*, but yet if it were, as you pretend, that you might know *better what to alter in it*; I am then glad I have given you occaſion to doe ſo, but muſt tell you, that now you have altered it, and delivered it from ſome infirmities, which appear'd to be in it, there be yet enough behind, to be reformed by any body elſe, and when that is done, there will remaine ſomewhat elſe perhaps, but I am ſure no anſwer to my *Lord of Falkland.*

Ibid. F. *Sir, your noble courteſie is gratefully acknowledged, and I deſire with all due reſpects and ſervices to correſpond.*

Anſw. This I conceive to be a *civility*, and I ſhall never go about to confute that, or anſwer it, but by the returne of the like, and my prayers alſo, that *the Lord give you a right judgement in all things.*

HEre it ſeemes was once an end of thoſe annotations, and it had been for the readers eaſe and mine, that you had continued in that minde. But upon better thoughts, either that which had beene here noted, was thought not quite ſufficient, or elſe, ex abundanti, this ſuperfœtation is beſtowed on us. The cloſing ſheet which I mentioned in the Preface, and promiſed to annex alſo. Which here in juſtice to the Apologiſt, I ſhall give you, though I conceive I had beene as kind to him, if I had forgotten it.

This

THis ſmall treatiſe *Apologeticall is no finiſht worke, but only a* Sect. 1.
firſt draught or inchoation, and was ventured abroad to explore the judgements or cenſures of one or two intelligent Adverſaries, that ſo the Author by his ſecond thoughts might be the better able to underſtand what was to be altered in it, what added, and what taken away, either as ſuperfluous or offenſive, and till that act was done, and withall an approbation and licence given by thoſe to whom it belonged, neither the worke, nor any line of it is to be acknowledged, or vouched by the Author.

The drift is not to prove the Church which we call Catholique, and Sect. 2.
the Enquirer cals Roman, to be infallible, but to defend it againſt the Enquirers arguments ; for he Sect. 28. *undertakes* to give reaſons why the Church of *Rome* is fallible. *So that our drift is to make it good that this ſame Church may ſtill be infallible, notwithſtanding any thing that he hath ſaid unto the contrary.*

The pillars that ſupport all his diſcourſe be 1. *Sect.* videl. *that* Sect. 3.
with us both Reaſon, Scripture, and Antiquity, be fallible ; his proofe of this aſſertion is a ſuppoſed maxime of ours, namely, that nothing is infallible but the Church. The aſſertion is firſt denyed, and afterward the proofe, and againſt theſe denialls no reply can be made, becauſe we know beſt our owne inward acts and judgements, and no man is able to tell us what we thinke, but we muſt tell them.

Theſe three pillars of fallibility being broken and relinquiſht as de- Sect. 4.
ſperate, you are pleaſed to come with new ones in their places.

Reaſon, ſay you, cannot prove the infallibility of your Church, be- Sect. 5.
cauſe it is not an evident verity ; Scripture cannot, becauſe not certainly expounded to that probation ; Fathers doe not, becauſe it was not a doctrine held in their time.

It ſeems then, that the cauſe why none of theſe three can prove our Sect. 6.
Churches infallibility, is not any want of infallibility in them, as the Enquirer contended it was, but ſome other different ; ſuch, namely, as you here aſſigne ; and ſo the Enquirers argument is at an end, even at the very beginning of it, and my taske is done, yet, in my reſpects, to you, I will goe on farther.

To

Sect. 7. *To your first, I answer, that though reason cannot it selfe alone prove our Churches infallibility, yet, as you acutely note, Sect. 3. reason can assure us, by shewing us some words of propheeie, or revelation from God, with sufficient evidence that it is a revelation, and thus reason can prove a verity be it never so inevident. After this manner it is that we say reason proves our Church, against which proof the inevidence of it, as we see, can be no impediment.*

Sect. 8. *To your second, I answer, by denying that scripture hath not beene so certainly expounded to that purpose, for we say it hath been shewed by our authors at large, as for example, by* Bellarmine, Valentia, Petavius, Veron *and others.*

Sect. 9. *To your 3. I answer, first, that* 1. Irenæus, 2. Augustinus, 3. Lactantius, *and* 4. Facundus Hermanensis *doe absolutely teach the Church to be infallible. Secondly, I deny that the Fathers teach not the Romane Church to be the true Church and contrary to your tenet, I affirme that they hold that Church to be the true Christian Church, as the forenamed authors have declared out of them, as also Card.* Perone *and* Coeffeteau *have excellently shewed. Also I my selfe have endeavoured it elsewhere out of the severall Testimonies of Antiquity not to be in this place repeated.*

1. L. 5. c. 20. l. 3. c. 4. 2. L. 2. adverſ. Creſcon. c. 33. item ep. 118. item l. de unitate Eccleſ. c. 22. 3. l. 4. c. 30. 4. L. 12.

Sect. 10. *The businesse touching the motives of Faith which I, with* Irenæus, *called* Ostensions, *their place, use and efficacity needs only explanation, and ought to be admitted by every Christian, and therefore, begging your patience, I will tarry longer upon it.*

Sect. 11. *We doe not goe about to prove our Church to be the true, therefore because she holdeth with the truth, but because we conceive we have good solid reasons to perswade us that she hath the truth. These reasons have been often rendred by our Authors, to whom if the Inquirer had replyed, we also had endeavoured to defend them. Concordance with the Scriptures and fathers we doe marshall amongst them, not in the first place indeed in order of Doctrine, but yet in the first in order of dignity. Neither doe we aime to prove our Church by the gallantry of Demonstration, or any other way then Christianity, sooner or later, is to be perswaded unto Infidels; for we are now dealing, not about a parcell, but the whole frame of Christianity, from the top to the foundation, and the laying of the first stone; which first stone we hold to be those actes of God which* Psal. 104. 27. *are called* verba signorum, *and fitly may be tearmed* signa realia, *that is to say,*

signes

ſings and oſtenſions, which be the acts of Gods omnipotence and ſoveraigne Government, and, by a moſt all certainty and rationall way are ſhewed for humane inſtitution and inſtruction. This ſort of ſignes is, by order of nature, to have the precedence before all artificiall ſignes, or vocall expreſſions of the divine will, and therefore as Raymund Sebund *obſerveth,* liber factorum *is to be peruſed before* liber dictorum; *By theſe ſignes, as by the* apparentiæ, *or* φαινόμενα, *in Aſtronomy, we are to get the firſt notions of theſe celeſtiall revolutions, or reſolutions of faith; and though theſe be ſure, yet are they not demonſtrative, becauſe no way intrinſecall, neither to the revelations which they aſſure, nor to the objects revealed, which are aſſured by the revelations, as being no cauſes, nor effects of either, nor ſignes inherent of thoſe objects.*

Sect. 12.

Seeing then, the true Catholique Religion is but the true Chriſtianity, they both of them are to be learned by the ſame Apparences, *or* Oſtenſions, *more or leſſe expreſly underſtood. Now, while we draw nearer unto theſe ſignes, and learne them more and more expreſly, amongſt other things we may diſcover as good characteriſmes and ſignatures of revealed truth, the Concordance of our Faith with holy Writ and venerable Antiquity, which two ſignes, without the preceding could have little force to perſwade beliefe. For, ſay I were to convert an Indian, I would not ſeeke to doe it by telling him firſt of all of theſe two Concordances mentioned, which 'tis like would move him but a little, for, though I could ſhew him the Bible was antient and Godly, and the Fathers wiſe, yet this would not be enough to perſwade him, and therefore I ſhould hold it fit, Firſt to repreſent unto him, ſome other motives, as namely, Propheticall predictions authorized by event, miracles and miraculous operations and effects, creditably recorded from age to age, both in the Evangeliſts and other ſequent Hiſtories, of whoſe faith a man rationally cannot doubt, at leaſt in the ſumme of them, or the chiefe bulke. I ſpeake not here of fabulous Narrations, or ſuſpected Hiſtories, but Authours of credit and eſteeme; Secondly, the excellency of our Faith it ſelfe, and manner of propagation of it. Thirdly, the perfection of life and heroicke actions of ſuch as doe profeſſe it, and all this after a manner not interrupted, but continued from age to age, and conveyed downe to us by the prime Eccleſiaſticall ſucceſſion, not of*

Et eſt pleniſſima hæc oſtenſio unam & eandem viviſicatricem fidem, &c. *Irenæus l. 3. c. 3.*

persons onely, but of Pastours in the chiefe seate, and other inferiour, prized so highly by Irenæus, and held a most sure note of truth, and a way to confound all that doe gainsay it. Lastly, a consonance with Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity. These and such like be our σημείωσις, these our Ostensions; these be the received notices and signatures of revealed truth; by these God invites us and induces us to believe; and by these, engages his owne veracity to warrant the act of our assent, it being repugnant to the high perfection of his truth, to lay upon man a rationall obligation, and then desert him, and to permit that the publique acts of his providence should be a snare, not a direction, not an introduction to truth, but a seduction from it. Though therefore these motives make our faith but credible in an eminent and a high degree, yet the veracity of God is at hand to supply, seale and confirme all, and with the authority thereof, to make the assurance absolute. This method of resolving and reducing faith, was signified by Irenæus, when as he said, Post tot Ostensiones factas non oportet adhuc quærere apud alios veritatem quam facile est ab Ecclesia sumere. This way designed by Saint Augustin, this is conformable to the Analytique principles delivered by Aristotle in his Organon; this the beaten path of all Divines, and no new invention or exotique stuffe.

Iren. l. 3. c. 4. Augustin, ad Honorátum Manichæum.

This method we are ready to maintaine as strong and solid, not permitting the believer to sit downe with a slender Socinian certainty liable to deceit, not enclosing him in any maze, circle, or semicircle, not enforcing him into endlesse and wearisome regresses, neither producing evidence, nor destroying liberty, but by these motives fortified with the divine veracity, leading him assuredly to the Church, and by the Church to the entire and determinate Canon of holy Scripture; and so at length by both these joyned together, to the full discovery and distinct knowledge of the doctrines of our faith, after the manner following.

Sect. 13. These motives or ostensions being once considered, we are forthwith to observe to what body of Christian professours they belong, and in what line of succession of Ecclesiasticall Magistrates they descend unto us, and in the passages of antiquity, diligently to note which ship it is which in the Christian fleet was counted the Prætorian, or Admirall, with which all the rest were to joyne company, and by the

the separation from which, we are to judge which vessels be fugitive, or pyraticall, and which not; which assembly of Christians legitimate and approved, and by this association to be distinguished from the broken and dispersed troopes of Anti-Catholiques, and by the same the army of the living God in the Church militant, discerned from the straggling companies of divided and disagreeing Sectaries, how numerous soever they may seeme, when summed up all into one inconsistent body, or confused rout. This way and method we hold, which if it doe not satisfie any, let them set us downe a better, and not leave us without any; but let them take heed, that while with the Enquirer, we receive and admit the fallibility of the Church of Rome, *or of any other determinate Church, and of one denomination we fall not, with Master* Chillingworth, *to the fallibility of the Christian faith, and so presently to Infidelity. It is easie to impugne the Organon of faith, or Doctrinall principles, but not easie to compose it, easie to pull downe, but not to build. The Enquirers judgement uttered to me, was, that* Baron, *when he writ against us, was lusty and strong, but when he spake any thing for himselfe, he was weake and languishing; and I believe this is the Enquirers owne case, and that he was able to say more against an infallibility then for it. In the one he hath shewed his strength, in the other not.*

Now a word or two about lawes, and I have done. In which point I observe it as an uncontroverted doctrine, that unjust lawes, properly speaking, are not lawes; first because Lex *is the* dictamen rectæ rationis practicæ in eo qui potestatem habet; *but an unjust law, is neither* dictamen rectæ rationis practicæ, *nor* potestatem habentis, *for no man is prescribed to doe wrong by reason, nor hath God the chiefe Legislatour given power to make them.* Durandus *concurres* in terminis in Opusculo de legibus, *saying,* Injusta leges magis sunt violentiæ quam leges, nam secundum quod dicit Augustinus, l. de libero arbitrio, Lex esse non videtur quæ justa non fuerit. Et tales non obligant quantum ad Deum. *So* Durandus. *To him* Suarius *subscribeth*, l. 3. de legib. c. 19. n. 11. Lex injusta non est lex, præsertim quando ex parte materiæ est injusta, quia rem iniquam præcipit; tum enim ad acceptandum eam non obligat, verum etiam, neque si sit acceptata. Sect. 14.

tata, *And presently after, giving a reason hereof, he addeth,* Quia excedit potestatem legislatoris.

Secondly, so much veneration is due to lawes, though never so unjust, that they are nevertheleſſe in conſcience to be obeyed, unleſſe they ſhould be publiquely and knownely found contrary to a greater authority then that was by which they were enacted; that is to ſay, to the law of God, or Nature, Therefore they are not to be judged or cenſured by any private man.

Thirdly, being diſcovered to be unjuſt, they derogate nothing at all from the authority of the reſt, no more then the unjuſt lawes of ſome Emperours did from the body of the law Imperiall. For though all of them were made by the ſame Authors, yet not by the ſame authority; becauſe for the making of one ſort, there was good authority derived from God; but, for the making of the other, there was none at all, but ſuch as could not make it.

Fourthly, in caſe of ſuch lawes, no man is to take armes, or make reſiſtance, but contrariwiſe, to ſuffer with humble patience, remitting the righting of his cauſe onely to God, per quem Reges regnant & legum conditores juſta decernunt. *And thus, Sir, I reſt your humble ſervant.*

Sect. 15. *The holy Scripture hath a threefold influence into faith. 1. Diſpoſitive, as one of the motives, or inducements. 2. Negative, as a property,* ſine qua non. *3. Poſitive, as a foundation or principle. The 1. as an ancient and godly booke. The 2. as a rule, without concordance to which faith could not be acknowledged; for every doctrine muſt be conſonant to its rule, whether that rule be true, or falſe, certaine, or uncertaine. The 3. as a ſetled principle, and a booke knowne to be Canonicall.*

To

TO all this I ſhall anſwer as briefly as I can.

Firſt, to the 1 *Sect.* That for the matter of fact which concernes this treatiſe, I have already averred thoſe truths, that will not permit any reaſonable man to believe that this was ſo indeed, [*a firſt draught, &c.*] for it was confeſt by him, *Chap.* 1. to be a ſecond draught. Secondly, it was not ſent out *onely to explore, &c.* for it was, * ſaith he, delivered but to two adverſaries, and to one of them (as I ſaid before) it was delivered as *unanſwerable*. Thirdly, if there were any ſuch deſigne of *exploring* and *mending, &c.* I muſt conceive that that work is now done; for when it was ſent home to me againe with theſe notes, many places which I had charged, were altered or taken away, and for *additions*, ſure ſuch were the marginall notes, and this appendage. Fourthly, For the *licenſe* I can ſay nothing, (but that I conceive it might as eaſily be gotten, as to what you have already made publique, if you had a minde to it) nor indeed force you to acknowledge or vouch any line of this booke, but onely tell you, that thoſe words in your firſt Chapter of complaint, [*That there was no notice given of licenſe for it be publiſhed, and have the advantage to be diſperſed abroad in many copies*] and that [*for want of the Printers helpe it ſhall lie concealed, and in much reſtraint, yea and be in danger to periſh*] ſeemed to me to ſignifie your willingneſſe then to make it publique; and if you have ſince retracted that deſigne, I hope ſo weake an anſwer, as ſome of your friends boaſt this to be, did not diſcourage you. I ſhall rather thinke it was modeſty, or elſe deſigne, that you choſe rather to have diſclaimed, then commended your owne, and thought it would appear more glorious for you to have it extorted from you, or (if it ſhould prove leſſe ſplendid) yet more tolerable, to have beene raviſht from you then proſtituted.

* In Concluſ.

To the ſecond *Sect.* I anſwer, that you had ſaid that before in *annot.* to the *counſ.* A. And the anſwer there belongs to this *Sect.* and if you had made good what you ſay was your drift, you ſhould be pronounced conquerour.

To the third *Sect.* You have taken a good courſe to defend

infallibility, by setting up for it your selfe, and affirming that no reply can be made to you in that matter, because it depends onely upon your judgement, which none can know but whom you tell it; But, good Sir, your Authors do tell us, that there is nothing *infallible* but the *Church*, and when they have done so, we may know your *outward* acts, for such are your writings, though your *inward* we pretend not to pry into.

To *Sect.* 4. I answer, that one argument of his *Lordships*, taken from your affirmed *fallibility* of *Reason*, *Scripture*, and *Antiquity*, is most prodigiously by you call'd *three pillars*. And how *Sampson-like* you have broken them downe, the Reader must judge; if you are so confident, I have here expresst my selfe your servant, by helping you to a publique tryall.

To *Sect.* 5. I acknowledge that from your owne confession I make those three arguments, that neither *Reason*, *Scripture*, nor *Antiquity*, can *infallibly* prove your Church to be infallible. And

To the *Sect.* 6. I say that the want of *infallibility* in those three mentioned *Sect.* 6. and by you confest, is sufficient to prove his *Lordships* conclusion that they cannot *infallibly* prove your *infallibility*, and this is the same that was meant by his *Lordship*, though more explicated by me, and brought home against you by way of retortion, and Argument *ad hominem*, upon your own confession. And so your ἀπίνιον was sung much too early, and you must to your taske again, if you will make an end of it.

To *Sect.* 7. I answer, that if you had shewed the revelation, on which reason inferres your infallibility, your section had stood good, but the totall want of that is your maine impediment.

To *Sect.* 8. Be you also pleased to produce your consent of *Antiquity* certainly expounding *Scripture* to inferre your *infallibility*; and that shall be yielded you also, but I conceive those writers of yours have not done it, and whensoever you please, I shall be ready to examine their testimonies with you.

To *Sect.* 9. I answer. That we have allowed a sence, wherein the *Church universall* may be stiled *infallible*, and that to save my selfe the paines of examining your testimonies (though some without examining I know to be ill cited) I shall grant it in that sence to be so; But then to your second proposition, (be

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it either [*I deny that they teach not*] or [*I affirme that it holds*] it matters little) *that the Roman Church is the true Church*, I answ. That if there be emphasis in the particle [*the*] in the predicate, so that it signifie the [*Catholick*] *Church* in the former proposition, 'tis then absolutely false, that the Fathers say any such thing. And you are prudent to cite none to that ridiculous purpose. But if you meane, that the *Roman Church* is a *true Church*, (so you doe not meane that all it saith is true) as we grant that, so we challenge you to prove, that ever the *ancient Church* thought any such *particular Church* of one denomination to be *infallible*, When you please to produce your testimonies, you shall receive answer to them.

To *Sect.* 10. Concerning the motives of *Faith*, You might have spared that paines, it being not at all concluded by you here or before, that that *infallibility* is built on the same grounds with *Christianity*.

To *Sect.* 11. If you had never such solid reasons to perswade you; that your *Church* had the truth (as I should not need to deny, were it not for your denying the *cup* to the *Laity* against Scripture, and your keeping the *Scripture* in an *unknowne tongue*, and some other such defects *in faciendis*, but rather charge you that you have more then the truth, *viz.* many errours mixt with the truth) this would prove but a very weake probation, that your *Church* is [the *true Church*] in the exclusive notion, *i. e.* that no other is the *Church*, but that: for *having the truth*, doth not signifie a *Monopoly*, or incloſure of it, or that no body else can have it; And if by [the *true Church*] you meane no more, but a true part, you know we doe not question it, nor affirme that your errors though many, have turn'd you *in non Ecclesiam*, *into a no Church*. As for your Concordance with the Fathers which you say you have, I answere, that in those things wherein you and we consent, we shall not be unwilling to grant it to you (but yet must remember you, that you would not allow that to be a proofe of your being *infallible*) but in those other which we call errors in you, we challenge you to produce an *universall Concordance*. You goe on; that you prove your Church by no other way then *Christianity* is perswaded unto *Infidels*. I hope your meaning is, that you

you prove your Church to be a *true Church*, and that shall be granted you without your proofe: but that it is the *only true* one, or the *infallible* one, I hope you have not *miracles* for that, (if you have, you have trifled away a great deale of time in not telling us of them) nor *revelation* from Heaven, nor universall *tradition* to assure you, (what you affirme so confidently) that the *Infallibility of your Church is the whole frame of Christianity*. And therefore what you learnedly adde about the *verba signorum*, or *signa realia*, *signes* and *ostensions*, *&c.* by which you go about to prove *Christianity*, I must professe to edifie me but little in point of the *infallibility* of your *Church*, because that is so distant a thing from it.

To *Sect.* 12. Your affirmation, that the true *Catholique Religion* is the true *Christianity*, (if that be the onely thing you aime at) shall be willingly granted you, all the question will be, whether all your doctrines, *that of denying the cup to the Laity &c.* be that *Catholique Religion*. And sure to him that questions that, all the *characterismes*, &c. all your *Prophetical predidictions* will give but little satisfaction, and no more will the *excellency of Faith*, *perfection of heroick actions of professors*, nor the *conveyance from age to age*, by the *Prime Ecclesiasticall succession of Pastors in the See of Rome*, because that of the *sub unicâ specie*, *&c.* which we quarrell at in you, might as well be pretended to have testimonies out of the present Articles of our *Church*, as out of these. If there be any of these evidences, or moreover of *Reason*, *Scripture*, *Antiquity*, on your side, for such controverted particulars, I beseech you let them be produced, or else you may be *Christians*, but yet corrupt in these particulars, your being a true Church will not pronounce you *infallible*, your *Church of Rome Primitive* may have the truth, and your *Moderne Rome* be filled with errors. And therefore you may spare the paines of proving (what we have no occasion at this time to deny) that God engages *his veracity to make good those things*, *for which he gives us such rationall meanes of proofe to induce our assent*, For what ever else is, your *infallibility*, or your other errours, for which we charge you, are none of these things. And if you mark it, that which (according to your discourse) gives us such assurance of the truth

of

of *Christianity*, is the *ostensive*, *miracles*, publick acts of *Gods providence*, not the *Infallibility* naturally inherent either in your *Church*, or in any particular society of men, nor the promise of God that any such society shall be *infallible*, and *visible* to all that it is that *infallible*. As for that which you covertly cast into the heape of the motives of *Faith*, [*thus 'twas continued from age to age in the succession of Pastors in the chiefe seat*] that is no more a ground of the truth of *Christianity*, then its *succession* in all other seats, as I conceive you have your selfe let fall also. The truth is the Preaching the Gospel over all the world, and the reception in so great a part of it, is an argument of the truth of *Christianity* (among many others) because it is the fulfilling of a Prophecy of their *sounds going out into all Lands*, But this is farre from concluding the peculiar priviledge of *infallibility* of those, who are under the *Roman subjection*. By which 'tis cleare, that what you cite out of *Irenæus*, and Saint *Aug.* comes home no better to your point of *infallibility*, then *Aristotles Analytick principles*, which in the same place (and elsewhere) you cite also. And therefore if all you say in that long Section were yeelded, (concerning the motives to *Christianity*, and your way by *bringing to the Church*, &c.) yet would you be as farre to seek as ever, concerning your pretended *infallibility*.

To your 13. *Sect.* which is neerer indeed to your purpose, I answere, that being by your meanes brought to *Christianity*, there is no need that I should find out any particular body of professors (or *Church* of one *denomination*) to which those motives to *Christianity* should so belong, as to belong to no other but that; This sure I may better say without proofe, then you have affirmed the contrary, For doe you thinke it reasonable, that *Christianity* being planted all the world over, each man that is converted to it, must finde out the *Roman Bishop*, and those that are in *subjection* to him, or not be accounted a *Christian*? If he be borne at *Jerusalem*, or converted there, will it not serve his turne to communicate with that Church, which hath given him *Baptisme*? Was there any thing in his *Creed* could send him thither, till the *holy Catholick Roman Church* was (by mockery I conceive) put in thither? As for the line of *succession* of *Eccle-*

ſiaſticall Magiſtrates, you muſt know, that is to be found in other *Chriſtian Churches*, as well as in *Rome*, and the *Scriptures* and *Apoſtolicall* verities deſcend downe to us in them alſo. And what if in ſome paſſages of *Antiquity* the *Sea of Rome* ſhould be found to be the *Prætorian* or *Admirall*, in your ſtile, *i. e.* the prime or principall Sea, would this prove her *infallible*, the *Prætorian* may ſpring a leake, as well as any other, and in caſe it ſhould, I doe not conceive, that all other Ships of that fleet, were bound to doe ſo too, or elſe be counted *fugitive*, becauſe they are unwilling to run that unhappy fate of ſinne, or errour with her. Sure if the *Prætorian* ſhould caſually, or wilfully ſplit upon a Rock, you would not cenſure all others for *Pyraticall*, that did not ſo too. The reaſons are viſible, why that Sea of *Rome* had the *Primacy* at ſome time (and at other times other Seas put in their plea for it, and if they obtained not, yet was that an argument that it was never judged a matter of Faith, becauſe the Pretenders were not condemned for *Hæreticks*, even when it went not with them) *viz.* from the *Imperiall Seat* being placed in that City, with which the *Eccleſiaſticall* πρεσβεῖα, or πρωτεῖα, might proportionably goe along, juſt as your *Prætorian* is that ſhip, where the *Admirall* reſides, or which peculiarly belongs to him. But what is that to *infallibility*? That honour which comes by ſympathy with the Civill State, is not like to be ſuch a charme, or amulet, ſo to elevate above humane condition, that it muſt preſently ſet up for *perfection*. Let your Church have all its due and cuſtomary reſpects, but doe not ſo linke *inerrableneſſe* with *Principality*, unleſſe you can bring ſome ground from Scripture, for the union, and becauſe in all your *Apology*, *Annotations*, and *Appendage* you doe not ſo much as name any ſuch, I ſhall conceive you are too wiſe to claime by [*Tu es Petrus*] or any other ſo unconcluding an argument. Believe me, your preſcription for ſome kinde of *Principality* from the poſſeſſion of it continued to that Sea ſo many yeares, is a better plea than any other, and againſt that I am not now a diſputing, but onely adde that greatneſſe ſacular is no marke of *infallibility*. As for your rule of judging by the *Aſſociation with Rome*, which Aſſembly of Chriſtians is legitimate, which not, that that is an *infallible* way of judging

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is not at all proved by your magnificent *simile*. For first, the *fleet* may be broken asunder by some tempest, and so without any fault of any ship, be divided from the *Pretorian*. 2. The *Pretorian* may quarrell with all, or any of the rest, and by threats or bullets drive them from her, and then if the cause be not just, if it be for example upon no other crime, but that the other ships judge it necessary to cast out some vessels or trumpery which they are resolved to be either useless, or perhaps dangerous to the vessell and all the Passengers, or againe because the rest of the ships are resolved to obey the commission that sent out the whole Fleet, when the *Pretorian* was resolved to disobey it, in this and the like cases, 'tis cleare, that the *Pretorian* is the onely *Schismatick*; Or if it be just, yet the ships though confest guilty of that other crime, or crimes, which made that severity of the *Pretorian* just, will yet not be guilty of a new crime of *separation*: the reason is cleare, because she is forced to that, driven away, and now ever since lies under it unwillingly, 'tis her infelicity, not her crime; her punishment, not her fault. Or if there be a fault in that, *viz.* That she doth not humbly *confesse the fault*, and desire to be reconciled, yet sure it will not be infinitely true, that that is a fault, when either she was guilty before of no fault, but a pretended one, for which that punishment was inflicted (to which purpose the *Chancellour of Paris* will advise you) or when the condition of her being received againe is such, as cannot with any honesty be entertained, be it the undertaking any Treasonable act against the *King*, whose Admirall he is, which denominates that *Pretorian*, and who is supreame Master of the whole *fleet*, or be it, but swearing any thing to be true which is false, or subscribing to the belief, or practice of what we believe neither true nor practicable. And that this is the state of our *Church* in its separation from yours, I shall undertake to make good, whensoever you will yeild the point of *Infallibility*, or exchange it for the question of *Schisme*. You see I am not much edified by your way, and because you are not so importunate, that I should, but are modestly content that if I am not satisfied with it, I should set you downe a better, I shall humbly crave leave to doe it in very few words. The farre better

way, more *Christian*, because more *humble* and more *charitable*, (and beyond all, probably the most *peaceful* too) Is, to make the *Scripture*, as 'tis interpreted by the *antient Fathers*, the ground of our belief for all the *substantial*, *i. e.* plaine parts of *Faith*; to define as few of this nature, as the *Primitive Christians* may be discerned to have done, to command and require obedience, and assent to these from all our Inferiours under our authority, and to proceed to *Ecclesiasticall admonitions, in case of errour, to censures*, in case of *contumacy*, but to *blood*, never purely for *Religion*, nor too often for Religion *in ordine ad temporalia*; To tolerate with meeknesse, those that are contrary minded, in all things that are not either of the number of these few, very few *necessariò credenda*, or that have not a necessary connexion and immediate influence on practice, and good life; This as it is farre from either pretending to *infallibility*, or letting loose the reines to licentiousnesse, so is it the happiest, most lasting, durable temper of a *Church*, most agreeable to all those ends that Christ hath made most estimable to us in his *Gospel*, and so will be farre from that feare of yours, of betraying us to a deserting of the *Christian faith*, or falling to *Infidelity*; universall peace and charity and humility, being above all things most contrary to that. And so you see, 'tis not so unpracticable a difficulty to compose an *Organon* of *Faith* so farre, as to *preserve* it among *Christians*; And for the planting it among Infidels, that is not *hujus considerationis*, nor doe I much believe I shall have much reason to differ from any learned *Romanist* on that Subject, on condition he would agree with me in this. As for your judgement upon his *Lordship, that he was able to say more against an infallibility then for it, and that in the one he hath shewed his strength, in the other not*, I easily believe, and must thinke my selfe bound to confesse, because I have seen a Booke of his *against Infallibility*, but never any for it. If this must be thought a fault in him, I must be content to lie under your severest censure for the same crime also, and *sic habes confitentes reos*, patiently expecting what you will pronounce against us.

Sect. 14. You are resolved it seemes to have a word or two about *Lawes*, upon what temptation, or provocation from the precedent discourses, at least from the maine businesse in hand,

I cannot readily ſatisfie my Reader. The moſt I can gueſſe is, that in our meeting we fell into ſome diſcourſe and difference about the nature of *unjuſt Lawes*, whether they might be ſaid to be *Lawes*, or no. And perchance your charity led you now out of your rode to informe me in this matter; if 'twere onely ſo, I muſt acknowledge it an obligation, and ſhall thanke you for that, though I chance to diſſent from you.

And that matter I perceive will be ſoone ſtated; Thus; That Lawes, if (conſidered in reſpect of the matter of them) they be found to command me to doe ought, which by any ſuperiour law, 'tis unlawfull for me to doe, they are then unjuſt Lawes, be the *Legiſlatour* never ſo lawfully my *Magiſtrate*; and in this caſe 'tis true, that God hath not given him *power* to make them; meaning thereby ſuch a power, that he may make them without being *unjuſt*; but yet another power he hath given him, to wit, ſuch an one, as that, if he exerciſe it thus againſt God the Doners will, yet it ſhall not be lawfull for any man, or ſociety of men on earth, to call him to account, and puniſh him, to reſiſt violently, or reduce him *in ordinem*; Onely God that hath given him *poteſtatem in genere* (which is *libera ad utroſque actus*, power to make good or evill lawes, but withall reſtrained by a command from the law of *nature*, and *God*, and limited by that law onely to the lawfull exerciſe of it, or making the *good lawes*) is to receive an account of the *Talent* given him to trade with as his *Steward*, and to enquire whether he hath uſed it well or no. Thus much, unleſſe I am miſtaken, your diſcourſe gives me reaſon to thinke granted by you. And from thence I muſt conclude, that any ſuch *abuſe* of *power* in the *Law-giver*, though it be in him aberration from the rule in reſpect of God, yet ſtill is an act that hath ſome effect on the man which is borne, or lives under that law, though not to oblige him to doe what is commanded him, yet to oblige him to non-reſiſtance, and ſuffering patiently, if the *Law-giver* be ſo wicked to tyrannize over him. Which obligation to *paſſive*, though not *active* Obedience, is the reſult of a Law, if not properly ſo called in your notion of it, yet very lawfully and intelligibly ſo called, as I have interpreted it; And for the *propriety* or *impropriety* of the word, I ſhall not much contend with you, ſo the ſubſtance be agreed on; and yet 'twere eaſie enough to re-

pay you with the quotations of *Schoole-men* and *Casuists*, which make no scruple to use the word in my sence, and to answer the places you have produced, and shew that 'twas onely in that sence which we yeild that they did deny it. But enough of this.

For your 15 *Section*. What it signifies, or whether it would, I cannot I confesse divine; 'twas I conceive in you an excessive act of liberality, that you thonght might be for my turne; and, though I know not how at this time I shall reap profit by it, yet I cannot but accept your good intentions. And so being extreamly weary of a very thankleſſe taske, I bid you heartily farewell.

FINIS.